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Introduction
1

Introduction
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in studying whether and how
institutions and representation can influence political decision-making. The
study of different political institutions can be classified within the broader field
of “New Institutional Economics” that has emerged since the middle of the
20th century (see Voigt, 2011). The interest in the effects of representation on
policies partly originated from the perception that the simple Downsian median
voter approach (see Downs, 1957), which is often used in theoretical models
to describe outcomes of political processes, in many cases does not provide
a convincing approximation to real-world decision-making. This approach
circumvents the formulation of a detailed political model by simply assuming
that the median voter decides over policy, i.e., political representation, for
example through political ideology or the form of government, does not matter.
There is growing empirical evidence that this assumption is inappropriate. Most
prominently, Lee et al. (2004) have found that voters elect rather than affect
policies in elections for the US house of Representatives.
This thesis is composed of four self-contained chapters that make indepen-
dent contributions to the question of how different forms of institutions and
representation can affect policy. Figure 1, inspired by Besley and Case (2003),
illustrates the three strands of the empirical literature dealing with institutions,
representation, and policy choices. Arrow 1 stands for (empirical) studies that
examine the link between institutions and representation. Examples from the
Figure 1: Institutions, representation, and policy
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existing literature include studies related to the effects of electoral rules on mi-
nority representation (see Trebbi et al., 2008) and on the validity of Duverger’s
law (see Fujiwara, 2011). However, this link is not covered in this thesis.
Arrow 2 stands for studies that examine the effect of political representation on
policy. For example, existing studies have investigated the impact of women’s
leadership on the provision of local public goods (see Chattopadhyay and
Duflo, 2004) and the effect of partisan representation in the US Congress on
the distribution of federal funds (see Albouy, 2013). Arrow 2 will be covered in
chapters 1 and 3 of this thesis. Specifically, I investigate whether government
ideology and the form of government influence policy.
Arrow 3 represents the reduced-form effect of institutions on policy, which
can be direct or mediated through the effect of political representation. Ex-
amples in the empirical literature representing arrow 3 include Persson and
Tabellini (2004), who investigate the effect of constitutional rules on the size of
government, and Funk and Gathmann (2011), who study the effect of direct
democratic institutions on public spending. In this thesis, arrow 3 is represented
by chapters 2 and 4.1
In chapter 1 of this thesis, I investigate whether and how coalition governments
causally influence fiscal policies using data from German municipalities. There
is a sizeable literature theorizing that the form of government has an influence
on the chosen policies (see, e.g., Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Perotti and Kontopou-
los, 2002; Schaltegger and Feld, 2009), and in turn testing whether this theory
has any empirical content. A preeminent problem in this literature is that the
form of government is typically not randomly assigned to political units. It is
plausible that electoral choices of voters are to a significant extent driven by
voter preferences regarding fiscal policy, and that this introduces endogeneity
concerns. Moreover, it is likely that there are many other unobservable factors
correlated with both fiscal policy and electoral outcomes. This could lead to an
1It might be debatable whether the number of legislators as considered in chapter 2 repre-
sents an institution or should be perceived as representation. In some election systems, the
number of legislators is itself affected by the electoral choices of the voters and might thus
be perceived as representation. This is, for example, the case when excess seats can occur. In
chapter 2 of this thesis, the number of legislators, however, is determined prior to the election.
Therefore, it should be considered as an institution. In line with this argument, Pettersson-
Lidbom (2012) also considers the number of legislators as an institution.
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omitted variable bias. A prime example of such an omitted variable is political
culture.
The main contribution of chapter 1 is to use a quasi-experiment that intro-
duces exogenous variation into the probability of being governed by a coalition
government. This can be exploited in a Regression Kink Design. Applying
the Regression Kink Design to a panel data set of German local governments
obtained from the state of North-Rhine Westphalia, it is assumed that local
governments close to the kink point (the 50% vote share of the strongest party)
are equal in all observable and unobservable covariates except for the treat-
ment probability. My results show that this empirical strategy is an important
innovation, as quasi-experimental estimates differ to a large extent from sim-
ple OLS estimates: While OLS estimates suggest that coalition governments
increase expenditures and taxes, the reverse is true when endogeneity issues
are addressed.
Chapter 2 is concerned with the interactions of institutions. It is natural to
believe that not only do different institutions exert independent influences on
policy, but that the effectiveness of a particular institution is conditioned by the
existence of other institutions. Understanding the interactions of institutions
is thus an important endeavor (see Acemoglu, 2005). However, estimating the
causal effect of a combination of institutions is complicated by the need to find
quasi-experiments in (at least) two dimensions.
Chapter 2 exploits such a rare opportunity. Specifically, I investigate how the
nomination scheme of the city manager, the head of the public administration
in municipalities of the German state Hesse, influences the effects of the munic-
ipal council’s fragmentation on public spending and taxation. The nomination
scheme could be an important determinant of the strength of fragmentation
effects for at least two reasons: First, the existing literature on government
fragmentation is suggestive (but not conclusive) of the fact that the effects of
government fragmentation on spending could be to a large extent dependent
on the underlying political and administrative system. Baqir (2002) provides
arguably the most encompassing analysis in this literature; however, he employs
rather questionable instrumental variables to tackle potential endogeneity is-
sues. Second, Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) theoretically argues that fragmentation
can play a role in local government systems, because a budget-maximizing
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public administration can be better monitored with more councilors. My em-
pirical analysis tests this argument of an agency-problem. Obviously, more
councilors are only necessary to monitor the public administration if the latter
is independent from the council such that it can diverge from the spending
preferences of the council. My findings suggest that a reform of the nomination
scheme implies an increase in the independence of the public administration,
and therefore, one should observe (more) significant effects of the number of
councilors after the reform.
Moreover, an important innovation of chapter 2 is that it empirically focuses on
the interplay between the local council as the local legislature and the public
administration. Local governments in developed countries typically consist of
these two separate institutions. Thus, it is important to understand the interplay
between these bodies of local governments. However, such kind of empirical
research is non-existent so far. Theoretical studies on this topic include those of
Rauch (1995) and Vlaicu and Whalley (2013). They also describe the relationship
between the public administration and the local council as a principal-agent
relationship, and my empirical results are in line with this interpretation.
It should be mentioned that many existing studies in political economy use
national-level data compared to local-level data as employed in chapters 1 and
2 of this thesis. Local government data have the advantage that these originate
from comparable political units that are observed under the same institutional
framework. Thus, estimates are less likely to suffer from unobserved hetero-
geneity. This is a large advantage compared to national-level data, especially if
claims for causality should be made. However, local-level data have the obvious
disadvantage that they cannot be used invariably, for example, in cases where
either the outcome or the explanatory variable of interest only varies at a higher
level of government, as is the case in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis.
In chapter 3, I study the effects of representation on environmental outcomes.
Specifically, using a cross-country data set and static as well as dynamic panel
data methods, I investigate to what extent political ideology and government
fragmentation are important determinants of CO2 emission reduction processes.
Besides the natural relevance of this topic in an era of climate change, it is
important to study partisan effects in environmental policy because it is un-
clear that the latter can be placed on the typical left-right scale of the political
spectrum. Left-wing as well as right-wing parties have both incentives and
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disincentives to promote environmental protection. For example, left-wing
parties might be incentivized to protect the environment because their typical
clientele is more often affected by the negative consequences of pollution. On
the other hand, these parties might shy away from environmental protection
because it might threaten employment opportunities in heavy-polluting sectors.
By contrast, right-wing parties might not be incentivized to promote environ-
mental protection because this might lead to adjustment costs for entrepreneurs.
However, these parties are often Christian parties (at least in the sample of West-
ern democracies that I study), and are therefore concerned with the integrity
of the divine creation. This could strengthen their interest in environmental
protection (see Potrafke, 2011).2
In line with these ideas, I find that the (perhaps most pragmatic) center-
governments reduce emissions to the largest extent. This analysis once again
indicates that the Downsian median voter theorem does not always hold. Study-
ing partisan effects in environmental policy is also helpful because this policy
field is arguably less subject to reverse causality concerns than others (e.g.,
social policy): environmental policy is not a major motivator in most elections.
Moreover, voters are likely to be poorly informed about who is responsible for
the outcomes of environmental policy. Thus, it is not likely that governments
will be turned out of office because of the environmental policies they pursue.
My exercise in chapter 3 therefore provides a strong test of the existence of
partisan effects.
My results in chapter 3 also show that the organization of government repre-
sented by the number of parties can have important (but to some extent less
significant) policy consequences: Emissions are reduced to a lesser extent if
the number of parties that constitute the government is high. This shows that
the degree of government fragmentation plays a crucial role in adjustment
processes as hypothesized by Alesina and Drazen (1991).
Chapter 4 is concerned with a classical example of special-interest policy. It
is well known that - at least in democracies - there is a systematic bias in
2Interestingly, there exist both right-wing as well as left-wing Green parties. For example,
in Germany, the most popular Green party (Bu¨ndnis 90/Die Gru¨nen) can be categorized as a
left-wing party, while the O¨DP (o¨kologisch-demokratische Partei) can be classified as a center-right
Green party. However, in contrast to the former, the latter has not been very successful in
elections.
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trade policies: Trade policies tend to generously support farmers, for example,
through price distortions (see Persson and Tabellini, 2002). In developing
countries, this bias in favor of the agricultural sector has historically been far
less apparent. However, in the last two decades, the developing countries
have modified trade policies in favor of agriculture (see Anderson et al., 2013).
Chapter 4 analyzes how a change in a bundle of institutions - represented by
the globalization process - affects this kind of special-interest policy. Precisely, I
investigate whether the globalization process has affected agricultural support
through price distortions or direct payments made to domestic farmers.
Globalization does not just affect one specific institution, but several others.
For example, globalization might affect the existence of trade barriers, shape
political institutions (for example, might cause a growing importance of supra-
national institutions), or might be responsible for a change in economic or social
culture.3 Globalization could affect not only farmers but also food consumers
in various negative ways, thus creating a rationale for politicians to increase
agricultural support in the globalization process. However, there are also
theoretical arguments for why agricultural support should be lowered in the
course of globalization, thus making the effects of globalization on agricultural
support ultimately an empirical question.
An econometric challenge in chapter 4 is that globalization is not likely to be
exogenous to agricultural support or trade policies in general. Both reverse
causality and omitted variables could plausibly bias simple OLS estimates.
Moreover, measurement error could be a problem as it is questionable whether
the employed KOF indices are perfect proxies for globalization. Both issues
have received little attention in the existing globalization literature. I deal with
these issues by employing system and difference GMM estimators that are
able to generate internal instruments for globalization. My results suggest that
globalization significantly increases agricultural support.
To summarize, this thesis empirically shows that both institutions and represen-
tation can have important effects on policy. A careful empirical examination
of these effects is necessary to resolve the theoretical ambiguities. From the
methodological point of view, the thesis shows that causality is a major issue in
the political economy literature. Thus, each chapter of this thesis takes causality
3This corresponds to a broad interpretation of institutions as suggested by North (1990). He
defines institutions as any “humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction.”
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issues seriously and develops empirical strategies that address endogeneity to
the largest possible extent.
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Chapter 1
The causal effect of coalition governments
on fiscal policies: evidence from a regres-
sion kink design
1.1 Introduction
Coalition governments seem to be the rule rather than the exception in demo-
cratic countries. In fact, 24 of the 28 countries in the European Union recently
have more than one party in their national government. Contrary to conven-
tional wisdom, coalition governments occur not only in proportional election
systems, but in majoritarian systems as well. A prominent example of such a
coalition is that which was established in the United Kingdom by the conser-
vatives and liberals in 2010. Despite the importance of coalition governments
in the political process, no clear consensus has yet emerged in the literature
regarding the causal effects that they might have on fiscal policy.
The lack of consensus on the subject is unsurprising, considering the inherent
difficulty in measuring such effects empirically. First, the form of government
is not randomly assigned to political units (such as local governments as in
the present case study): This creates problems of reverse causality and omitted
variable bias. Second, in proportional election systems individual parties are
rarely close to holding the absolute majority of neither the vote share nor
the seat share. Third, it is difficult to utilize simple Regression Discontinuity
methods to establish causality in the present case: In proportional election
systems, as in my case study, there is no discontinuity at the 50% vote share of
13
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the strongest party (i.e. the party with the most votes in the municipal elections)
as, by contrast, would be the case in a two-party system.
In this study, I develop an empirical strategy to estimate the causal effect of
coalition governments on fiscal policies. I overcome the problems stated above
by using a Regression Kink Design (RKD) and municipal data from the state
of North Rhine–Westphalia (NRW), Germany. The RKD makes use of the fact
that, because of the D’Hondt seat allocation method employed in the municipal
election system, the probability of holding the absolute majority of the seats
exhibits a kink at the 50% threshold of the vote share of the strongest party1,
which can be exploited in an instrumental variables (IV) strategy. Moreover, in
my panel data set there are almost as many single-party governments as there
are coalition governments such that problems associated with the existence of a
proportional election system can be overcome.
Theoretically, the model put forth by Weingast et al. (1981) predicts that
government spending should be higher under coalition governments than under
single-party governments as the number of decision-makers in a government is
positively associated with the amount of spending. The underlying argument
is framed as a political common pool problem: Their model assumes that the
budget is a common pool for all political actors. These political actors value the
benefits of projects for their own interest groups more than the costs associated
with them, leading to an overutilization of the public budget and consequently
a bias toward overspending.2 Empirically, results are less clear-cut: Existing
empirical studies (Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Edin and Ohlsson, 1991; De Haan
and Sturm, 1994; Perotti and Kontopoulos, 2002; Ashworth and Heyndels, 2005;
Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006; Persson et al., 2007; Schaltegger and Feld, 2009)
come to conflicting conclusions. Most importantly, though, it is unclear to what
extent the potential problems of omitted variable bias and reverse causality
1I use an absolute seat majority of the strongest party in the local council as a proxy for
single-party governments as the form of government is not observable in the data set. If the
strongest party had no seat majority, the municipality was considered to be governed by a
coalition government. More details on this procedure are given in section 1.2.2.
2In a recent contribution, Primo and Snyder (2008) question the findings of Weingast et al.
(1981) and show that under alternative assumptions, even a reverse Law of 1/n can hold, i.e.
there exists a negative relationship between government fragmentation and spending.
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have been resolved in these studies.3
More generally, the present study is related to a recent literature studying the
aforementioned common pool problem in political economy (Tyrefors Hinner-
ich, 2009; Schaltegger and Feld, 2009; Egger and Ko¨thenbu¨rger, 2010; Pettersson-
Lidbom, 2012). Moreover, the study fits in with recent studies in political
economy that use methods from the program evaluation literature to measure
the effects of political institutions on economic outcomes (Pettersson-Lidbom,
2008; Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013; Tyrefors Hinnerich and Pettersson-
Lidbom, 2014). Furthermore, this study is related to a new body of literature
that utilizes the RKD to generate credibly causal estimates (Dahlberg et al., 2008;
Simonsen et al., 2010; Nielsen et al., 2010; Card et al., 2012; Lundqvist et al.,
2014). This study is one of the very first to implement such a design. Moreover,
to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to use a RKD in the case of a
binary (as opposed to a continuous) treatment.
The main conclusion of this study is that coalition governments do not spend
more, but rather significantly less, than single-party governments. Looking at
different sub-categories of the budget, I find that the lower spending in the case
of coalition governments is mainly driven by a decrease in spending on public
administration. Moreover, I find that coalition governments generate lower tax
revenues.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 consists of a
description of the institutional framework in NRW and the data used for this
study. Section 1.3 presents the empirical strategy. In section 1.4, I present the
results and check their robustness. Finally, section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Institutional framework and data
1.2.1 Institutional framework
In Germany, municipalities are the lowest administrative unit of government
but are, however, of considerable economic importance: They have the right
to self-government and are responsible for roughly one-third of total German
3In a paper that was written concurrently to this one, Freier and Odendahl (2012) estimate
the coalition effect using computer simulated counterfactuals. They also find some evidence
that coalition governments spend less. However, their results seem to be quite dependent on
the specification used.
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government spending. Furthermore, they are free to set three different tax rates:
a tax on business profits (Gewerbesteuer), on agricultural land (Property Tax A),
and on business and private land (Property Tax B). Aside from levying taxes
and receiving grants from higher tiers of government, municipalities finance
themselves through debt, fees, and financial contributions. German municipali-
ties are responsible for culture, elementary schools, economic promotion, and
the maintenance of municipal roads, among other things.
NRW, the state upon which this study focuses, is the most populous German
state with approximately 17.5 million inhabitants spread across 396 municipali-
ties. Of these, 23 municipalities double as counties (kreisfreie Sta¨dte). Because
these municipalities have greater autonomy and different spending responsibil-
ities than cities that belong to a county, they are not comparable to the other
municipalities, and therefore, they have been excluded from the study. This
leaves 373 municipalities that I observe over the 1985–1999 period. This period
consists of three legislative terms, each lasting five years. The elections for these
legislative terms were in the years 1984, 1989, and 1994. Because elections were
held toward the end of the year4, it is reasonable to assume that each newly
elected government could influence only the variables in the year following
the election for the first time, i.e. the relevant years for the legislative term
1984–1989 are 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1989.
During the investigation period, NRW had a closed-list, mixed-member pro-
portional election system. The number of seats in a municipal council was
determined by population size and ranged from 21 to 69 seats. Seats were
allocated using the D’Hondt method and only parties with a minimum vote
share of 5% were considered in the seat allocation process. In 1999, a large
reform of the municipal election system took place in NRW, which changed
the political system in several ways: Among other things, there was a switch
from a council-manager to a mayor-council system, the minimum vote share
was abolished, and the seat allocation method was changed. Because of the
dramatic differences in institutional settings that this reform created, only data
until 1999 was included.
Two parties mainly characterize the political spectrum of NRW: in almost
all municipal elections from 1985 to 1999, either the center-right Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) or the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD)
4The concrete dates were September 30, 1984; October 1, 1989; and October 16, 1994.
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was the strongest party. Only in the case of nine elections did a third party
achieve the majority of votes. These third parties were always voter associations.
Because these nine elections seem to be highly non-partisan, and because
the political system in these municipalities might be non-comparable to other
municipalities, these nine cases have been dropped from the analysis.5 The
results, however, remain virtually unchanged if they are included. Two smaller
parties are of importance in local politics in NRW: The liberal Free Democratic
Party (FDP) and the Greens. These parties are legislatively represented in many
municipal councils. If a coalition has to be built, the Greens are traditionally
close to the SPD, while the FDP is close to the CDU. There are also municipality
specific voter associations and other parties in NRW, but, compared to other
German states, they are relatively rare and seldom represented in councils.
1.2.2 Data
For this study, I use yearly electoral, financial, and population data for NRW
from the Statistical Office of NRW. The following eight outcome variables are
used:
− Total expenditures
− Spending on personnel
− Spending on public administration
− Material spending
− Tax revenues
− Multiplier Property Tax A
− Multiplier Property Tax B
− Multiplier Business Tax
I express all expenditure variables and tax revenues in per capita terms in
constant 2005 prices (EUR). The multipliers for the three local tax rates, which
the municipalities are free to set, are denoted in percentage points. Because
the histograms typically show a right-skewed distribution of the variables (as
can be seen in figure 1.1), a logarithmic transformation is applied to all of the
outcome variables for the estimation. As a result, the influence that the type
of government has on these variables will have a percentage interpretation.
5Since each election results in 5 years of data, 45 observations have therefore been dropped.
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of outcome variables
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
Outcome variables
Total Expenditures 1958.99 401.80 1038.63 5289.8
Spending on Personnel 357.32 96.17 147.95 972.88
Spending on public 135.96 36.15 59.50 646.77administration
Material Spending 283.49 61.56 89.58 1244.37
Tax revenue 723.91 223.53 251.54 2182.45
Multiplier Property Tax A 183.96 38.00 100 370
Multiplier Property Tax B 280.60 43.21 200 480
Multiplier Business Tax 359.54 32.50 250 470
Assignment variable
Vote share of the 0.4917 0.0719 0.3256 0.8114strongest party
Covariates
Population size 26295.89 22425.53 3752 148870
Proportion of people 0.1741 0.0204 0.1211 0.2610below 15
Proportion of people 0.1377 0.0229 0.0787 0.2187above 65
Council size 37.92 7.92 21 69
Population density 3.97 3.83 0.39 22.27
Share of foreigners 0.0613 0.0316 0.0068 0.2192
Notes: Expenditure variables are expressed in constant 2005 prices in per
capita terms. The multipliers of the tax rates are expressed in percentage
points. The table only contains municipalities with a relevant population size
less than 25000. There are 6308 observations that fulfil this requirement.
Summary statistics for these eight variables and the main explanatory variables
of this chapter can be found in table 1.1.
The data set offers several advantages: First, in contrast to political units in
cross-country studies, local governments in NRW are very homogenous and
operate under a unified framework. Second, it is a very large panel data set.
The estimates are based on more than 5500 observations, and there are enough
data points in each interval near the 50% threshold to reliably estimate the
propensities of coalition governments. See table 1.2 for an overview. Third, the
number of cases in which the strongest party received an absolute majority
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Table 1.2: Propensity of Coalition Governments
Interval of the vote share Number of elections Propensity of Coalitionof the strongest party Governments
(0.51; 0.52] 56 0
(0.50; 0.51] 60 0
(0.49; 0.50] 80 0.0625
(0.48; 0.49] 77 0.3636
(0.47; 0.48] 61 0.5902
(0.46; 0.47] 60 0.9333
(0.45; 0.46] 61 0.9836
(0.44; 0.45] 63 0.9841
(0.43; 0.44] 56 1
(0.42; 0.43] 45 1
Notes: The table shows the number of elections that resulted in a given
interval of the vote share of the strongest party plus the propensity that the
strongest party did not receive the absolute majority of the seats for each
interval of the vote share.
of seats is almost equal to the number of cases in which no party received an
absolute majority, which is rather untypical for proportional election systems.
One disadvantage of the data set is that the election data contains no information
about the coalitions that have been built in a specific municipality (or whether
a coalition was built at all). I would like to point out that almost all related
studies using local government data face the same problem.6 Therefore, I proxy
for coalition governments with a variable indicating whether the strongest party
in the local council does not hold an absolute majority of the seats, i.e. whether
the seat share of the strongest party is not larger than 50%.
A problem with this proxy could be that with a seat share below 50%, parties
might prefer minority governments to coalitions. Still, in minority governments,
as well as in coalition governments, it is necessary to bargain between (at least)
two parties to decide on policy. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that in
minority governments, the same bargaining inefficiencies exist as in “typical”
coalition governments. Consequently, I define a coalition government as any
kind of government in which such a bargaining over policy between different
6The only exception I am aware of is Ashworth and Heyndels (2005).
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parties must take place.7
Another potential problem is that parties with an absolute majority could
decide to build a coalition. However, for the following three reasons, this
problem may be regarded as a non-issue: First, theoretical research (Baron and
Diermeier, 2001) finds that, in the absence of a crisis, only minimum winning
coalitions (those in which every party in government is needed to secure an
absolute majority) should form, which makes coalitions unlikely if one party
has an absolute majority. Second, in contrast to the local governments in most
other German states, a competitive democracy exists in NRW as opposed to a
concordance democracy (Holtkamp, 2008). It is well known that a competitive
democracy is associated with a strong party system and minimum winning
coalitions as opposed to broad-based, consensus orientated coalitions. Third,
for German state governments, one can observe which coalitions have been built,
and in the last 40 years, there has never been a case in which a party with an
absolute majority decided to form a coalition government. Thus, the problem
stated above does not seem to be very significant in the present political context,
such that I argue that a seat share of over 50% is a reasonable approximation of
a single-party government.
Most importantly, even if there were outliers which did not comply with the
rule used to proxy for coalition governments (i.e., even if some parties with an
absolute majority built coalition governments or parties without an absolute
majority built single-party governments), my approach would still identify an
intention-to-treat (ITT) effect, i.e. the causal effect of the offer of treatment
on the outcome variables. Moreover, the ITT effect is a lower bound of the
treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) effect when one accounts for an innocuous
assumption. The TOT effect can be calculated as (Angrist and Pischke, 2008)
TOT =
ITT
Compliance rate treatment group− Compliance rate control group (1)
Under the assumption that a larger percentage of municipalities in the treatment
group (i. e., those municipalities in which the strongest party has a seat share
of no more than 50%) are treated (i.e., are governed by a coalition government)
than municipalities in the control group (i.e., those municipalities in which
7The classification of minority governments as coalition governments is not unusual in the
literature and has, for example, been used by Sole´-Olle´ and Sorribas-Navarro (2008).
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the strongest party has a seat share larger than 50%), the TOT effect obviously
must be larger (in absolute terms) than the ITT effect derived in this study.
Moreover, if not many political units deviate from the rule specified above (i.e.,
if the percentage treated in the treatment group is close to 1 and the percentage
treated is close to 0 in the control group), the ITT effect is very close to the TOT
effect.
1.3 Identification strategy
1.3.1 Regression Kink Design
The main interest of this study is the causal effect of the type of government
on different fiscal policies, and therefore, the relationship I am interested in is
given by
yit = α+ βCit + eit (2)
where yit is a fiscal outcome in municipality i in year t and Cit is a dummy
equal to one if the seat share of the strongest party is smaller than 0.5 and zero
otherwise. α is a constant, and e is an error term with the usual properties.
However, if I were to estimate this equation by OLS, the estimated parameters
would likely be biased due to potential problems of omitted variable bias and
reverse causality.
To generate exogenous variation in Cit, I use that the treatment probability is
a kinked function of the vote share of the strongest party. Figure 1.2 nicely
illustrates the empirical strategy. Figure 1.2 shows the propensity of a coalition
government as a function of the vote share of the strongest party.8 The slope
change of the function at the 50% vote share threshold of the strongest party is
caused by a feature of the election system of NRW: The D’Hondt seat allocation
method that was in place during the time period of interest fulfills the absolute
majority condition in the case of an odd council size.9 The absolute majority
condition states that a party that gets more than 50% of the votes necessarily
8Figure 1.2 also shows that there is no discontinuity in the probability of a coalition govern-
ment at the threshold.
9Note that an odd council size is prescribed by law in NRW.
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Figure 1.2: Propensity of coalition governments
Notes: Lines in green and in black are Lowess curves over the observations
with vote share of the strongest party below and above 0.5, respectively.
receives more than 50% of the seats. This means that it is not possible to get
more than 50% of the votes and receive less than 50% seats. On the other hand,
it is possible to get less than 50% of the votes but more than 50% of the seats.
The latter can happen because parties with less than 5% of the votes are not
considered in the seat allocation process or when votes between other parties
are split to the best advantage of the strongest party. Thus, the probability of
a coalition government is zero when the vote share of the strongest party is
above 50%, while the probability of a coalition government is a positive, but a
decreasing function of the vote share when the vote share of the strongest party
is below 50%.
The effects of the absolute majority condition can also be seen directly by
investigating the results from the elections in 1984, 1989, and 1994 (see table
1.3): There were many more cases in which the strongest party held more than
50% of the seats than cases in which the strongest party got more than 50% of
the votes. Additionally, table 1.4 shows the election results organized by the
frequency with which each of the two largest parties had been the strongest
party in the three municipal elections.
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Table 1.3: Election periods and election results
Election Seat share stron- Seat share stron- Vote share stron- Vote share stron-
Period gest party > 0.5 gest party ≤ 0.5 gest party > 0.5 gest party ≤ 0.5
1985-1989 240 133 203 170
1990-1994 187 186 136 237
1995-1999 175 198 108 265
Sum 602 517 447 672
Notes: The table shows how often municipal elections resulted in seat and vote shares
above or below 0.5. Overall, there have been 1119 elections in the investigation period.
Table 1.4: Election results split up by identity of strongest party
Seat share stron- Seat share stron- Vote share stron- Vote share stron-
gest party > 0.5 gest party ≤ 0.5 gest party > 0.5 gest party ≤ 0.5
Strongest 422 309 320 411Party: CDU
Strongest 177 202 124 53Party: SPD
Notes: The table shows how often municipal elections resulted in seat and vote shares above
or below 0.5 for the two different strongest parties. I dropped those 9 observations where a
third party was the strongest party. This leaves 1110 election results.
The absolute majority condition thus induces a slope change in the treatment
probability when the strongest party achieves the 50% threshold of the vote
share. The RKD that I use is based on the claim that political units slightly
above the kink point (50% vote share of the strongest party) are similar in all
respects to political units slightly below the kink point except for the treatment
probability. Suggestive evidence for this claim can be found by inspecting
whether the baseline covariates of political units slightly above the kink point
do not differ significantly from that of those slightly below it. Here, it is
important to use only those covariates that are themselves unaffected by the
treatment. I consider the following covariates to be valid: population size,
population density, the share of foreigners, the proportion of people aged below
15, the proportion of people aged above 65, and the size of the municipal
council.10 All these baseline covariates are measured before treatment takes
place (i.e., at the beginning of the years 1984, 1989 and 1994).
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 illustrate the investigation as to whether the baseline covari-
10The size of the municipal council is determined by the relevant population size before the
election. It is therefore, by design, a pre-determined covariate.
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Table 1.5: Means of baseline covariates for coalition and
single-party governments
Coalition Single-party Difference
in meansgovernments governmentMeans Means
Population size 28201.21 24670.49 3530.72***
Proportion of 0.1704 0.1773 -0.0068***people below 15
Proportion of 0.1417 0.1344 0.0074***people above 65
Council size 38.79 37.18 1.61***
Population 4.23 3.74 0.49***Density
Share of 0.0651 0.0581 0.0069***foreigners
Notes: *Significant at the 10 percent level, **Significant at the 5
percent level, ***Significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 1.6: Means for baseline covariates when the vote share
of the strongest party is within 2 percentage points from the
50%-threshold
0.48 < vit ≤ 0.5 0.5 < vit ≤ 0.52 Difference
Means Means in means
Population size 29041.29 28358.09 683.68
Proportion of 0.1712 0.1711 0.0001people below 15
Proportion of 0.1383 0.1398 -0.0015people above 65
Council size 39.05 38.66 0.39
Population 4.38 4.43 -0.05Density
Share of 0.0624 0.0614 0.0010foreigners
Notes: *Significant at the 10 percent level, **Significant at the 5
percent level, ***Significant at the 1 percent level.
ates are indeed balanced close to the kink point: In table 1.5, I provide the means
for the baseline covariates for coalition governments (Column 1), single-party
governments (Column 2), and the difference between these means (Column
3). As expected, for all of the variables a t-test rejects the null hypothesis of
equal means. However, when the range of observations is restricted to a vote
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share within 2 percentage points of the 50% threshold (as is shown in table
1.6), the t-test can no longer reject the null hypothesis of equal means for the
pre-determined variables. This indicates that the municipalities whose strongest
party held a vote share slightly above or below the threshold are indeed similar
except for the treatment probability.
1.3.2 Implementation
In this section, I will formalize my RKD approach. In the empirical strategy, I
make the identifying assumption that the direct effect of the vote share of the
strongest party on the outcome variables differs from the kinked relationship
between treatment probability and vote share described above, i.e. I assume that
there is no slope change in the direct effect of the vote share on the outcomes
variables at the 50% threshold. Under this condition, I can use the functional
form between treatment probability and vote share as an instrument for the
dummy variable Cit. The first and second stage in the two-stage least squares
estimation procedure are given by the following two equations:
Cit = α0 +
p
∑
p=1
αp(vit − 0.5)p +
p
∑
p=1
βp(vit − 0.5)pDit + λt + eit
yit = γ0 + γ1Cˆit +
p
∑
p=1
δp(vit − 0.5)p + λt + uit
(3)
where the vote share of the strongest party, vit, is the forcing variable in the
RKD, λt is a year-fixed effect, and Dit is a dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if vit ≤ 0.5 and 0 otherwise.11
This global polynomial approach is my preferred specification as it uses all
available data points and is therefore most efficient under the assumption
that the control function is not misspecified. To rule out the possibility that
11Note that centering the assignment variable vit on the threshold 0.5 is standard in the
literature (Dahlberg et al., 2008) and ensures that the effect is measured at the threshold.
Further, note that I need not include municipality-fixed effects for two reasons: First, the within-
variation of Cit is not very large. Second, in RKDs, as well as in Regression Discontinuity
Designs, the source of identification is a comparison between those units slightly above and
those slightly below the threshold (Lee and Lemieux, 2011). Adding municipality-fixed effects
would introduce more restrictions than necessary without any gain in identification (Tyrefors
Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom, 2014).
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the results are a product of a misspecification of the control function, I use
polynomials ranging from the third to the fifth order as a way to determine
whether the estimated coalition effect is sensitive to the choice of the control
function. In addition, I also present the results from local linear regressions
in which the sample is restricted to observations close to the threshold. The
corresponding estimating equations read
Cit = α0 + α1(vit − 0.5) + β1(vit − 0.5)Dit + λt + eit, −h < vit − 0.5 < h
yit = γ0 + γ1Cˆit + δ1(vit − 0.5) + λt + uit, −h < vit − 0.5 < h
(4)
I choose varying bandwidths h ∈ (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) of the vote share of the strongest
party.12 In all specifications, I include year-fixed effects and cluster the standard
errors at the municipality level to allow for arbitrary serial correlation of the
standard errors (Bertrand et al., 2004).
In the context of the IV estimation approach, I can formulate the conditions that
need to be fulfilled to estimate the causal effect of coalition governments on
fiscal policy: First, there needs to be a kink in the treatment probability, i.e. the
instruments
p
∑
p=1
βp(vit− 0.5)pDit need to be relevant, which can be evaluated by
the Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic. Second, the exclusion restriction needs to hold,
i.e. once I control for the direct effect of the vote share on the outcome variables,
I can leave out the term
p
∑
p=1
βp(vit − 0.5)pDit in the second stage (i.e. there
is no kink in the direct relationship between the vote share and the outcome
variables). With one instrument, as in the local linear regression approach, this
assumption is untestable. However, because I use higher-order polynomials in
the global polynomial approach, I can test the exclusion restriction with the
Hansen–Sargan overidentification test, i.e. the J-Test (under the assumption that
one instrument is valid).13
Card et al. (2012) derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the RKD to
12While, for example, Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) develop data-driven approaches for
the selection of the optimal bandwidth in the Regression Discontinuity Design, for the RKD
such approaches do not yet exist. Note, also, that it does not make sense to use a bandwidth
smaller than 3% of the vote share, because with smaller bandwidths the number of coalition
governments in the sample becomes too small, as can be inferred from table 1.2.
13The results from the J-Test, however, have the disadvantage that they are not based on
multiple instruments coming from different dynamics. It is not clear to what extent this affects
the results of the J-Test. Thus, one should interpret them with caution.
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identify a treatment-on-the-treated parameter, i.e. to guarantee that the exclu-
sion restriction holds. First, it is necessary that there is no precise manipulative
sorting at the 50% threshold: It should not be possible for political units to
sort themselves precisely over or under the threshold. In other words, there
should be some random component in the vote share of the strongest party.
Second, although the vote share of the strongest party may have a direct effect
on the outcome variables (which is very likely to be the case), there should be
no kink in this relationship at the threshold. This implies that there should be
no kink at the threshold for any pre-determined covariates. This can be tested
by checking whether the estimates from specification (3) are sensitive to the
inclusion of the baseline covariates. Another way to check for the presence of
a kink in the baseline covariates is to use each of the covariates as dependent
variables in RKD specifications across a range of bandwidths and polynomial
orders in order to see if coalition governments systematically affect the baseline
covariates. I present these validity tests in section 1.4.2.
The derivations of Card et al. (2012) are, however, only suited to cases that
feature a continuous treatment variable. In the present case, however, Cit is a
binary treatment variable. Fortunately, Dong (2012) has shown that the RKD
can even be applied with a binary treatment indicator where the identification
comes from a kink in the treatment probability.14
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Results from the regression kink design
In this section, I present empirical evidence on the effect of coalition govern-
ments on fiscal policy. Table 1.7 shows the results of the empirical model (3).
Each cell in table 1.7 represents one estimate/standard error pair plus the
p-value of the J-Test (where available). Column 1 of table 1.7 presents the results
of the OLS estimation procedure. The OLS results either show no effect or
confirm the theoretical hypothesis that spending is significantly greater under
14In other words, the RKD estimand, as detailed by Card et al. (2012), depends on the
derivative of the continuous treatment variable, while the estimand I use depends on the
derivative of the expected value of the binary treatment variable, the treatment probability
(Dong, 2012).
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Table 1.7: Results from the parametric estimation approach
OLS RKD RKD RKD
Log (Total spending)
-0.005 -0.053 -0.032 -0.034
(0.013) (0.026)** (0.031) (0.030)
- 0.407 0.582 0.514
Log (Spending on
Personnel)
0.046 -0.075 -0.042 -0.05
(0.022)** (0.040)* (0.047) (0.047)
- 0.563 0.876 0.862
Log (Spending on Public
Administration)
0.020 -0.067 -0.073 -0.082
(0.015) (0.029)** (0.036)** (0.035)**
- 0.517 0.484 0.482
Log (Material spending)
-0.001 -0.023 -0.031 -0.034
(0.015) (0.028) (0.033) (0.033)
- 0.773 0.146 0.293
Log (Tax revenues)
0.092 -0.064 -0.094 -0.093
(0.022)*** (0.042) (0.050)* (0.050)*
- 0.304 0.285 0.170
Log (Multiplier Property
Tax A)
-0.003 -0.035 -0.024 -0.019
(0.004) (0.030) (0.039) (0.039)
- 0.183 0.185 0.729
Log (Multiplier Property
Tax B)
0.021 -0.015 -0.005 -0.004
(0.009)** (0.018) (0.022) (0.021)
- 0.589 0.579 0.679
Log (Multiplier Business
Tax)
0.011 -0.017 -0.012 -0.011
(0.006)* (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
- 0.712 0.680 0.768
Sample Full Full Full Full
Degree of polynomial None Third Fourth Fifth
Kleibergen-Paap - 1240.29 745.51 603.19F statistic
Observations 5550 5550 5550 5550
Number of clusters 372 372 372 372
Notes: Each cell presents an estimate/standard error-pair from a separate
regression plus the p-value of the J-Test (in italics). All regressions include
year-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality-level are
reported in parentheses. *Significant at the 10 percent level, **Significant at
the 5 percent level, ***Significant at the 1 percent level
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coalition governments. The most obvious result is a large and highly significant
effect on tax revenues: The OLS estimates suggest that tax revenues are 9.2%
higher under coalition governments. I also find significantly positive effects for
spending on municipal personnel as well as for the multipliers of two of the
municipal tax rates.
Columns 2–4 show the two-stage least squares results. Moreover, these columns
report the first stage Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic for the excluded instruments.
The instruments are highly relevant in all cases such that problems of weak
instruments should not be a concern. The J-Test is never significant at the 10%
level or higher which indicates that the instruments are valid.
Looking at the RKD results suggests that the simple OLS estimates are likely
to be extremely biased. For each outcome variable that I use, I find that coali-
tion governments only have negative effects. The significance of these effects
depends on the outcome variable. For both total and personnel expenditures, I
find significant effects for one specification, suggesting that there may be some
significant negative relationship between these variables and the presence of a
coalition government.
My results (including those from the local linear regressions) strongly suggest
that coalition governments mainly affect two outcome variables: First, expen-
ditures on the public administration significantly decrease no matter which
polynomial order I use. The estimated effects are economically relevant: Even
the most conservative estimate suggests that a coalition government decreases
spending on public administration by about 6%. The robustness of the estimates
for different control functions suggests that the control function is not misspeci-
fied. General conclusions do not change no matter which polynomial order I
use. Second, tax revenues are significantly lower under coalition governments
than under single-party governments. Only one coefficient barely fails to be
significant at the 10% level, but all other polynomial orders show a significantly
negative effect. Again, the magnitude of these estimates points to economically
relevant effects. For all other outcome variables, I find negative effects that are
not significant in most specifications. The estimated effects are, in general, very
stable across the different polynomial orders.
The results of the local linear regressions (presented in table 1.8) are mostly
in line with the results of the global polynomial approach. First, except for
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Table 1.8: Results from the local linear regressions
RKD RKD RKD
Log (Total spending) -0.053 -0.102 -0.123(0.067) (0.045)** (0.042)***
Log (Spending on -0.074 -0.136 -0.155
Personnel) (0.095) (0.064)*** (0.060)***
Log (Spending on Public -0.102 -0.108 -0.122
Administration) (0.078) (0.050)** (0.048)***
Log (Material spending) 0.027 -0.064 -0.105(0.067) (0.042) (0.039)***
Log (Tax revenues) -0.074 -0.124 -0.131(0.105) (0.069)* (0.062)**
Log (Multiplier Property 0.067 -0.060 -0.100
Tax A) (0.087) (0.053) (0.046)**
Log (Multiplier Property -0.027 -0.034 -0.034
Tax B) (0.042) (0.027) (0.026)
Log (Multiplier Business -0.018 -0.026 -0.025
Tax) (0.026) (0.016) (0.016)
Bandwidth ±0.03 ±0.04 ±0.05
Kleibergen-Paap 85.6 376.64 615.5F statistic
Observations 1950 2490 2970
Number of clusters 230 265 287
Notes: Each cell presents an estimate/standard error-pair
from a separate local linear regression. All regressions in-
clude year-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the
municipality-level are reported in parentheses. *Significant
at the 10 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level,
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
two cases, all the estimated coalition effects are negative. Second, coalition
governments significantly decrease tax revenues and spending on public ad-
ministration. These effects are highly significant except in the case where the
bandwidth was ±0.03. This is because the standard errors strongly increase
as the number of observations decreases, which happens when the bandwidth
shrinks from ±0.04 to ±0.03. The point estimates, however, are still economi-
cally relevant and even larger (in absolute terms) than in the global polynomial
approach. As a final point, the estimates of the other expenditure categories are
higher (in absolute terms) in the local linear regressions than they are in the
global polynomial approach and more often significant as well.
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How can one explain the causal negative effect that coalitions have on tax rev-
enues and public administration expenditures? Most of the theoretical literature,
as well as most existing empirical studies, find that the degree of government
fragmentation is positively associated with government spending. The first
empirical study, however, to find negative effects on spending caused by frag-
mentation was that of Pettersson-Lidbom (2012). He suggests that the negative
effects of fragmentation, measured in this case by council size, are due to agency
problems between the public administration and the municipal council. Because
more legislators are better able to monitor the public administration, excessive
spending driven by a budget-maximizing bureaucracy decreases in the presence
of a larger council. In the second chapter of this thesis, I also provide evidence
that there exists an agency problem between the public administration and the
municipal council. I find that fragmentation negatively affects spending when
the public administration is relatively independent from the municipal council,
while there is no significant relationship when the council is responsible for
the administration’s term length in office. It could be the case that the same
underlying mechanism also holds in the case of coalition governments: When
there are two or more parties in government, bureaucrats should be easier to
monitor, which would lead to a decrease in expenditures. This mechanism
might also hold for tax revenues: Although bureaucrats are not able to set these
tax rates themselves, it could be possible for them to influence politicians with
their recommendations. Bureaucrats might recommend higher tax rates because
a larger public budget is associated with greater prestige for the bureaucracy
(Niskanen, 1971). With more parties in government, however, it is possible that
these recommendations would face greater opposition from politicians.
However, there are, of course, other explanations one can think of for the
coalitions’ negative impact on spending. For example, coalition governments
change the way politicians are accountable to voters. With a single party in
government, policy outcomes can quite accurately be attributed to that party.
With more than one party in government, voters do not exactly know whom
to hold accountable for the realized policies: This might result in less voter-
friendly spending. As a second potential mechanism, coalition governments
might find it more difficult to agree in controversial policy areas, suggesting
that coalitions would tend not to approve spending projects in cases where
there was not a perfect agreement. As a final example, coalitions might exhibit
a different political culture than single-party governments. Decisions might be
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based on the expertise of more politicians, which might increase the efficiency
of governance. Moreover, politicians in different parties tend to monitor each
other more closely than politicians belonging to the same party, which might
decrease political rents. This idea is in line with the literature that argues
that political competition tends to reduce political rents (Svaleryd and Vlachos,
2009; Sole´-Olle´ and Villadecans-Marsal, 2012). More theoretical work is clearly
necessary to explain the negative effects of coalition governments on public
spending and to discriminate between possible mechanisms.
1.4.2 Robustness checks
I have checked the robustness of my results by testing the identifying assump-
tions of the RKD. As discussed in section 3, the RKD is not valid if political
units are able to precisely manipulate the assignment variable in order to sort
themselves above or below the 50% threshold. The assumption of absence of
precise sorting can be evaluated by inspecting the density of the assignment
variable. In the absence of precise sorting, the derivative of the density of the
assignment variable should be smooth around the threshold. In figure 1.3, I
provide histograms of the assignment variable with three different bandwidths.
In none of these histograms, a “hole” in the distribution of the assignment vari-
able is apparent. Moreover, it is reassuring to see that the number of political
units slightly below the 50% threshold of the vote share of the strongest party
is almost the same as the number slightly above the threshold if ones uses very
small bandwidths of the vote share around the threshold. This suggests that
political units did not strategically self-select above or below the threshold.
More formally, one can test the null hypothesis that there is no discontinuity at
the threshold with a McCrary test (see McCrary, 2008). Figure 1.4 reports the
results of the McCrary test. The null hypothesis that there is no discontinuity
at the threshold cannot be rejected. Overall, there is strong evidence against
manipulative sorting. Intuitively, this could have been expected because election
manipulation should not be a concern in Germany. Moreover, in a recent
contribution, Eggers et al. (2014) study more than 40000 closely contested
elections from different countries (including Germany) and do not find any
evidence of imbalances around the threshold.
The second identifying assumption of the RKD is that there is no kink in the
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Figure 1.3: Histogram of the assignment variable (centered at 0)
(a) Bandwidth: 0.01
(b) Bandwidth: 0.005
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(c) Bandwidth: 0.0025
direct relationship between the outcome variables and the vote share at the
threshold, i.e. the marginal effect of the vote share of the strongest party on the
outcomes is smooth. As explained in section 1.3, this implies that there should
be no kink at the threshold for any pre-determined covariates. The fulfillment
of this identifying assumption can therefore be tested by the inclusion of pre-
determined covariates into the specification (3). If the baseline estimates are
not sensitive to the inclusion of these covariates, then this should be strong
evidence for the exclusion restriction to hold. Table 1.9 presents the results
after inclusion of the proposed covariates: population size, population density,
the share of foreigners, the proportion of people aged below 15 and above 65
and the logarithm of the size of the municipal council. The results show that
almost all estimates are strikingly similar to the ones before the inclusion of
the covariates. Also, none of the conclusions concerning statistical significance
changes by including these covariates.
As explained above, another strategy to test whether there is a kink in the
baseline covariates is to employ these covariates as dependent variables in
specifications across a range of bandwidths and polynomial orders. Table
1.10 presents the corresponding results for the global polynomial approach
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Table 1.9: Results from the parametric estimation approach when
controlling for pre-determined covariates
OLS RKD RKD RKD
Log (Total spending)
-0.026 -0.052 -0.033 -0.035
(0.011)** (0.022)** (0.026) (0.025)
- 0.325 0.345 0.472
Log (Spending on
Personnel)
-0.003 -0.064 -0.039 -0.046
(0.014) (0.028)** (0.034) (0.033)
- 0.621 0.333 0.262
Log (Spending on Public
Administration)
0.006 -0.051 -0.074 -0.082
(0.014) (0.027)* (0.034)** (0.034)**
- 0.296 0.425 0.729
Log (Material spending)
-0.016 -0.026 -0.033 -0.036
(0.014) (0.026) (0.032) (0.031)
- 0.784 0.068* 0.151
Log (Tax revenues)
0.047 -0.051 -0.072 -0.072
(0.018)*** (0.038) (0.042)* (0.043)*
- 0.525 0.249 0.277
Log (Multiplier Property
Tax A)
-0.015 -0.029 -0.020 -0.016
(0.015) (0.030) (0.038) (0.038)
- 0.224 0.173 0.626
Log (Multiplier Property
Tax B)
0.005 -0.011 -0.004 -0.002
(0.007) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
- 0.568 0.638 0.972
Log (Multiplier Business
Tax)
0.000 -0.012 -0.010 -0.009
(0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
- 698 0.692 0.995
Sample Full Full Full Full
Degree of polynomial None Third Fourth Fifth
Kleibergen-Paap - 1166.39 695.21 571.20F statistic
Observations 5550 5550 5550 5550
Number of clusters 372 372 372 372
Notes: Each cell presents an estimate/standard error-pair from a separate
regression plus the p-value of the J-Test (in italics). All regressions include
year-fixed effects and population size, population density, the proportion of
people aged below 15, the proportion of people aged above 65, the share of
foreigners and the logarithm of the size of the municipal council as control
variables. Standard errors clustered at the municipality-level are reported
in parentheses. *Significant at the 10 percent level, **Significant at the 5
percent level, ***Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Figure 1.4: McCrary-test of the vote share of the strongest party (centered at 0)
Notes: Weighted kernel estimation of the log density of the assignment variable,
performed seperately on either side of the threshold (centered at 0). Point
estimate of the discontinuity: -0.019, se: 0.121. Optimal bandwidth is calculated
as in McCrary (2008).
and table 1.11 those for the local linear regressions. Only in the case of the
proportion of people aged below 15, I find two significant treatment effects.
One of these effects is marginally significant at the 10%-level, while the other
one is significant at the 5%-level. However, for (at least) two reasons I do
not believe that this invalidates my approach. First, the estimated effect is
not systematic. The effect varies from being negative to being positive across
different bandwidths in the local linear regression approach and is therefore far
from being insensitive to the specifications used. Second, in total I estimate 36
coefficients of which one is significant at the 10%-level and one is significant at
the 5%-level. These are even less significant coefficients than one would expect
from a totally random distribution. Thus, I can conclude that there seems to be
no clear evidence for a kink in the direct effect of the vote share on the outcome
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Table 1.10: Balance test for baseline covariates: Global
polynomial approach
RKD RKD RKD
Population size 1965.74 1679.9 1482.29(3602.76) (4400.34) (4343.11)
Population density -0.485 -0.459 -0.548(0.654) (0.796) (0.769)
Share of foreigners -0.003 -0.002 -0.002(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Log (Council size) 0.010 -0.023 -0.023(0.033) (0.041) (0.040)
Proportion of young, 0-15 0.005 0.003 0.003(0.003)* (0.004) (0.004)
Proportion of old, 65+ -0.002 -0.002 -0.002(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Sample Full Full Full
Degree of polynomial Third Fourth Fifth
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 1240.29 745.51 603.19
Observations 5550 5550 5550
Number of clusters 372 372 372
Notes: Each cell presents an estimate/standard error-pair from
a separate regression. All regressions include year-fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered at the municipality-level are reported
in parentheses. *Significant at the 10 percent level, **Significant
at the 5 percent level, ***Significant at the 1 percent level.
variables which suggests that the exclusion restriction is likely to be valid.15
1.4.3 Does the coalition effect depend on the ideology of the
municipal government?
Another potential problem could be that the pure coalition effect that I am
estimating might be confounded by a specific coalition effect. To be precise,
a closer inspection of table 4 reveals that the center-right CDU is far more
often capable of building a single-party government than the center-left SPD.
15Another robustness check would be to perform a falsification test where one estimates the
coalition effect at “fake” kink points. However, as explained by Simonsen et al. (2010), this is
not possible in the Regression Kink Design. The reason is that the functional form of the curve
is unknown and potentially differs between real and “fake” kink points. Thus, one cannot use
the functional form from the original kink point at any “fake” kink points.
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Table 1.11: Balance test for baseline covariates: Local linear
regressions
RKD RKD RKD
Population size -4064.98 -4507.82 -2532.33(9324.01) (5839.38) (5527.75)
Population density -0.706 -1.338 -0.431(1.450) (1.051) (0.944)
Share of foreigners -0.002 -0.006 -0.006(0.013) (0.010) (0.008)
Log (Council size) -0.103 -0.069 -0.030(0.090) (0.054) (0.047)
Proportion of young, 0-15 -0.001 0.007 0.010(0.006) (0.005) (0.004)**
Proportion of old, 65+ 0.011 -0.002 -0.007(0.010) (0.006) (0.005)
Bandwidth ±0.03 ±0.04 ±0.05
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 85.60 376.64 615.50
Observations 1950 2490 2970
Number of clusters 230 265 287
Notes: Each cell presents an estimate/standard error-pair from
a separate local linear regression. All regressions include year-
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality-level
are reported in parentheses. *Significant at the 10 percent level,
**Significant at the 5 percent level, ***Significant at the 1 percent
level.
This could imply that the switch from a coalition to a single-party government
is highly correlated with a rightward shift in the ideology of the municipal
government.16 Thus, the coalition dummy might express some effect that
is caused by the ideology of the government rather than by the form of the
government. Therefore, it makes sense to include the ideology of the municipal
government into the regression in order to account for its influence on the
results.
I follow Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) and assume a two-bloc system for the ideolog-
ical orientation of the municipal governments: I assume a left-wing government
to be in place if either the absolute majority of seats are held by the center-left
16The result that a coalition government generates significantly less tax revenues is evidence
against the possibility of a shift in the ideology of the government to the right when there is a
switch from a coalition to a single-party government. Intuitively, one would suppose that left-
wing governments have causally higher revenues as has been found in Pettersson-Lidbom (2008).
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Table 1.12: Classification of government identity
Number of elections resulting in
Left-wing government 323 SPD 177SPD+Greens 146
Right-wing government 596 CDU 422CDU+FDP 174
Undefined majority 191
Notes: The table shows how often the municipal governments
in the period of investigation were classified to be left-wing or
right-wing.
SPD or by a combination of the Greens and the SPD, while, conversely, I define
a right-wing government as one in which the absolute majority of seats are held
by the center-right CDU or by the CDU and the FDP together. In all other cases,
I consider the ideology of the municipal government to be undefined. Table
1.12 gives further information on how often each kind of government occurred.
Table 1.13 shows the results I obtain when I include a dummy variable for a
left-wing government into the global polynomial regression and exclude all
cases in which the ideology is undefined.17
The inclusion of the ideology of the municipal government only slightly changes
the estimates. Most importantly, conclusions regarding the statistical signifi-
cance of the effect of coalition governments on total expenditures and spending
on public administration do not change. For tax revenues, coefficients decrease
marginally in size such that the estimates barely fail to be significant. However,
the estimates are still of an economically relevant magnitude. The small drop
in size could be because now there are fewer observations as governments with
undefined ideologies are excluded. Therefore, I conclude that the results are not
driven by the ideology of the municipal governments, but are rather caused by
their form, that is, whether they are a single-party government or a coalition.18
17Note that one, of course, cannot interpret the results of this robustness check as causal
effects. The reason is that the ideology of the government is not a pre-determined variable.
18This does not, of course, mean that ideology does not play a role in government policies at
the municipality level, but that the effect of the form of government on my outcome variables
is not mediated by ideology.
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Table 1.13: Results from the empirical model when controlling for
government ideology
OLS RKD RKD RKD
Log (Total spending)
-0.035 -0.058 -0.04 -0.041
(0.012)*** (0.025)** (0.030) (0.029)
- 0.291 0.326 0.485
Log (Spending on
Personnel)
-0.017 -0.051 -0.029 -0.045
(0.015) (0.030)* (0.038) (0.037)
- 0.665 0.361 0.224
Log (Spending on Public
Administration)
-0.008 -0.064 -0.078 -0.084
(0.014) (0.031)** (0.038)** (0.038)**
- 0.808 0.398 0.612
Log (Material spending)
-0.015 -0.009 -0.024 -0.035
(0.015) (0.028) (0.034) (0.033)
- 0.777 0.149 0.393
Log (Tax revenues)
0.038 -0.059 -0.068 -0.066
(0.020)* (0.042) (0.047) (0.045)
- 0.469 0.181 0.235
Log (Multiplier Property
Tax A)
-0.025 -0.014 -0.017 0.01
(0.017) (0.036) (0.042) (0.044)
- 0.181 0.240 0.868
Log (Multiplier Property
Tax B)
-0.003 -0.005 0.000 0.008
(0.008) (0.017) (0.019) (0.021)
- 0.601 0.631 0.974
Log (Multiplier Business
Tax)
-0.007 -0.010 -0.008 0.001
(0.006) (0.120) (0.012) (0.013)
- 0.380 0.560 0.963
Degree of polynomial None Third Fourth Fifth
Kleibergen-Paap - 1080.43 479.30 226.75F statistic
Observations 4595 4595 4595 4595
Number of clusters 356 356 356 356
Notes: Each cell presents an estimate/standard error-pair from a separate
regression plus the p-value of the J-Test (in italics). All regressions include
year-fixed effects, population size, population density, the proportion of
people aged below 15, the proportion of people aged above 65, the share of
foreigners, the logarithm of the size of the municipal council and a dummy
for left-wing governments as control variables and exclude all cases in which
the government ideology is considered to be undefined. Standard errors
clustered at the municipality-level are reported in parentheses. *Significant
at the 10 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level, ***Significant at
the 1 percent level.
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1.5 Conclusion
In this study, I estimate the effect that coalition governments have on fiscal
policies using municipal level data from NRW, Germany. The claim for causality
can be made because the probability of a coalition government forming is a
kinked function of the vote share of the strongest party. This allows me to
estimate a RKD that assumes that the direct effect of the vote share on the out-
comes differs from the effect of the vote share on the treatment probability. The
RKD generates credible sources of exogenous variation under very reasonable
and testable identifying assumptions, which allows me to mimic a randomized
experiment quite closely. I find that once issues of reverse causality and omitted
variable bias have been addressed with the RKD, coalition governments spend
less than single-party governments, contrary to the theoretical hypothesis and
the OLS estimates. The spending results are mainly driven by lower expendi-
tures on public administration. Moreover, I find that coalition governments
have lower tax revenues. These results are robust to typical specification tests
in a RKD.
The negative effect of government fragmentation on fiscal policies is in line with
recent studies that generate causal estimates of the influence of government
fragmentation. The recent literature argues that the negative effects are due to
agency problems between the public administration and the municipal council
that could be better solved with more political decision-makers. The outcome
variables that were mainly affected in this study are in line with this view.
However, there is clearly a need for more theoretical work to explain these find-
ings and to discriminate between alternative mechanisms that might eliminate
or overshadow the common pool problem in the case where fragmentation is
represented by the form of the government.
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Chapter 2
Elected or appointed? How the nomination
scheme of the city manager influences the
effects of government fragmentation
2.1 Introduction
Government fragmentation, i.e. the number of decision-makers in government
such as the number of legislators, is often considered an important determinant
of government size (see, e.g.,Weingast et al.,1981; Schaltegger and Feld, 2009).
Despite massive attention in the empirical literature1, however, no definitive
conclusion has emerged regarding the causal effect of fragmentation on policy.
Strikingly, Egger and Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2010) as well as Pettersson-Lidbom (2012)
even apply the same identification strategy to different data sets and find
completely different results. A main characteristic of the empirical literature is
that it has measured the effect of fragmentation in completely different (local)
political systems.
This chapter asks whether the underlying heterogeneity in local political systems
can explain this diversity of the results. Specifically, using a large panel data
1This footnote gives a (non-complete) list of papers. In this literature, there exist different
measures of government fragmentation. Besides the number of legislators as used in this
chapter, the number of ministers and the number of parties in government are sometimes used
(see, e.g., Roubini and Sachs, 1989;Perotti and Kontopoulos, 2002; Schaltegger and Feld, 2009).
However, the number of legislators seems to be the most often used measure of government
fragmentation (see, e.g., Gilligan and Matsusaka, 1995; Bradbury and Crain, 2001; Baqir, 2002;
MacDonald, 2008; Egger and Ko¨thenbu¨rger, 2010; Pettersson-Lidbom, 2012).
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set of 426 municipalities in the German state Hesse in the period 1985-2000, I
compare the effect of the number of legislators on spending (i.e. the council
size effect) in two distinct local political systems: In the first setting, the city
manager - the head of the public administration in Hesse - is appointed by
the municipal council. In the second setting, he is elected by the voters.2 To
establish causality, I combine a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) with
a Difference-in-differences approach (DiD). The RDD uses that council size
in Hesse is a discontinuous function of population size. The DiD approach
exploits that the timing of the switch from appointment to election differed
across municipalities due to a quasi-random phase-in period of the new system.
I indeed find that the effect of fragmentation differs in these two political
systems: When the manager is appointed by the council, there is no relationship
between the size of the municipal council and spending. When the manager is
elected by the voters, there is a highly significant negative council size effect,
i.e. the larger is the size of the council the smaller is the size of government.
The theoretical findings on the relationship between fragmentation and policy
are as diverse as the existing empirical results. In a seminal contribution,
Weingast et al. (1981) have argued that fragmentation leads to inefficiently
high spending because each legislator tries to benefit his constituencies through
pork-barrel spending but internalizes only a fraction of the associated costs.
Primo and Snyder (2008), however, show that the model of Weingast et al. (1981)
can even lead to inefficiently low spending. Recently, Pettersson-Lidbom (2012)
has argued that agency problems between the council and a budget-maximizing
public administration can be better solved with more legislators, thus creating
a negative relationship between fragmentation and spending.
The specific mechanism behind the effects of fragmentation on policy is impor-
tant to understand the welfare consequences of fragmentation. In pork-barrel
type models such as Weingast et al. (1981) and Primo and Snyder (2008), both
positive and negative effects of fragmentation lead to inefficiency. By contrast,
if agency problems exist, more fragmentation can curb down inefficiently high
2An important predecessor of this chapter is Baqir (2002). He compares the effects of
government fragmentation in mayor-council and council-manager systems in US cities and
finds that mayor-council systems break the relationship between fragmentation and spending.
However, in his paper political units might self-select into specific forms of local governments
such that it is questionable whether the estimated effects can be given a causal interpretation.
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spending.
I argue that my results point to the existence of agency problems between the
public administration and the council. When the manager is appointed, he is
completely accountable to the council. If the manager cares about staying in
office, there will be, if any, a very restricted incentive to counteract the decisions
of the council.3 More legislators are therefore not necessary to monitor him.
When the manager is elected by the voters, his tenure in office should be less
dependent on the council and his political position should be stronger: He does
not need a parliamentary majority behind him to stay in office. This should
create (or further strengthen) agency problems between the municipal council
and the manager compared to the case of appointment. Therefore, more council
members are helpful to better monitor the public administration. This creates a
negative relationship between the number of legislators and spending.4
To evaluate whether the different council size effects in these two political
systems might really be caused by agency problems, I perform the analysis for
different sub-categories of the budget as well as for local tax rates. Fittingly, the
above conclusions only hold for expenditure categories over which the public
administration has discretion. Since agency problems can only exist for those
policy fields that the manager is able to influence, this is supportive of the
proposed mechanism.
3This is similar in spirit to the initial intent of the inventor of the city manager plan in the
United States as described by Stone et al. (1940): “By authorizing the council to hire and fire
the city manager at its discretion, however, the city manager plan effectively gave the council
control over administrative, as well as over legislative, policy.”
4A question that arises when regarding the relationship between city manager and council
as a principal-agent problem is why elections for the city manager should make a difference
if voters might be able to discipline the city manager through elections for the city council:
After all, the city manager is made more beholden after the introduction of elections to the
same people who elect the council. A key assumption for elections to make a difference is the
existence of incomplete information of the voters: If voters have perfect information, it should
make no difference of whether the city manager is elected or appointed. If in this case the
city council appoints an incompetent city manager, voters will simply punish the council in
council elections. Thus, councils would not hire managers that voters would not elect. If voters,
however, have incomplete information about the behavior of the local political actors, Vlaicu
and Whalley (2013) show that it can make a difference of whether the manager is elected or
appointed. A second explanation of why the nomination scheme of public officials matters is
because separate elections for the council and the administrator might allow unbundling policy
issues (see Besley and Coate, 2003).
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This chapter’s results have important policy implications: Knowledge about
which political institutions can avoid inefficiencies through either pork-barrel
spending or agency problems is helpful.5 Moreover, mayor-council systems
have been found to imply other council size effects than council-manager
systems (Baqir, 2002). Is this caused by the nomination scheme of the public
administration? The election of the head of the public administration is highly
correlated with the existence of a mayor-council system6, whereas in council-
manager systems, it is more common that the city manager is appointed by
the council. Therefore, disentangling the effect of the nomination scheme on
the council size effect from the effect of the whole administrative system is in
general difficult, but possible in the present setting as the reform only changed
the former.
Additionally, the results have important implications for the validity of cross-
country studies in the government fragmentation literature: A council size
effect that differs depending on the political system illustrates the need to
use data from a homogeneous institutional setting rather than conflating data
from political units with different political systems as it is done particularly in
cross-country studies.
More generally, this chapter contributes to the literature on fiscal policy deter-
mination in different forms of local governments (see, e.g, MacDonald, 2008;
Coate and Knight, 2011; Vlaicu and Whalley, 2013). Up to now, causal empirical
evidence on the interplay between the local executive (city manager or mayor)
and the city council as the local legislature is scarce if not non-existent. This
lack is unsurprising considering the econometric challenge to find (at least) two
natural experiments. Moreover, the chapter is related to a growing literature
investigating the role of the public administration in the decision-making pro-
cess in governments (see e.g., Alesina and Tabellini, 2007; 2008; Ting, 2012).
Third, the chapter is related to the literature in political economy that estimates
5This is particularly true if this relationship also holds for other measures of fragmentation
in local governments. Consider for example the case of government fragmentation due to coali-
tion governments. National policy-makers are not able to determine whether a municipality
is governed by a single-party or a coalition government as this is the result of the municipal
elections. But if there are negative effects from one of these forms of governments, national
policy-makers might be able to mitigate these negative effects by simply changing the nomina-
tion scheme of the public administration.
6For example, Baqir (2002) reports that in his sample of US cities, 98% of the mayors in
mayor-council systems are elected by the voters.
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causal effects by making use of variants of the RDD (see, e.g., Fujiwara, 2011;
Gagliarducci et al., 2011; Tyrefors Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom, 2014). To
the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to use the RDD to measure
interaction effects of separate institutions.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 2, I describe the
institutional framework in Hesse and the data set used. Section 3 presents the
empirical strategy. In section 4, I first present evidence for the direct effect
of the change in the nomination scheme on the outcome variables. Second, I
present evidence that the change in the nomination scheme also has had effects
via government fragmentation. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2.2 Institutional framework and data
2.2.1 Institutional framework
In Germany, municipalities are the lowest administrative unit of government,
but are, however, of considerable economic importance: They are responsible
for roughly one-third of the total German government spending and employ
40% of all state employees. Moreover, municipalities are free to set three dif-
ferent tax rates: a tax on business profits (Gewerbesteuer), a tax on agricultural
land (Property Tax A) and a tax on land used by business and private house-
holds (Property Tax B). Municipalities are, for example, responsible for culture,
elementary schools, economic promotion and maintenance of municipal roads.
In this chapter, I use a large panel data set covering the 426 municipalities of
the state Hesse over the time period 1985-2000. Hesse is located in the center
of Germany and has approximately 6 million inhabitants. Figure 2.1 shows a
map of Hessian municipalities. The 1985-2000 period consists of four legislative
terms, each lasting four years. Municipal council elections were in 1985, 1989,
1993 and 1997 each time at the beginning of the year.
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Figure 2.1: Map of Hesse with municipal borders (in white)
Hesse has a closed-list7, proportional election system. Legislators in the munici-
pal council are elected at large, i.e. the whole municipality forms one electoral
district. Importantly, due to the characteristics of the municipal election system
7A closed-list system (as compared to an open-list system) is given if voters can only vote
on predecided party lists. Party lists determine which candidates get the seats that a party has
been awarded in the city council. For example, if a party gets 5 seats in the municipal council,
in a closed-list system the first 5 candidates on the party list will get these seats. In an open-list
system, voters do not only vote for a party list, but also have some opportunity to influence the
order of the candidates on the list (and can thus to a certain extent influence which specific
candidate gets elected).
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in Hesse, overhang seats are not possible.8 After 2000, a large reform of the
election system became law: For example, an open-list system was introduced
and the barrier to entry9 into the municipal council was abolished. Moreover,
since 2001, municipalities can also, to a certain extent, influence the size of
the municipal council. Because this reform created enormous differences in
institutional settings, only data until 2000 are used.
The municipal constitution (Gemeindeordnung) in Hesse is the so-called mag-
istrate constitution (Elsner, 1956; Schneider, 1981; Dreßler, 2010): This local
constitution can be described as one with a clear dividing line between the
decision and the implementation level in the political process. The municipal
council has the ultimate decision power in all affairs that concern the municipal-
ity and is responsible for monitoring the public administration. The decisions
of the council are implemented by a small magistrate (typically two members
plus the manager) that leads the public administration.
The magistrate is presided by the manager and decides by majority. In case
of a draw, the vote of the manager is pivotal. The manager has the right to
allocate responsibilities to the other members of the magistrate. Thus, he can
design the organization of the public administration in the way that is most
compatible with his concepts. It is also important to note that the manager
works full-time, while the other members of the magistrate typically work on
an honorary basis. Thus, they are more time-constrained than the manager as
they have to do their normal jobs besides working in the public administration.
This is likely to create sizeable information advantages for the manager over
the rest of the magistrate.
Importantly, the manager (as well as the other members of the magistrate) has
no political function. He is an employee of the municipality and is not allowed
8Overhang seats can arise in mixed-member proportional election systems in which some
members of the council are not elected by party lists but by (geographic) constituencies.
Overhang seats are generated when a party gets less seats based on votes for the party list than it
wins constituencies. In this case, the council may be larger than prescribed by law. Importantly,
such a phenomenon cannot occur in Hesse because in contrast to many other German states,
Hesse has no mixed-member proportional system. Otherwise, causal identification would be
harder to achieve (the RDD would be fuzzy).
9A barrier to entry implies that only parties that have received more than a certain percentage
of votes are considered in the seat allocation process. Thus, only those parties can receive seats
in the municipal council. In Hesse, the barrier to entry was set at 5% of the votes.
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to be member of the municipal council. In contrast to most other German
states, the head of the public administration in Hesse has no voting rights
in the municipal council and cannot veto against the decisions of the council.
Accordingly, the decisions of the council also do not require approval by the
manager or by the magistrate. Thus, the manager and the magistrate are clearly
not part of the decision, but of the implementation process.
The position of the head of the public administration in Hesse is therefore
equivalent to what the theoretical literature on local government systems (see
Coate and Knight, 2011) defines as a city manager: As compared to a mayor
in a mayor-council system, a city manager has no veto or voting rights and is
not part of the municipal council. De facto, except for the existence of a small
magistrate, the Hessian local government system is very close to the typical
council-manager system in the United States.
This is unsurprising as local government systems in different German states
were at least partly shaped by the identity of the allied power that had occupied
that state after World War II. States that were occupied by the UK like for
example North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony had (at least until the local
government systems were reformed in the 1990s) systems that were close to
the British analogue, while states like Hesse that were part of the US sector
tended to adopt local government systems close to the US analogue. My results
are therefore also informative for local governments in the US given the high
similarity of the local government systems in both countries and because in
council-manager systems in the US, it is also possible to have the city manager
elected by the voters instead of appointed by the council.
However, while having no legislative power, for tasks that are necessary for
the daily administration the magistrate has some discretion over expenditures:
The magistrate can freely hire or dismiss municipal employees as long as
this is in accordance with the employment plan of the council and does not
stand in contrast to the council’s general employment policy. This should give
the magistrate some discretion over personnel expenditures. Moreover, the
magistrate does not require approval of the council for daily administration
tasks. These can be defined as tasks of small financial magnitude that are
executed repeatedly. This should give the magistrate some discretion over
material spending as this expenditure type consists of positions with these
characteristics.
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Before the reform, the members of the magistrate as well as the manager were
appointed by the council with a 2/3 majority. After the reform, the manager was
elected by the voters in a runoff election in which a candidate is elected if he
receives more than 50% of the votes in the first round. If no candidate succeeds
in the first round, only the top two candidates from the first round advance to
the second round. The magistrate, however, was still appointed by the council.
Thus, only the nomination scheme of the manager and neither the nomination
scheme of the magistrate nor the responsibilities of any of the political actors
changed after the reform. Moreover, also the manager’s salary and pension
entitlements (or those of any political actor) were not changed by the reform.
The council has several possibilities to enforce his decisions: Most importantly,
the council is able to remove members of the magistrate from office. Before
the reform, the council could also remove the manager from office. After the
reform, only the voters can vote him out of office. Thus, the reform implied a
strong decrease in the dependence of the manager on the council. This leads
me to expect an agency problem after the reform that creates the necessity of
many legislators monitoring the administration.
2.2.2 Data
For this chapter, I use electoral, financial, and population data from the Statis-
tical Office of Hesse. The data is on a yearly basis. I express all expenditures
variables in per capita terms in constant 2005 prices (EUR). Moreover, all expen-
diture variables are expressed in logarithms, because histograms typically show
a right-skewed distribution of these variables (Figure 2.2 ). Therefore, the effect
of the number of legislators on expenditures will have a percentage interpreta-
tion. I also use the multipliers of the three local tax rates as outcome variables,
but do not transform them into logarithms. However, such a transformation
does not affect the results. Summary statistics for the main variables used in
this chapter can be found in table 2.1.
2.3 Identification strategy
I am interested in the interaction between the nomination scheme of the manager
and the size of the municipal council and the influence of this interaction on
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of outcome variables
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
Total spending 1131.6 371.1 279.1 11248
Personnel spending 285.4 74.6 24.8 833.1
Material spending 210.2 64.7 88.3 1023.2
Investment spending 341.3 184.3 18.4 2116.3
Property Tax A 257.7 43.1 0 450
Property Tax B 227.6 41 100 380
Business Tax 308.6 26 210 400
Council size 29.6 6.9 13 37
Proportion of old, 65+ 0.154 0.024 0.082 0.272
Proportion of young, 0-15 0.163 0.016 0.106 0.227
Seat share CDU 0.32 0.124 0 0.71
Seat share SPD 0.444 0.135 0 0.867
Dummy: Absolute Majority 0.45 0.497 0 1
Notes: Expenditure variables are expressed in constant 2005 prices
in per capita terms. The multipliers of the tax rates are expressed in
percentage points. The table only contains municipalities with a relevant
population size less than 25000. There are 6308 observations that fulfil
this requirement.
fiscal policy. Formally, this relationship is given by
yit = α+ βCit + γCitDit + eit (1)
where yit is a fiscal outcome of a municipality i in year t, Cit is the size of
the municipal council and Dit is a dummy variable that is equal to one if
the municipality has an elected manager and zero otherwise. For a manager
appointed by the council, the council size effect I am interested in is given by β.
With an elected manager, the council size effect is given by β+ γ.
In this chapter, I am interested in evaluating whether the conclusion that council
size matters is a universal one. If council size was a significant determinant
of fiscal policies under both political systems that I study, one would suspect
both β and β+ γ to be significantly different from zero. Thus, I focus on the
comparison of the marginal effects of the number of council members on fiscal
policy under the two different political systems. In this way, I am able to observe
whether the conclusions drawn in empirical studies can indeed be affected by
the political system in place.
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Table 2.2: The council size law
Relevant Population Size (pop) Council size
pop ≤ 3000 15
3000 < pop ≤ 5000 23
5000 < pop ≤ 10000 31
10000 < pop ≤ 25000 37
25000 < pop ≤ 50000 45
50000 < pop ≤ 100000 59
100000 < pop ≤ 250000 71
250000 < pop ≤ 500000 81
500000 < pop ≤ 1000000 93
pop > 1000000 105
However, if equation (1) is estimated directly, the estimated parameters will
likely be biased. To solve potential endogeneity problems, one thus needs two
natural experiments that introduce exogenous variation in the terms Cit and
CitDit, respectively.
First, in Hessian municipalities, I can use that council size is a deterministic
discontinuous function of population size. Table 2.2 shows the council size law
according to paragraph 38(1) of the local constitution of Hesse. The idea of an
RDD in this context is that municipalities with a population size slightly below
a population threshold are similar in all respects to those with a population
size slightly above a threshold. Any difference in outcomes between these
municipalities can therefore be attributed to the council size.10
According to the local constitution of Hesse, the specific number of council
members is determined by the relevant population size that the Statistical
Office of Hesse had calculated and published at the last regular date before the
exact date of the election was scheduled by the state government.11
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of the relevant population size before elections.
As can be seen, most municipalities have a population size below 25000. In
10An RDD using council size laws has recently been used by Egger and Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2010)
and Pettersson-Lidbom (2012). For standard references on the RDD see Imbens and Lemieux
(2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2011).
11The relevant population sizes for the four elections under investigation have been deter-
mined by the Statistical Office of Hesse on the following dates: June 30th, 1984; December 31st,
1987; March 31st, 1992; March 31st, 1996. Election dates have been: March 10th, 1985; March
12th, 1989; March 7th, 1993; March 2nd, 1997.
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Figure 2.3: Histogram of relevant population size
(a) All Municipalities (b) Municipalities with Pop < 25000
fact, only 29 of the 426 municipalities never had a relevant population size
below 25000 in the investigation period. Because the RDD requires many
observations near the threshold, I drop those observations with population size
over 25000 and focus on the three thresholds for municipalities with less than
25000 inhabitants: the 3000-, the 5000- and the 10000-threshold in the council
size law.12
For the RDD to measure the causal effect of council size, it is necessary that there
are no other changes at the 3000-, 5000- or 10000-threshold of the assignment
variable (see Lee and Lemieux, 2011 and Ade and Freier, 2011 for a discussion
on this topic). In Hesse there are changes in the population weight of the fiscal
equalization law at the 5000- and 10000-population threshold and in the salary
of the manager at the 10000-threshold. However, the assignment variables for
the salary of the manager and for the weights in the fiscal equalization law
differ from the assignment variable for council size: Council size is determined
by the relevant population size that is measured at specific dates before the
start of the legislative term. The weights in the fiscal equalization law and the
salary of the manager are determined by the current population size and by
the current population size lagged one year, respectively. Thus, at the three
thresholds of the relevant population size, only council size changes which
helps me to disentangle the council size effect from other confounding policy
factors. Nonetheless, in the appendix, I also show that my results do not change
12After one election, a council in one municipality had 15 seats as prescribed by law but
effectively only 13 council members simply because one party had not enough candidates to
fill all the seats that it has received in the election. Importantly, my results are not sensitive to
excluding these 4 observations.
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when I directly control for the salary of the manager and the weights in the
fiscal equalization law in the regressions.
Suppose that there were no change in the nomination scheme of the manager.
Then, using the council size law, one could estimate the council size effect for
the whole investigation period by
yit = α+ βCit + δ′Xit + f (Popit) + eit, (2)
where f is a polynomial function of the treatment-determining variable Pop, the
relevant population size before an election, and X is a set of potential control
variables.
To generate exogenous variation in CitDit, I use that the introduction of the
election of the manager was implemented gradually over six years and that
the timing of the first manager election for each municipality was arguably
independent of observable and unobservable municipal characteristics.13 More
precisely, the decision of a change in the nomination scheme in Hesse evolved
as follows: In 1991, the state government of Hesse launched a referendum to ask
the citizens whether the manager in Hessian municipalities should be elected
instead of appointed. The referendum resulted in a vote for the switch in the
nomination scheme with a large majority. The reform should become law from
1993 on.
For my identification strategy, it is important that the date at which the term
of the last appointed manager ended differed across municipalities and has
not been under control of the state or local decision-makers in the year of the
change in law, 1991. Because this date differed across municipalities, it was
easier for the state government to implement a phase-in period of the new
nomination scheme with a length of 6 years than to let all municipalities switch
to the new system at a single date. Thus, municipalities switched to the new
system when the term of the last appointed manager ended. Therefore, I can
use those municipalities that had not been switched as counterfactual outcomes
for those that already had an elected manager. In this way, I can disentangle
general state-wide time effects from the introduction of the elected manager.
I code the variable Dit as follows: It is equal to one for the first time when
13For empirical studies also using a similar phase-in period of a switch in local government
systems in a different contexts see Egger et al. (2011a, 2011b) and Ade (2014).
Elected or appointed? 61
Table 2.3: Switch in the nomination scheme
Year Number of municipalitieswith D = 1 for the first time
1993 45
1994 77
1995 85
1996 77
1997 63
1998 66
1999 13
Sum 426
the elected manager is likely able to effectively lead the public administration
and from then on stays one until the year 2000. Manager elections take place
throughout the year. If the first election of the manager is in the first half of the
year, I assume that the elected manager is able to lead the public administration
for the first time in the year of the election. If it is in the second half, I assume
that the manager can effectively lead the administration from the next year
on. For example, if the first manager election is in the first half of 1995, Dit is
equal to one for the first time in 1995, while Dit is equal to one for the first time
in 1996 if the first election is in the second half of 1995. Table 2.3 shows the
distribution of the timing of the switch for the 426 municipalities.
I estimate a combination of a Regression Discontinuity Design with a Difference-
in-Differences Approach:
yit = α+ βCit + γCitDit + δ′Xit + ρDit + f (Popit) + f (Popit)Dit + λt + eit (3)
Thus, I control for direct effects of the nomination scheme on fiscal policies by
including Dit directly into the regression and allow the polynomial function
of the treatment-determining covariate to differ before and after the change
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in the nomination scheme.14 I use polynomials ranging from the third to the
fifth order to investigate whether the estimated council size effect is sensitive to
the choice of the control function. In addition, I estimate the council size effect
using only observations that are close to one of the population thresholds. I
choose three different window sizes around the thresholds: ±25, ±20 and ±10
percent, respectively. In all specifications, I include year-fixed effects λt and the
proportion of people aged below 15 and above 65 in the specific municipality
as control variables.15 I cluster the standard errors at the municipality level to
allow for arbitrary serial correlation within a municipality (see Bertrand et al.,
2004).
Note that my approach differs from the typical RDD used in the literature
where there is a single discontinuity. Here, (and in related papers, see Egger
and Ko¨thenbu¨rger, 2010 and Pettersson-Lidbom, 2012) the data are pooled
around several population thresholds because the number of political units
close to a single threshold is typically too low to provide meaningful RDD
estimates. By pooling the data, however, the model exploits a large variation
in the assignment variable, i.e. population size, across jurisdictions which
might affect the estimates. Nonetheless, in the robustness checks in section
2.4.3, I will show that the results are insensitive to this large variation in
population size. It may be more appropriate to view the estimation approach
without restriction in the variation of the assignment variable as a difference-
in-differences approach where the first difference comes from the change in
the nomination scheme and the second difference from the different number of
14The estimated model is similar to the Difference-in-Discontinuities Design estimated by
Grembi et al. (2012) and Lalive et al. (2012). However, while their motivation is to disentangle
one policy factor from other confounding policy factors, my aim is to estimate the combined
effect of two features of the municipal system. Accordingly, they test for interactive effects
between their policy factor of interest and other confounding policy factors as the presence of
such interactions would invalidate their approach. By contrast, as I am interested in a combined
effect of two policy factors, interactions between these policy factors do not invalidate my
approach, but are at the core of the analysis.
15I also checked the robustness of the results by additionally including the seat shares of
the two most important local parties, the center-right CDU and the center-left SPD as well as
a dummy for absolute majorities (as a proxy for single-party governments) in the municipal
council as control variables, although these are not pre-determined variables in a strict sense.
The inclusion of these three additional control variables did not change the results and therefore
I omit them to save space. The results are available from the author upon request.
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legislators across municipalities.16
Before investigating the change in the council size effect, I measure the direct
causal effect of the change in the nomination scheme on the outcome variables.
If the switch in the nomination scheme of the manager results in higher spend-
ing for those expenditure categories over which the public administration has
the most discretion, this will be evidence that the manager prefers different
policies than the council and is indeed able to implement these policies after his
independence from the council has increased. This is an important requirement
for the existence of agency problems.
Besides that, the direct effect of a change in the nomination scheme is also
interesting in its own right. There are many early empirical studies that have
focused on local political institutions and their consequences for public policy,
mainly investigating the reform movements in the United States in the early
and mid-20th century (see, e.g., Booms, 1966; Morgan and Pelissero, 1980;
Rauch, 1995).17 In a recent contribution, Enikopolov (forthcoming) investigates
whether elected or appointed public officials differ in the employment policies
they pursue, but acknowledges that self-selection of local governments into
different political systems cannot be ruled out in his setting.
To measure the causal effect of a change in the nomination scheme, I implement
the following difference-in-differences estimation approach:
yit = µi + ρDit + λt + δ′Xit + eit (4)
where µi is a municipality-fixed effect. For the DiD approach, I use population
size, council size18, the proportion of people aged below 15 and above 65, the
seat shares of the two major parties (the center-left SPD and the center-right
16I thank an anonymous reviewer for this comment. I have followed his suggestion and titled
the estimates without restriction in the variation of the assignment variable in table 2.5 as DiD
estimates.
17Rauch (1995) was also one of the first to explicitly describe the relationship between the
city council and the public administration as a principal-agent problem in which incentives for
the bureaucracy depend on the specific local government structure in place.
18Note that I allow the coefficient on the council size to differ before and after the reform
as the analysis below clearly shows that this is appropriate. This way, I am able to measure
the effect that is due to a change in the nomination scheme without confounding it with the
effect that is due to a changing relationship between fragmentation and fiscal policies after the
change in the nomination scheme.
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CDU), and a dummy variable for absolute majorities in the municipal council
as control variables.
For the difference-in-differences approach to be valid, it is required that those
municipalities that have not switched to the new system yet can be regarded
as valid counterfactuals for those municipalities that have already switched.
This requirement implies that in absence of the treatment, the fiscal policies
of the treated municipalities should have evolved on the same time path as of
those municipalities that have not been treated. It is most likely to hold if the
timing of the switch was indeed quasi-random such that municipalities did not
self-select into the treatment or control group. Evidence for the validity of this
assumption is presented in section 2.4.3.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 The direct effects of a change in the nomination scheme
Table 2.4 presents the results from the difference-in-differences approach (4).
Total expenditures, personnel expenditures and material spending significantly
increase when the manager is elected instead of appointed, while most other
outcome variables are not affected. Only for the multiplier of the property tax B,
I find a significantly negative effect. The effects for the outcome variables over
which the public administration has the most discretion are highly significant
and economically relevant. For example, material spending grows by more than
10% in response to the switch in the nomination scheme. These results provide
evidence for the interpretation that the manager has different spending priorities
than the municipal council and that he can use his increased independence from
the council after the change in the nomination scheme to influence spending.
The results thus point to agency problems between the public administration
and the municipal council.
2.4.2 The change in the council size effect
In this section, I provide evidence on how the council size effect changes when
there is a change in the nomination scheme by estimating the empirical model
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Table 2.4: The direct effect of a change in the nomination scheme (Equation
(4))
ρ
0.0915
Log (Total Expenditures) (0.0340)***
0.0657
Log (Personnel exp.) (0.0297)**
0.1031
Log (Material spending) (0.0385)***
-0.0007
Log (Capital expenditures) (0.0975)
-4.5423
Multiplier Property Tax A (3.8705)
-12.7461
Multiplier Property Tax B (5.0712)**
-4.2133
Multiplier Business Tax (4.0642)
Observations 6308
Notes: Expenditure variables are expressed in constant 2005 prices. The tax rate
multipliers are expressed in percentage points. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level. There are 397 clusters. The sample includes only municipalities
with a relevant population size below 25000 in the time period 1985-2000. All regres-
sions include year-fixed effects, municipality-fixed effects and the control variables
mentioned in the text. ∗Significant at the 10 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent
level, ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
(3). Table 2.5 presents the results for the council size effect before (β) and after
(β + γ) the change in the nomination scheme of the manager. Moreover, I
report results on the coefficient γ. OLS results differ depending on the outcome
variable and no clear pattern emerges neither regarding the significance nor
the sign of the council size effect before and after the change in the nomination
scheme. The comparison with the DiD results leads to the conclusion that the
OLS estimates are severely biased.
In the following, I will consider the council size effect not only for total expen-
ditures, but also for different types of expenditures for two reasons. First, the
main pattern in the data might be more visible in specific types of expenditures
than in aggregate expenditures because the latter consist to a significant extent
of expenditure categories over which the city manager has no discretion.
Second, considering different types of expenditures allows shedding some
light on the mechanism underlying the results. If agency problems between
the public administration and the legislature are driving the results, then
the negative effects after the reform should be existent in those expenditure
categories over which the public administration has the most discretion. If
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Table 2.5: Results from the empirical model (3)
OLS DiD DiD DiD
Log(Total Expenditures)
β
0.0067 -0.0053 -0.0061 -0.0061
(0.0014)*** -0.0036 (0.0037)* (0.0037)*
γ
-0.0051 -0.0026 -0.0038 -0.0037
(0.0013)*** (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047)
β+ γ
0.0016 -0.0080 -0.0099 -0.0098
(0.0015) (0.0042)* (0.0043)** (0.0043)**
Log(Personnel exp.)
β
0.0090 -0.0041 -0.0032 -0.0029
(0.0015)*** (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0035)
γ
-0.0040 -0.0049 -0.0052 -0.0052
(0.0012)*** (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0051)
β+ γ
0.0050 -0.0090 -0.0084 -0.0081
(0.0016)*** (0.0050)* (0.0050)* (0.0050)
Log(Material spending)
β
0.0040 -0.0045 -0.0057 -0.0055
(0.0014)** (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044)
γ
-0.0057 -0.0090 -0.0084 -0.0082
(0.0014)*** (0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0060)
β+ γ
-0.0018 -0.0135 -0.0141 -0.0137
(0.0019) (0.0056)** (0.0059)** (0.0057)**
Log(Capital expenditures)
β
-0.0061 -0.0015 -0.0025 -0.002
(0.0024)** (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0063)
γ
-0.0061 -0.0074 -0.0089 -0.0091
(0.0032)* (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0109)
β+ γ
-0.0122 -0.0088 -0.0114 -0.0112
(0.0033)*** (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0106)
Multiplier Property Tax A
β
-1.4079 0.0672 0.2515 0.2656
(0.2908)*** (0.7533) (0.7675) (0.7693)
γ
0.2108 0.3388 0.3733 0.3733
(0.1933) (1.0268) (1.0440) (1.0488)
β+ γ
-1.1971 0.4060 0.6248 0.6389
(0.2784)*** (0.8980) (0.8929) (0.8904)
Multiplier Property Tax B
β
-0.7698 1.0389 1.1750 1.1505
(0.2627)*** (0.7340) (0.7412) (0.7421)
γ
0.3904 -0.7867 -0.6932 -0.6882
(0.1903)** (0.8722) (0.8911) (0.8941)
β+ γ
-0.3793 0.2522 0.4818 0.4623
(0.2540) (0.7356) (0.7402) (0.7420)
Multiplier Business Tax
β
0.7209 -0.4320 -0.3664 -0.3849
(0.1692)*** (0.3899) (0.3959) (0.3980)
γ
0.0906 0.1342 0.2174 0.2021
(0.1487) (0.5896) (0.5989) (0.5970)
β+ γ
0.8115 -0.2978 -0.1491 -0.1828
(0.2024)*** (0.5330) (0.5291) (0.5295)
Degree of polynomial None Third Fourth Fifth
Notes: Expenditure variables are expressed in constant 2005 prices. The tax rate
multipliers are expressed in percentage points. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level. There are 397 clusters. The sample includes only municipalities with
a relevant population size below 25000 in the time period 1985-2000. There are 6308
observations. All regressions include year-fixed effects and the proportion of people
aged below 15 and above 65 as control variables. *Significant at the 10 percent level,
**Significant at the 5 percent level, ***Significant at the 1 percent level.
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the public administration has no discretion over an expenditure category and
can accordingly not influence it even after the reform, a large(r) council is
simply not needed to monitor the public administration. In this case, the
number of legislators would not have any effect on fiscal policies. As argued in
section 2, the public administration should have considerable discretion over
personnel expenditures and material spending. Table 2.4 has shown that the
public administration indeed strongly increases spending in these areas once
it has become more independent from the council after the introduction of
elections. Thus, there is suggestive evidence that the public administration is
budget-maximizing.
Using the estimation approach (3), for total expenditures I find a council
size effect that is at the border of statistical significance when the manager is
appointed: For the third order polynomial, the council size effect is marginally
insignificant and for the fourth and fifth order polynomial marginally significant
(p-values: 0.096 and 0.099). Thus, there is only weak evidence for a council size
effect when the manager is appointed. After the introduction of elections, the
estimates suggest that there is a highly significant negative council size effect.
This is some preliminary weak evidence that the council size effects could not
be generalizable to all political systems. However, for stronger evidence in
favor of this hypothesis, as explained above I will consider different types of
expenditures because total expenditures also include expenditure types over
which the manager has no discretion.
I indeed find highly significant negative council size effects for material spend-
ing and personnel expenditures for the period with an elected manager, but not
for the period with an appointed manager. The estimates for the period with
an elected manager are of a larger magnitude for material spending than for
total expenditures. To put the estimates in numerical magnitude, my baseline
results suggest that an additional councilor decreases personnel expenditures
and material spending after the reform by approximately 0.9% and 1.4%, re-
spectively, while the corresponding estimates for the period with an appointed
manager suggest that an additional councilor reduces both expenditure types
by only approximately 0.4%.
For the elected manager the results therefore correspond to those from Pettersson-
Lidbom (2012). The estimated effects are very robust across polynomial spec-
ifications. This insensitivity to the choice of the polynomial order suggests
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that the control function is not misspecified. Thus, a directly elected manager
wants to increase spending according to the results in section 2.4.1, while this
increase is smaller the larger the council is. This is highly suggestive for the
interpretation that a larger council has more possibilities to restrict the spending
preferences of the manager. The manager can use the increasing independence
from the council after the reform better if he cannot be monitored by many
councilors.
For investment expenditures over which the manager has no discretion, I do
not find any significant effect for either period. Again, the council size effects
are very robust across polynomial specifications. Other outcome variables over
which the public administration has no discretion are the multipliers of the
three local tax rates that municipalities are free to set. Therefore, I should not
find negative council size effects after the change in the nomination scheme
for these outcome variables. Indeed, using the three local tax rates reveals no
significant council size effects before and after the reform: The tax rate effects
are small and close to zero (note again that I have not transformed the tax rates
into logarithms) and there is no clear pattern of whether the council size effects
before or after the reform are larger.
The channel through which the reform affects fiscal policy is important to
evaluate the welfare consequences of the interaction between the switch in
the nomination scheme and government fragmentation. If agency problems
are responsible for the results, then more fragmentation is positive from a
welfare point of view, because more legislators are better able to monitor a
budget-maximizing administration. This is especially true after the switch in the
nomination scheme as agency problems have presumably become stronger after
the reform. By contrast, pork-barrel type models as put forward by Weingast
et al. (1981) and Primo and Snyder (2008) would suggest that any effect of
the number of legislators on expenditures (i.e. over- or underspending) leads
to inefficiency. In this case, the introduction of elected managers has created
inefficiency through underspending.
If I relate the findings for different outcome variables using the empirical model
(3) ) to the findings of the direct effects of the change in the nomination scheme
as shown in table 2.4, my results suggest that the number of legislators only
plays a role for those expenditure categories for which a powerful administrator
had the opportunity to increase expenditures after the reform due to his growing
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independence from the council. This finding indicates that indeed agency
problems could be responsible for the results: As mentioned above, monitoring
the public administration to restrict a possible spending expansion is only
necessary if the administrator has some discretionary power to decide on
expenditures and if the administrator chooses spending levels that diverge
from the spending preferences of the council. It seems to be the case that more
legislators are indeed better able to curb down the spending expansion that has
resulted from the change in the nomination scheme.
As an alternative explanation one might argue that the change in the council
size effect could be due to political selection rather than due to the direct
effect of a different institutional setting. For example, it may be possible that
when the manager is appointed by the council, strong ties to the party system
are necessary for a candidate to hold office. By contrast, when the manager
is elected by the voters more independent candidates could have a greater
chance. Therefore, I have compared the party affiliations of the appointed
managers before the switch in the system with the party affiliations of the
elected managers after the switch.
Unfortunately, municipalities recorded the party affiliations (and other personal
characteristics of the city manager) only after the change of the nomination
scheme. For the time before the change, I only have cross-sectional information
on the party affiliations for the year 1991. Comparing the structure of the
party affiliations of the city managers in the year 1991 to the structure in 1999
(after all municipalities have switched to the new system) only points to minor
changes in the partisan identities of the city managers. Especially the number
of independent candidates only rose marginally.
Moreover, political selection might play a role in the sense that the average
quality of the managers changes after the reform. This may be the case if, for
example, the position of the manager has become politically more attractive. As
noted above, detailed characteristics about the city managers as proxies for their
quality are not available before the reform. However, there are good arguments
for why the quality of the managers did not change through the reform (at least
in the short-run period after the reform that I consider).
First, neither pay nor pension conditions have changed through the reform.
Second, the city manager has also not become politically more important as
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he has not gained any competencies. Third, Hesse was the first German state
that has reformed the position of the city manager and moreover, the local
government system of Hesse is unique in Germany. Thus, political actors in
Hesse could not have any precise information about how the attractiveness of
the position could change after the reform. It is likely that for the first manager
election the same types of candidates were nominated that would have also
been considered under the old system. In fact, many of the politicians that had
been city manager shortly before the reform (in 1991) stood also for election
after the system had been changed (and were often elected). Thus, the average
quality of the city manager has likely not changed at least in the short run. To
summarize, it seems to be unlikely that political selection is driving the results.
As a specification check of the results in table 2.5, the council size effect is also
estimated using only observations that are close to the population thresholds.
Tables 2.6-2.8 report the results from the ±25%, ±20% and ±10% window
widths around the thresholds, respectively. These results are very similar to
the estimation results obtained with the full sample. Most of the results stay
significant and the magnitude of the point estimates roughly stays the same.
This is further evidence that the results are very robust against misspecification.
2.4.3 Robustness checks
In this section, I discuss the robustness of the results. A concern that may render
the RDD invalid is when political units strategically manipulate the assignment
variable in order to self-select into the treatment or control group. While I argue
that local governments do not have the possibility to misreport their population
size, it may be - at least theoretically - possible that citizens strategically migrate
into or out of municipalities to influence council size. Evidence for this kind
of sorting would be given if there is a discontinuity in the distribution of the
assignment variable at the threshold (see Lee and Lemieux, 2011). In Figure 2.4,
I show histograms of the assignment variable at the three thresholds. These
histograms do not provide any evidence for sorting around the thresholds as
the number of local governments slightly below each threshold is always nearly
equal to the number of local governments slightly above each threshold.
More formally, I can test the null hypothesis of no discontinuity with a McCrary-
test (see McCrary, 2008). Figure 2.5 reports the results of the McCrary-test at
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Table 2.6: Window size ±25% around the threshold (equation (3))
OLS RDD RDD RDD
Log(Total Expenditures)
β
0.0025 -0.0068 -0.0070 -0.0066
(0.0018) (0.0040)* (0.0041)* (0.0042)
γ
-0.0040 -0.0034 -0.0028 -0.0016
(0.0017)** (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0061)
β+ γ
-0.0014 -0.0103 -0.0099 -0.0082
(0.0017) (0.0051)** (0.0054)* (0.0056)
Log(Personnel exp.)
β
0.0046 -0.0030 -0.0028 -0.0030
(0.0017)*** (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0039)
γ
-0.0027 -0.0081 -0.0083 -0.0089
(0.0016)* (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0065)
β+ γ
0.0019 -0.0111 -0.0111 -0.0119
(0.0020) (0.0054)** (0.0056)** (0.0057)**
Log(Material spending)
β
0.0000 -0.0042 -0.0037 -0.0038
(0.0022) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046)
γ
-0.0031 -0.0126 -0.0113 -0.0125
(0.0018)* (0.0070)* (0.0072) (0.0074)*
β+ γ
-0.0030 -0.0168 -0.0150 -0.0162
(0.0021) (0.0062)*** (0.0064)** (0.0066)**
Log(Capital expenditures)
β
-0.0045 0.0004 0.0007 0.0009
(0.0030) (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0074)
γ
-0.0041 -0.0004 0.0007 0.0064
(0.0039) (0.0131) (0.0136) (0.0144)
β+ γ
-0.0087 0.0000 0.0014 0.0074
(0.0040)** (0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0134)
Multiplier Property Tax A
β
-0.9219 -0.2472 -0.3104 -0.1111
(0.3736)** (0.8949) (0.9076) (0.9414)
γ
0.1205 1.0453 0.7994 0.5415
(0.3090) (1.3200) (1.3283) (1.3676)
β+ γ
-0.8015 0.7981 0.4890 0.4304
(0.3641)** (1.0379) (1.0720) (1.0767)
Multiplier Property Tax B
β
-0.4545 0.0605 0.0504 0.1921
-0.3555 -0.8367 -0.8450 -0.8855
γ
0.0999 -0.5019 0.3609 -0.7062
-0.2811 -1.1479 -1.1449 -1.1961
β+ γ
-0.3546 -0.4414 -0.3105 -0.5141
-0.3452 -0.9037 -0.9051 -0.9494
Multiplier Business Tax
β
0.3672 -0.5301 -0.5293 -0.4191
(0.2109)* (0.4398) (0.4415) (0.4595)
γ
-0.0477 0.5876 0.5434 0.3192
(0.2125) (0.7073) (0.7106) (0.7487)
β+ γ
0.3194 0.0576 0.0141 -0.0999
(0.2473) (0.5298) (0.5391) (0.5521)
Degree of polynomial None Third Fourth Fifth
Notes: Expenditure variables are expressed in constant 2005 prices. The tax rate
multipliers are expressed in percentage points. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level. There are 298 clusters. The sample includes all municipalities with
a population size in the ±25% window around the three thresholds. There are 4204
observations. All regressions include year-fixed effects and the proportion of people
aged below 15 and above 65 as control variables. *Significant at the 10 percent level,
**Significant at the 5 percent level, ***Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 2.7: Window size ±20% around the threshold (equation (3))
OLS RDD RDD RDD
Log(Total Expenditures)
β
0.0029 -0.0067 -0.0067 -0.0064
(0.0019) (0.0040)* (0.0041)* (0.0042)
γ
-0.0040 -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0013
(0.0018)** (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0061)
β+ γ
-0.0011 -0.0093 -0.0094 -0.0077
(0.0018) (0.0053)* (0.0054)* (0.0056)
Log(Personnel exp.)
β
0.0053 -0.0031 -0.0030 -0.0026
(0.0018)*** (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0039)
γ
-0.0037 -0.0086 -0.0092 -0.0100
(0.0018)** (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0066)
β+ γ
0.0016 -0.0117 -0.0122 -0.0125
(0.0021) (0.0056)** (0.0056)** (0.0057)**
Log(Material spending)
β
0.0006 -0.0028 -0.0027 -0.0037
(0.0023) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046)
γ
-0.0034 -0.0131 -0.0120 -0.0111
(0.0020)* (0.0073)* (0.0073)* (0.0073)
β+ γ
-0.0027 -0.0159 -0.0147 -0.0148
(0.0021) (0.0064)** (0.0065)** (0.0065)**
Log(Capital expenditures)
β
-0.0034 0.0034 0.0036 0.0022
(0.0032) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0074)
γ
-0.0027 -0.0008 -0.0004 0.0072
(0.0041) (0.0136) (0.0139) (0.0146)
β+ γ
-0.0060 0.0027 0.0032 0.0094
(0.0041) (0.0126) (0.0129) (0.0135)
Multiplier Property Tax A
β
-0.7479 -0.4319 -0.4231 -0.2153
(0.3883)* (0.9033) (0.9071) (0.9309)
γ
0.1947 1.2487 1.1849 0.6368
(0.3557) (1.3724) (1.3705) (1.3757)
β+ γ
-0.5532 0.8168 0.7617 0.4215
(0.3836) (1.0611) (1.0723) (1.0759)
Multiplier Property Tax B
β
-0.5839 0.0165 0.0291 0.1827
(0.3729) (0.8539) (0.8568) (0.8809)
γ
0.0682 -0.3733 -0.3553 -0.8657
(0.3270) (1.1858) (1.1681) (1.1692)
β+ γ
-0.5157 -0.3568 -0.3262 -0.683
(0.3632) (0.9232) (0.9163) (0.9329)
Multiplier Business Tax
β
0.2920 -0.6594 -0.6631 -0.5010
(0.2287) (0.4390) (0.4393) (0.4510)
γ
-0.0158 0.6360 0.6899 0.3698
(0.2395) (0.7337) (0.7260) (0.7458)
β+ γ
0.2763 -0.0235 0.0268 -0.1312
(0.2654) (0.5413) (0.5378) (0.5526)
Degree of polynomial None Third Fourth Fifth
Notes: Expenditure variables are expressed in constant 2005 prices. The tax rate
multipliers are expressed in percentage points. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level. There are 269 clusters. The sample includes all municipalities with
a population size in the ±20% window around the three thresholds. There are 3460
observations. All regressions include year-fixed effects and the proportion of people
aged below 15 and above 65 as control variables. *Significant at the 10 percent level,
**Significant at the 5 percent level, ***Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 2.8: Window size ±10% around the threshold (equation (3))
OLS RDD RDD RDD
Log(Total Expenditures)
β
0.0019 -0.0052 -0.0060 -0.0060
(0.0025) (0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0043)
γ
-0.0054 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0008
(0.0030)* (0.0067) (0.0073) (0.0073)
β+ γ
-0.0035 -0.0061 -0.0069 -0.0068
(0.0025) (0.0057) (0.0059) (0.0058)
Log(Personnel exp.)
β
0.0049 -0.0019 -0.0015 -0.0013
(0.0024)** (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0042)
γ
-0.0058 -0.0090 -0.0097 -0.0098
(0.0033)* (0.0077) (0.0081) (0.0082)
β+ γ
-0.0009 -0.0109 -0.0112 -0.0112
(0.0034) (0.0064)* (0.0068)* (0.0068)
Log(Material spending)
β
0.0026 -0.0004 0.0013 0.0013
(0.0029) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0047)
γ
-0.0041 -0.0126 -0.0161 -0.0158
(0.0034) (0.0081) (0.0081)** (0.0081)*
β+ γ
-0.0015 -0.0130 -0.0147 -0.0146
(0.0029) (0.0069)* (0.0067)** (0.0067)**
Log(Capital expenditures)
β
-0.0031 0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.0047) (0.0074) (0.0077) (0.0077)
γ
-0.0033 0.0099 0.0043 0.0045
(0.0070) (0.0172) (0.0169) (0.0170)
β+ γ
-0.0064 0.0107 0.0041 0.0042
(0.0067) (0.0154) (0.0152) (0.0152)
Multiplier Property Tax A
β
-1.2784 -0.6249 -0.7592 -0.7567
(0.5180)** (0.9809) (0.9442) (0.9446)
γ
0.8601 1.1362 1.5534 1.523
(0.6047) (1.6055) (1.6370) (1.6262)
β+ γ
-0.4182 0.5113 0.7942 0.7663
(0.5720) (1.1640) (1.2041) (1.1914)
Multiplier Property Tax B
β
-0.6996 0.2624 0.4290 0.4781
(0.5233) (0.9493) (0.9194) (0.9084)
γ
0.3213 -1.2911 -1.4974 -1.5765
(0.5348) (1.3526) (1.3739) (1.3425)
β+ γ
-0.3784 -1.0288 -1.0684 -1.0984
(0.4916) (0.9693) (1.0024) (0.9891)
Multiplier Business Tax
β
-0.0657 -0.7949 -0.8391 -0.8418
(0.3010) (0.4549)* (0.4565)* (0.4594)*
γ
0.365 1.2704 1.4131 1.3959
(0.3376) (0.8247) (0.8790) (0.8822)
β+ γ
0.2993 0.4755 0.5739 0.5541
(0.3076) (0.5993) (0.6586) (0.6533)
Degree of polynomial None Third Fourth Fifth
Notes: Expenditure variables are expressed in constant 2005 prices. The tax rate
multipliers are expressed in percentage points. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level. There are 175 clusters. The sample includes all municipalities with
a population size in the ±10% window around the three thresholds. There are 1816
observations. All regressions include year-fixed effects and the proportion of people
aged below 15 and above 65 as control variables. *Significant at the 10 percent level,
**Significant at the 5 percent level, ***Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Figure 2.4: Histogram of relevant population size around the thresholds
(a) 3000-threshold (b) 5000-threshold
(c) 10000-threshold
the three thresholds before the four elections. At none of these thresholds, the
null hypothesis of no discontinuity can be rejected. Moreover, I conducted the
McCrary-test separately for the relevant population size before and after the
reform. It might be possible that the potential benefits of a specific council
size differ between the two possible nomination schemes such that sorting of
political units might only occur before or after the reform. However, I also
do not find any evidence for a discontinuity at the thresholds if I consider
both time periods separately. Results are omitted here, but are available upon
request.
A second concern with the RDD is that council size might not be randomly
assigned at the threshold. To test for this, I use council size as dependent
variable and run a regression on the observable covariates and the control
function (see Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008), i.e. I estimate
Cit = α+ δ′Xit + f (Popit) + λt + eit (5)
I run separate regressions for the periods with either nomination scheme of the
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Figure 2.5: Histogram of relevant population size
(a) Threshold of 3000 inhabitants. Point estimate of the discontinuity: 0.3349, se: 0.2662
(b) Threshold of 5000 inhabitants. Point estimate of the discontinuity: -0.1356, se: 0.1821
(c) Threshold of 10000 inhabitants. Point estimate of the discontinuity: 0.24, se: 0.1675
Notes: Weighted kernel estimation of the log density of the assignment variable,
performed separately on either side of each of the three population thresholds.
The optimal bandwidth is computed as in McCrary (2008).
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Table 2.9: Council size as dependent variable before change in nomi-
nation scheme (eq. 5))
(1) (2) (3)
Council Size Council Size Council Size
Proportion of old, 65+ -0.0431 -0.0416 -0.0463
(0.0425) (0.0413) (0.0410)
Proportion of young, 0-15 -0.1040 -0.0988 -0.1017
(0.0649) (0.0648) (0.0647)
Dummy: Absolute majority -0.0856 -0.0229 -0.0056
(0.2029) (0.2075) (0.2109)
Seat share CDU -0.1172 -0.3019 -0.3869
(0.8907) (0.9425) (0.9779)
Seat share SPD -0.4416 -0.6637 -0.7309
(0.9096) (0.9873) (1.0345)
Observations 4238 4238 4238
Degree of polynomial Third Fourth Fifth
p-value F-Test 0.5584 0.6151 0.58
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. There are
397 clusters. The sample includes all municipalities before the switch in the
nomination scheme of the manager with a relevant population size below
25000. All regressions include year-fixed effects. *Significant at the 10 percent
level, **Significant at the 5 percent level, ***Significant at the 1 percent level
manager. If the coefficients of the covariates were significantly different from
zero, this would indicate that council size depends on some covariates and that
therefore council size is not randomly assigned. Tables 2.9 and 2.10 show the
results for different polynomial orders in the control function. Neither are any
of the individual coefficients significantly different from zero for either period
nor are the coefficients jointly significantly different from zero as indicated by
the F-tests. Another strategy to test whether council size is randomly assigned
is to look for a discontinuity in the distribution of a covariate at the threshold,
i.e. to employ the baseline covariates as dependent variable in (3). However, I
do not find any significant treatment effect no matter which covariate I use as
dependent variable. Results are available upon request.
A concern with the empirical strategy might be that the estimates could be
driven by the large variation in the assignment variable because my estimation
approach pools data from three different population thresholds. A strategy to
rule out such concerns is to include discontinuity fixed effects into the spec-
ifications within specific window sizes around the three thresholds (i.e. the
specifications in tables 2.6-2.8). Precisely, I include a dummy variable equal to
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Table 2.10: Council size as dependent variable after change in nomi-
nation scheme (eq. 5))
(1) (2) (3)
Council Size Council Size Council Size
Proportion of old, 65+ -0.0564 -0.0669 -0.0693
(0.0578) (0.0571) (0.0574)
Proportion of young, 0-15 -0.0109 -0.0213 -0.0164
(0.0859) (0.0856) (0.0856)
Dummy: Absolute majority -0.1136 -0.0284 -0.0295
(0.2766) (0.2814) (0.2845)
Seat share CDU -0.4797 -0.5515 -0.6082
(1.1319) (1.1525) (1.1806)
Seat share SPD 1.0521 0.8932 0.8989
(1.2058) (1.2929) (1.3377)
Observations 2070 2070 2070
Degree of polynomial Third Fourth Fifth
p-value F-Test 0.7936 0.7453 0.7063
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. There are
393 clusters. The sample includes all municipalities after the switch in the
nomination scheme of the manager with a relevant population size below
25000. All regressions include year-fixed effects. *Significant at the 10 percent
level, **Significant at the 5 percent level, ***Significant at the 1 percent level
one if an observation is close to the first threshold and zero otherwise. Analo-
gously, I include a second dummy variable for whether an observation is close
to the second threshold (the third threshold serves as the reference category).
Moreover, I interact the running variable with these discontinuity fixed effects
to estimate separate functions of the assignment variable within each of the
three discontinuity samples. With this procedure, I allow the estimates to be
identified only by the variation within each of the three discontinuity samples.
In tables 2.11-2.13, I present the results of specifications without polynomials
and with polynomials of first and second degree. To economize on space, I
only present the estimates for those outcome variables with significant results
in the baseline specification.19 As can be seen, the results are qualitatively very
similar to those obtained by the baseline model. For the larger bandwidths
±25% and ±20%, a second order polynomial seems to be more appropriate
than a first order polynomial (this is also suggested by model selection criteria
like the AIC). For the smallest bandwidth, specifications with first and second
order polynomials give quantitatively very similar results. In contrast to the
19The results for the other outcome variables are never significant and in line with what I
have found in the baseline specification.
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Table 2.11: Specification (3) with discontinuity fixed effects -
Window size ±25% around the threshold
RDD RDD RDD
Log(Total Expenditures)
β
-0.0033 -0.0049 -0.0046
(0.0028) (0.0037) (0.0039)
γ
-0.0039 0.0008 -0.0021
(0.0017)** (0.0041) (0.0047)
β+ γ
-0.0073 -0.0041 -0.0066
(0.0027)*** (0.0044) (0.0046)
Log(Personnel exp.)
β
-0.0019 -0.0035 -0.0025
(0.0025) (0.0037) (0.0037)
γ
-0.0027 -0.0023 -0.0053
(0.0016)** (0.0045) (0.0051)
β+ γ
-0.0046 -0.0058 -0.0078
(0.0027)* (0.0047) (0.0052)
Log(Material spending)
β
-0.0077 -0.0005 0.0024
(0.0031)** (0.0044) (0.0045)
γ
-0.0031 -0.0036 -0.0107
(0.0018)* (0.0046) (0.0057)*
β+ γ
-0.0107 -0.0041 -0.0084
(0.0030)*** (0.0051) (0.0056)
Degree of polynomial None First Second
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The
table shows results obtained by estimating table 2.6 with discontinuity
fixed-effects. The same control variables as in Table 2.6 are included.
*Significant at the 10 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level,
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
baseline model, however, some estimates are now slightly insignificant because
of an increase in the standard errors. Most interestingly, the estimates with no
polynomial included are also close to the results of the baseline specification in
table 2.5: This suggests that there is no evidence for the initial concern that the
results could be driven by the (high-order) population controls.20
A further concern with the change of the nomination scheme might be that
appointed managers who know to get treated (i.e. elected) in the near future
20A second strategy to test whether the large between-variation of population controls is able
to drive the results is to include municipality-fixed effects. As discussed by Pettersson-Lidbom
(2012), in this case the estimates are only identified by the within-variation of population
size, and can thus not be due to the large variation in the running variable between different
municipalities at presumably different population thresholds. In non-reported robustness
checks, I have also performed these fixed-effects regressions. The results were qualitatively
similar to the baseline specification such that I omit them here.
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Table 2.12: Specification (3) with discontinuity fixed effects -
Window size ±20% around the threshold
RDD RDD RDD
Log(Total Expenditures)
β
-0.0034 -0.0038 -0.0031
(0.0028) (0.0038) (0.0040)
γ
-0.0039 0.0010 -0.0021
(0.0018)** (0.0043) (0.0049)
β+ γ
-0.0073 -0.0028 -0.0052
(0.0027)*** (0.0046) (0.0048)
Log(Personnel exp.)
β
-0.0016 -0.0036 -0.0031
(0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0037)
γ
-0.0034 -0.0038 -0.0054
(0.0018)* (0.0046) (0.0054)
β+ γ
-0.0050 -0.0074 -0.0085
(0.0028)* (0.0050) (0.0054)*
Log(Material spending)
β
-0.0063 0.0011 0.0033
(0.0033)* (0.0044) (0.0045)
γ
-0.0034 -0.0057 -0.0118
(0.0020)* (0.0049) (0.0061)*
β+ γ
-0.0097 -0.0046 -0.0086
(0.0031)*** (0.0055) (0.0059)
Degree of polynomial None First Second
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The
table shows results obtained by estimating table 2.7 with discontinuity
fixed-effects. The same control variables as in table 2.7 are included.
*Significant at the 10 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level,
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
will already start to pursue different policies before the switch takes place.21
For example, they might feel the need to please important party members to be
nominated as an official party candidate for the upcoming elections. To rule out
such concerns, I investigate whether the time until the switch of the nomination
scheme influences the behavior of the managers by including anticipation terms
into specification (4). Moreover, I also investigate whether the time since the
switch has occurred affects the policies pursued by the (then elected) managers.
Specifically, I estimate
yit = µi + ρDit + λt +
3
∑
l=−3
τilt + δ
′Xit + eit (6)
with τilt as dummy variables that indicate the time until/since the first election
of the city manager (i.e. l = −3 indicates three years before the first election
21I thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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Table 2.13: Specification (3) with discontinuity fixed effects -
Window size ±10% around the threshold
RDD RDD RDD
Log(Total Expenditures)
β
-0.0027 -0.0065 -0.0059
(0.0032) (0.0043) (0.0046)
γ
-0.0054 -0.002 -0.0038
(0.0030)* (0.0058) (0.0065)
β+ γ
-0.0081 -0.0084 -0.0097
(0.0034)*** (0.0065) (0.0067)
Log(Personnel exp.)
β
-0.0028 -0.0022 -0.0018
(0.0029) (0.0042) (0.0045)
γ
-0.0059 -0.0065 -0.0068
(0.0031)* (0.0069) (0.0074)
β+ γ
-0.0086 -0.0087 -0.0086
(0.0039)** (0.0075) (0.0077)
Log(Material spending)
β
-0.0025 0.0001 0.0015
(0.0038) (0.0049) (0.0051)
γ
-0.0041 -0.0084 -0.0113
(0.0034) (0.0072) (0.0084)
β+ γ
-0.0066 -0.0083 -0.0098
(0.0038)* (0.0072) (0.0078)
Degree of polynomial None First Second
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The
table shows results obtained by estimating table 2.8 with discontinuity
fixed-effects. The same control variables as in table 2.8 are included.
*Significant at the 10 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level,
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
and l = 3 three years after the first election). Specification (6) includes the same
control variables as (4).
Table 2.14 shows the results. Only for the multiplier of the business tax in the
third period after the switch I find an effect that is marginally significant at the
10%-level. To further probe whether my results could be sensitive to adjustment
or anticipation effects, I have re-run my baseline model (3) excluding the year
of the first election as well as the three years before and after the first election
for each municipality. However, my baseline results did not change. Based on
these two robustness checks, it is very unlikely that my results are driven by
adjustment or anticipation effects.
Although the order in which municipalities switch to an elected manager
appears to be quasi-random, another robustness check is to test whether the
timing of the transition to the new system is really independent of observable
covariates. Therefore, I perform a duration analysis for the transition from the
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Table 2.15: Results from the discrete complementary log-log model (7)
(1)
Dit
Proportion old 0.0082
(0.0233)
Proportion young 0.0517
(0.0406)
Seat share SPD 0.7379
(0.5188)
Seat share CDU -0.0336
(0.5274)
Abs. majority -0.1392
(0.1250)
Population -0.000
(0.000)
Observations 1446
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. There are 394 clusters.
The sample includes all municipalities since 1993 that either have an appointed man-
ager or have Dit = 1 for the first time. The baseline hazard is fully nonparametric.
*Significant at the 10 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level, ***Significant at
the 1 percent level
year 1993 on. Because I have grouped the timing of the switch into yearly data,
I estimate a discrete duration model. I estimate the discrete complementary
log-log model with a fully nonparametric baseline hazard (Allison, 1982) which
is the discrete time representation of a continuous time proportional hazard
model. To estimate this model, I construct a panel data set in which the
dependent variable is 0 for a municipality if it has not switched yet to the new
system and 1 in the year of the transition (it is then the last observation for this
municipality).22 Formally, using the newly constructed panel data set I estimate
Dit = α+ δ′Xit + λt + eit (7)
The effects of the observable covariates on the hazard of switching to the new
system are shown in table 2.15. In short, I do not find any significant effect
of neither the population variables nor the political variables on the hazard of
the transition from the system of an appointed manager to the system with
22Practically, estimating the discrete complementary log-log model is equivalent to estimating
a logit model on the newly constructed panel data set.
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an elected manager. Although I can of course not perform such a test for
unobservable covariates, the fact that the observable covariates do not have any
influence on the timing of the first manager election suggests that the order of
the switch was indeed quasi-random.
In section 2.3, I have discussed that also the population weight to calculate the
fiscal need of a municipality in the fiscal equalization law in Hesse as well as the
salary of the manager are discontinuous functions of population size, but that
the weight as well as the salary do not depend on the relevant population size,
but on the current population size and the population size lagged by one year,
respectively. Although the relevant population size is not perfectly correlated
with the assignment variables for the weights in the fiscal equalization law
and for the salary of the manager23, the correlation between these assignment
variables might take up some effects that I have attributed to the council size.
To further investigate this issue, I first include the corresponding population
weights from the fiscal equalization law into the baseline regression (3) and
investigate whether this inclusion alters the council size effect. The fiscal
equalization law is depicted in table 2.16. Here, I can use that the thresholds
Table 2.16: Population weights in the fiscal equalization law
Current Population (Pop cur) Weight
≤5000 107
5000<Pop cur≤7500 114
7500<Pop cur≤10000 121
10000<Pop cur≤15000 124
15000<Pop cur≤20000 126
20000<Pop cur≤30000 127
30000<Pop cur≤50000 129
Pop cur>50000 130
in this law are not perfectly collinear with the council size law. There are
more thresholds than in the council size law and not at all thresholds of the
council size law, there is also a change of the population weights in the fiscal
equalization law. Second, I investigate whether the change in the salary of the
23For example, the correlation between a dummy variable indicating whether the relevant
population size has crossed the threshold 10000 and a dummy variable indicating whether the
current population size has crossed the threshold 10000, i.e., Cor(1{Pop>1000}, 1{Pop cur>1000}), is
only 0.5314 in a 5%-interval around the 10000-threshold of the relevant population size.
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manager at the 10000-threshold of the lagged population size captures some
effects that I have attributed to the council size effect. To be precise, I include a
dummy variable indicating whether the lagged population size is above 10000
into the regression. Again, I can use that the change in the salary of the manager
is not perfectly collinear with the change in the council size.
Table 2.17 shows the corresponding results. I restrict the presentation to the
case of a third-order polynomial of the relevant population size in the con-
trol function as other polynomial orders give very similar results. Column 1
presents the results obtained by including the population weights from the
fiscal equalization law into the regression. The general conclusions do not
change: The council size effect after the change in the nomination scheme is
much larger than the council size effect before the change in the nomination
scheme. Column 2 shows the results obtained by including the dummy variable
for the salary of the manager. Again, the results do not change. The point
estimates stay very similar to the ones before inclusion of the dummy variable
and the general conclusions stay the same. Moreover, the coefficients on the
population weights are never significant, while the coefficients on the salary of
the manager are sometimes significant.24 Nevertheless, the inclusion does not
change the magnitude and significance of the baseline results. Thus, I can be
confident that the effects that I have estimated are really due to the council size
effect.
2.5 Conclusion
Empirical results on the effects of government fragmentation are diverse. One
reason for this diversity might be that empirical studies are typically settled
in totally different institutional environments and that some studies even con-
flate data from different environments. In this chapter, I investigate whether a
different institutional setting can indeed change the relationship between frag-
mentation and fiscal policies. To this end, I compare the council size effect in
two different local political settings: when the head of the public administration
is elected by the voters and when he is appointed by the municipal council.
In contrast to the scarce existing empirical studies on factors that might shape
24I do not report these coefficients here due to space considerations.
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Table 2.17: Results when controlling for confounding
factors in equation (3)
(1) (2)
Log(Total Expenditures)
β
-0.0052 -0.0050
(0.0036) (0.0037)
β+ γ
-0.0076 -0.0074
(0.0042)* (0.0042)*
Log(Personnel exp.)
β
-0.0042 -0.0041
(0.0037) (0.0037)
β+ γ
-0.0092 -0.0089
(0.0050)* (0.0050)*
Log(Material spending)
β
-0.0045 -0.0028
(0.0045) (0.0046)
β+ γ
-0.0136 -0.0112
(0.0055)** (0.0055)**
Log(Capital expenditures)
β
-0.0016 0.0006
(0.0061) (0.0063)
β+ γ
-0.0092 -0.0059
(0.0104) (0.0105)
Multiplier Property Tax A
β
0.0517 -0.1517
(0.7567) (0.7647)
β+ γ
0.3652 0.0986
(0.9051) (0.8893)
Multiplier Property Tax B
β
1.0425 0.9853
(0.7341) (0.7455)
β+ γ
0.2624 0.1769
(0.7375) (0.7286)
Multiplier Business Tax
β
-0.4279 -0.5705
(0.3908) (0.3908)
β+ γ
-0.2862 -0.4923
(0.5393) (0.5297)
Degree of polynomial Third Third
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
There are 397 clusters. Column 1 includes the population
weight taken from the fiscal equalization law. Column 2 in-
cludes a dummy variable for different salary categories of the
city manager. There are 6308 observations.*Significant at the 10
percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level, ***Significant
at the 1 percent level
Elected or appointed? 86
fragmentation effects, in my setting there are two natural experiments. This
allows giving the results a causal interpretation.
I indeed find that the institutional background matters for the effect of frag-
mentation on spending: When the manager is appointed by the council, there
is no robust relationship between fragmentation and spending, while there is
a significantly negative council size effect when the manager is elected by the
voters. Moreover, the most probable explanation for these effects are agency
problems between the public administration and the municipal council as I find
significant effects for expenditure categories over which the public administra-
tion has the most discretion, but not for capital expenditures or for the three
local tax rates that the council is free to set. My results are robust to a battery
of sensitivity checks.
To conclude, the findings thus suggest that the negative effects of fragmentation
found in the recent literature do not need to be a universal phenomenon. It
seems to be the case that the sign and significance of the effects of fragmentation
depend on the underlying (local) political system and the incentives created
from it. The results therefore provide evidence against the validity of empir-
ical studies (in particular cross-country studies) in which data from different
political systems are pooled together.
Regarding fiscal policy determination in different forms of local governments,
it might be interesting in future research to further study the interplay between
the local council and the local executive. Both theoretically and empirically,
such kind of evidence is up to now almost non-existent. However, this chapter
suggests that already a simple change in the nomination scheme of the public
administration (without changing any competencies) is able to change the
policies pursued by the council. It is likely that due to the small change in
the institutional setting studied in this chapter, my results provide a lower
bound of the effects that the institutional framework has on the council size
effect. Further investigating the interplay between these local institutions might
uncover other interesting relationships. For example, in future work I consider
investigating whether a strong manager is able to curb down party politics in
the city council. Importantly, the large number of local government reforms
(such as the one used in this chapter) in the last decades in Germany allow to
give these estimates a causal interpretation.
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Chapter 3
Do government ideology and fragmentation
matter for reducing CO2-emissions? Empir-
ical evidence from OECD countries
3.1 Introduction
Given the high stakes involved, climate policy and, more specifically, the
reduction of CO2-emissions as the main cause of global warming should rank
high on the political agenda of the 21st century. Global climate change is
arguably the most important environmental problem that governments have to
solve. A particularly problematic feature that significantly impedes international
cooperation is that the reduction of CO2-emissions can be regarded as a global
common-pool problem with temporal as well as spatial dimensions (see Stavins,
2011), in which it is individually rational to free-ride, given that a sufficient
number of other countries cooperate at some point in time to avoid the worst-
case scenario. Where the impulse for countries to take a leading position in
the emission reduction process should come from, given that it is individually
irrational to do so, is thus an important question. Why do some countries
invest high efforts into CO2-emission reduction while others behave more like
free-riders? Why do some countries make the necessary adjustments earlier
while others free-ride at the expense of future generations?
A possible explanation that has received only limited attention so far is gov-
ernment ideology. Political groups might simply favor the reduction of CO2-
emissions because they prefer to do so. The emergence of Green parties in
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several Western democracies suggests that there is indeed a political market
for such preferences. For example, the German Greens have promoted strong
increases of taxes on fuels once they were for the first time part of a German
national government. On the other hand, ideology might also hinder the emis-
sion reduction process. It is interesting to observe that the United States has
never ratified the Kyoto Protocol, while Canada abandoned it in 2011. Both
countries are often argued to be politically more right-wing than most Euro-
pean democracies. Moreover, other political factors might also slow down the
reduction process. Government fragmentation might lead to less reduction of
emissions because decision costs increase with the number of decision-makers
in governments (for example, the number of parties in government), leading to
policy inertia.
So far, there is only limited evidence on the political economy of emission
reductions. Most research dealing with political economy considerations of
emission reductions studies the political economy of international negotiations
(see, e.g., DeCanio, 2009) rather than political economy forces in individual
countries. There are some noteworthy exceptions. For example, some studies
(see Ba¨ttig and Bernauer, 2009; Policardo, 2010) examine how democracy can
affect climate policy. In a recent contribution, Fredriksson and Neumayer (2013)
argue that it is the initial stock of democratic capital rather than the current level
of democracy that affects the emission reduction process. Steves and Teytelboym
(2013) investigate how several factors like democracy, public awareness, and
strength of the carbon-intensive industry lobby influence climate policy.
In this study, I examine how political factors like government ideology and
fragmentation influenced the emission reduction process in OECD countries in
the time period 1992-2008. A few studies have considered whether government
ideology is associated with climate policy (see, e.g., King and Borchardt, 1994;
Jahn, 1998; Scruggs, 1999; Neumayer, 2003, 2004), but overall the existing
evidence is inconclusive. Econometric methods and data availability have
considerably improved in recent years, making a re-evaluation of the effects
of government ideology on climate policy particularly attractive. Moreover, I
am not aware of any study that has investigated how political fragmentation
represented by the number of parties in government influences climate policy.
Using rigorous panel data estimation methods, my findings indicate that (1)
right-wing governments are associated with reduced emissions to a smaller
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extent than center and left-wing governments, (2) emissions rise with the
number of parties in government, and (3) minority governments (compared to
majority governments) do not have a significant effect on emission reductions.
These results indicate that, first, political factors are important determinants
of the strength of the reduction efforts in OECD countries and, second, there
is an association between political factors and the emission reduction process
even in the short run. I also have investigated whether the influence of political
factors changes over time and find that political variables have become less
important in the 21st century than in the 1990s, which suggests that political
platforms have converged over time. Possible reasons could be that electoral
competition has increased over time or that the emergence of Green parties has
forced mainstream parties to adopt some of their policy positions.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
theoretical background of the political economy concepts and their possible
application to the field of climate policy, while section 3 presents the data set
and my empirical model. Section 4 presents the results and evaluates their
robustness. Finally, section 5 concludes the study.
3.2 Partisan theory and government fragmentation
The standard model of electoral competition, the median voter model (see
Downs, 1957), crucially assumes that political candidates are opportunistic
and thus only care about holding office. Under this assumption, electoral
competition leads policies to converge to the position of the median-voter, and
the conclusion would therefore be that partisan differences have no effect on
emissions. However, an important part of the existing literature on partisan
differences assumes that policy outcomes directly motivate political candidates.
For example, politicians could be intrinsically motivated by concerns for en-
vironmental quality and the fate of future generations. A growing body of
literature has examined how personal characteristics of politicians shape policy
outcomes (see, e.g., Moessinger, 2014). Whether politicians can make binding
commitments to policies announced before an election is an issue when they
have ideological preferences over outcomes. If this is not possible, political
candidates may choose divergent policies (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000).
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Ideological differences between politicians directly lead to the partisan theory.
Burke (1770) describes a party as “a body of men united, for promoting by
their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle in
which they all are agreed.” Thus, parties are a collection of politicians with
similar ideological preferences, and policy can at least partly be shaped by these
partisan preferences because of the possibility of divergent political platforms.
Accordingly, the classical partisan theory (Hibbs, 1977) as well as the rational
expectations (Alesina, 1987) partisan theory has been developed to predict
government interventions as the result of which party/parties forms/form
the government. Left-wing parties are closer to the labor base and are thus
more likely to conduct expansionary policies. Generally, while right-wing
parties are more concerned about inflation, left-wing parties focus more on
preventing unemployment. As ecological policies might threaten jobs, for
example, in heavily-polluting industry sectors, left-wing parties might not
promote emission reduction (see Neumayer, 2004). On the other hand, left-wing
governments are also known to be more in favor of government interventions.
Left-wing parties may therefore promote the restructuring of the economy in the
course of climate change to expand control and regulation in the economy (see
Buttel and Flinn, 1976). Additionally, the typical clientele of left-wing parties
is often more likely to be negatively affected by air pollution, thus providing
an additional rationale for why left-wing governments could be in favor of
ecological policies.
By contrast, right-wing governments are traditionally closer to capital owners.
On the one hand, capital owners may dislike increased taxes and adjustment
costs because of emission reduction requirements. In this case, right-wing
governments will promote less emission reduction. On the other hand, capital
owners might be successful in passing these higher costs onto the consumers
through higher prices. This might be especially true in the energy sector because
energy demand could be quite inelastic (see Espey, 1996; Belke et al., 2012).
Under the assumption that the energy consumer sector constitutes the labor
base, reducing emissions might also hit the typical clientele of left-wing parties.
Moreover, there is also the possibility that the government does not tax all
polluters at the same rate, but resorts to discriminatory taxes. In practice, it is
often observed that the household sector is taxed more than the industry sector.
Richter and Schneider (2003) show that this can be an efficient policy if labor
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supply exerts market power.
In addition, rising costs of energy and adjustment processes to change to
renewable energy sources might lead to a recession in the national economy.
This might hurt both the labor base and capital owners, the former more
than the latter to the extent that capital is more internationally mobile than
labor. Right-wing voters are more likely to be able to escape from the negative
consequences of climate change as well as from economic downturns. To
summarize, whether government ideology matters for climate policy and, if so,
which type of government tends more strongly to reduce emissions is an open
empirical question. Moreover, it is so far not clear whether emission reduction
policy can be placed on the typical left-right scale of the political spectrum.
Theoretical research also suggests that the form of government matters for policy.
The weak government hypothesis states that weaker, i.e., more fragmented,
governments tend to have larger spending and larger budget deficits. Two
theoretical foundations of the weak government hypothesis are particularly
interesting for the case of the emission reduction policy. First, Alesina and
Drazen (1991) present a “war of attrition” model that explains government
inaction as a function of the number of decision-makers in the decision-making
process. With more than one decision-maker in government, decisions are
delayed until the cost of delay becomes too high for one of the decision-makers.
This decision-maker in turn has then to bear the largest burden of the negative
effects resulting from the decision. A second and somewhat related theoretical
argument is the veto player theory proposed by Tsebelis (1995). In this theory,
each decision-maker is viewed as a veto player, and a decision would not
be possible without his agreement. Thus, decision costs increase with the
number of decision-makers, leading to more difficulties to change the status
quo. Both theories thus propose that fragmented governments have a tendency
to postpone changes in policy.
Some studies have tested whether the number of veto-players in a country
matters for environmental policy (see, e.g., Stadelmann-Steffen, 2011; Madden,
2014). However, I am not aware of any study that explicitly examines the effect
of the number of parties on climate change policies.
Obviously, from a theoretical standpoint, in the field of climate policy, more
fragmented governments are therefore likely to not lower emissions at least
Do government ideology and fragmentation matter for reducing CO2-emissions? 96
in the short run. However, the validity of the weak government hypothe-
sis, and thus the effect of the number of decision-makers in government on
CO2-emission reductions, is an open empirical question. While some earlier
studies have found the theoretically suggested effects of fragmentation on fiscal
variables (see, e.g., Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Perotti and Kontopoulos, 2002),
some recent studies (see Pettersson-Lidbom, 2012; Freier and Odendahl, 2012;
Garmann, forthcoming) find the reverse relationship, thus making the effect of
fragmentation on fiscal variables empirically ambiguous. Moreover, while the
existence of policy inertia might predict less adjustment in climate policy (and
thus lower reductions), accountability in coalition governments could be lower
if voters have more precise knowledge about who is responsible for presumably
unpopular policies under single-party than under coalition governments. This
may well lead to higher emission reductions with coalition governments.
It also makes sense to include a dummy for minority governments into the
analysis, because minority governments might differ in important ways from
majority governments. For example, minority governments have to work with
varying partners and find compromises that are then often supported by a
broad majority in parliament. Often, these policies are more pragmatic and less
ideology induced than those proposed by majority governments.
The presented theories assume that governments target policies towards certain
voters in order to increase their chances of re-election. An issue that has been
neglected so far is that these theories require voters to be informed about
the actions of the government, i.e. voters need to know the policy fields that
governments can influence and which party can be hold accountable for the
chosen policies. As already described by Downs (1957, p. 248) a government
that knows that specific voters cannot trace back the effects of policy to the
government that has chosen this policy will ignore these voters. The literature
on voter ignorance strongly suggests that the immense size and scope of
government makes it impossible for most voters to be fully informed about
government actions and their consequences (see Somin, 1998; 2006; 2010).
This is especially true for policy fields like climate policy that are not major
motivators in elections. Thus, there could not be a straightforward connection
between party orientation and policy as proposed by the theories presented
above as governments may well ignore a large part of the electorate. This would
make the effect of government ideology and fragmentation on climate policy
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even more an empirical issue.
3.3 Data and empirical strategy
3.3.1 Data
I combine CO2-emissions data obtained from Marland et al. (2008) with GDP
data from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World
Bank to calculate yearly data on CO2-emissions per unit of GDP (kg per 2005
PPP $). Thus, I use emission intensity data (see Camarero et al., 2013) in my
analysis because CO2-emissions may well change with the economic situation.1
I thereby eliminate the possibility that the true effect stems from the economic
policy of the political sector and not from climate policy, considering that the
general economic situation also depends on the influence of political factors.
I use the yearly growth rates in CO2-emissions per unit GDP as the outcome
variable. Panel unit roots strongly indicate that the growth rates are stationary
while the results for the raw series are ambiguous. The test results for the raw
series strongly depend on how the panel unit root tests are specified. Only when
no lags are included, but a deterministic time trend, are the panel unit root
tests able to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at conventional significance
levels. By contrast, the null hypothesis can always be rejected for the growth
rates, independent of the assumptions made in the panel unit root tests. Note
that these results are similar irrespective of which of the commonly used panel
unit root tests is chosen. See table 3.1 for test results obtained by using the
Im-Pesaran-Shin test (Im et al., 2003).
One might argue that it would be desirable to use more direct measures of cli-
mate policy, for example, the amount of taxes imposed on energy use. However,
this seems infeasible, as there is a strong heterogeneity in the mix of policy
instruments across countries as well as even across different sectors in one
country. As already noted above, it is not uncommon to tax the household
sector more than the industry sector. Measuring the extent of government
1One potential explanation could be the environmental Kuznets curve. However, it is also
important to note that the environmental Kuznets curve is highly contested and its general
validity not established (see Dinda, 2004; Stern, 2004).
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Table 3.1: Panel unit root tests
(a) Raw series
H0: Unit Root Deterministic Trend Lags stat. Prob.
No 0 1.411 0.921
Yes 0 -5.276 0.000
Yes 1 -1.279 0.104
Yes 2 -1.045 0.148
No 1 3.062 0.999
No 2 3.000 0.999
(b) Growth rates
H0: Unit Root Deterministic Trend Lags stat. Prob.
No 0 -10.42 0.000
Yes 0 -10.55 0.000
Yes 1 -8.22 0.000
Yes 2 -3.91 0.000
No 1 -9.53 0.000
No 2 -5.58 0.000
Notes: Results are obtained by performing the Im-Pesaran-Shin
Test. Other unit root tests give quite similar results.
interventions in the presence of multiple policy instruments and different imple-
mentations across different sectors seems difficult if not impossible. Moreover,
for example, taxes on energy are not always raised to influence behavior and
reduce emissions, but sometimes simply to generate revenues. Note that using
the climate policy indicator developed by Steves and Teytelboym (2013), and
also adopted by Fredriksson and Neumayer (2013), in my panel data analysis
is also not possible as this indicator is available only for a single cross-section.
Therefore, I use the extent to which emissions actually have been reduced as a
more easily measurable outcome variable (see Lo´pez and Palacios, 2014).
The countries included in my empirical analysis are the 20 founding members
of the OECD except Ireland. Ireland is left out because emission data are
available only since 2001. By excluding Ireland, my panel data set is nearly
balanced.2 The founding members of the OECD are characterized by good
data coverage and, even more importantly, should follow the same trajectory
of climate policy over time. By contrast, the countries that have joined the
OECD after its founding are mostly former communist states whose trajectories
2As can be seen in table 3.2, for the change in the employment shares of the secondary and
tertiary sectors, one data point is missing. Thus, in the regressions with control variables, I lose
one observation.
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of environmental policy probably differ markedly from those of other OECD
countries because of the regime change (see, e.g., Hwang, 2007; Kahn, 2003).
Thus, the countries included are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portu-
gal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. The observation period runs from 1992 to 2008.3 A question that arises
from the selection of countries in my empirical analysis is to what extent my
results can be generalized to other countries. Because of the concentration on
OECD founding members, the sample consists mostly of European countries,
of which many are members of the EU. The EU has played an important role
in enforcing international climate negotiations. Therefore, it is not guaranteed
that my results can be generalized to other highly developed countries such
as Australia or Japan. Moreover, it would also be interesting to know whether
my results could be generalized to emerging economies such as the BRICS
countries. The political systems (including the party systems) and cultures
of these countries are very dissimilar to those of the included countries. This
heterogeneity would be difficult to capture econometrically.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Deviation Min Max Obs
∆Emissions -1.964 5.2 -19.515 20.819 323
Government ideology 3.031 0.845 2 4 323
Number of parties 2.183 1.345 1 8 323
Election 0.266 0.443 0 1 323
Minority government 0.198 0.399 0 1 323
Population growth 0.676 0.463 -0.190 2.530 323
Urban population growth 1.003 0.630 -0.065 2.656 323
GDP growth 2.609 2.071 -5.697 9.363 323
Change share aged 0-14 -0.007 0.010 -0.037 0.014 323
Change share aged 15-64 0.000 0.002 -0.005 0.008 323
Electric power
consumption growth 0.017 0.033 -0.086 0.306 323
Change in openness 0.022 0.052 -0.281 0.235 323
Change in tertiary sector 0.009 0.018 -0.086 0.135 322
Change in sec. sector -0.013 0.028 -0.139 0.124 322
KP ratification 0.359 0.480 0 1 323
Data on political variables come from Woldendorp et al. (2000, 2011) as well
as from the database on political institutions (see Beck et al., 2001). Data
3The observation period was chosen so as to minimize the influence of German reunification
on the results. Growth rates of German emissions in 1991 were of course extremely high
because of the additional emissions from East Germany.
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on the control variables mentioned in the next section come from the WDI
database. In table 3.2, I provide summary statistics for the main variables used
in this study. As can be seen, the observation period shows a small tendency
towards lower emission intensity, with the mean growth rate slightly below
zero. However, some country-year pairs show remarkably large growth rates,
with the maximum slightly above 20%.
3.3.2 Empirical strategy
In this section, I explain the empirical models that I estimate - a static and a
dynamic panel data model. The static empirical model has the following form:
∆Emissionsit =∑
j
αjPoliticalVariableijt +∑
k
βk∆ ln Xikt + ηi + λt + uit (1)
where ∆Emissionsit denotes the yearly growth rate of emissions per unit GDP
in country i and year t, ηi is a country-fixed effect4 that is able to take up
time-invariant effects of not only history, climate, or topography, for example,
but also political factors such as the electoral system5 and λt is a year-fixed
effect that should take up general global trends in climate policy. uit is an error
term further discussed below.
∑
j
αjPoliticalVariableijt contains four political variables. First, as an indicator
for government ideology, I follow the related literature (see, e.g., Chang and
Berdiev, 2011; Potrafke, 2012; Klomp and de Haan, 2013) and use an index
proposed by Woldendorp et al. (2000) that places government ideology on a
left-right scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates right-wing dominance, and is
4The usage of a fixed-effects model can be motivated by a Hausman test that rejected the
null hypothesis that the fixed-effects model does not significantly differ from the random-
effects model (p-value: 0.000). In this case, the fixed-effects estimator is consistent while the
random-effects estimator is not.
5Government fragmentation is closely related to the electoral system, as proportional election
systems are typically associated with coalition governments while majoritarian election systems
often lead to single-party governments. Hence, it is important to note that the electoral systems
of the countries in the sample are almost time-invariant over the sample period (only Italy
changed the election system in the time period under investigation; my results are robust to
taking this into account by means of a dummy variable). Thus, the country-fixed effects capture
the effects of the electoral system such that it is possible to estimate the effects of fragmentation
on emissions without conflating it with the effect of the electoral system on emissions.
Do government ideology and fragmentation matter for reducing CO2-emissions? 101
given if the share of seats of governing right-wing parties in the cabinet and
in parliament is greater than 2/3. The value 2 is given if this share is between
1/3 and 2/3, while 3 is given if the share of center parties is larger than 1/2 or if
left-wing and right-wing parties form a government that is not dominated by
either side. As the index is symmetric, 4 and 5 indicate left-wing governance
analogously.6 However, in the period of investigation, the values 1 and 5 of the
index do not occur (see summary statistics in table 3.2). Thus, there have been
no forms of extreme right- or left-wing dominance.
If the coefficient on the government ideology index were negative, this would
mean that left-wing governments are associated with reduced emissions com-
pared to more right-wing governments. As the second political variable, I
include the number of parties in government in the year under consideration.
Third, I include a dummy variable that is one in election years and zero other-
wise to control for the influence of the electoral cycle on climate policy. Fourth,
I use a dummy variable that is equal to one if a minority government is in
place and zero otherwise. A minority government is in place if the governing
parties do not possess more than 50% of the seats in parliament. In case of
a minority government, however, it might obviously be problematic that gov-
ernment ideology could overlap in terms of seats in parliament. I will discuss
this problem further in the robustness section and find that my results for
government ideology still hold if all minority government observations are
excluded.
∑
k
βk∆ ln Xikt contains control variables shown in the literature as strong deter-
minants of CO2-emissions (see Friedl and Getzner, 2003: Lantz and Feng, 2006;
Halicioglu, 2009; Sharma, 2011; Camarero et al., 2013). I include the growth
rate of GDP, the growth of total population, the growth in the percentage of
urban population, the change in the share of people aged between 0 and 14
and between 15 and 64, the growth rate of energy consumption (proxied by
the electric power consumption per capita as in Sharma, 2011), the change in
trade openness (measured as the sum of exports and imports as a percentage
6If there is a change of government within a year, I code the year according to the government
that was in office for the longer period.
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of GDP) to measure the influence of globalization and the change in the em-
ployment shares of the secondary and tertiary sectors.7 Moreover, I include a
dummy variable indicating the ratification status of the Kyoto Protocol (KP)
in the country-year pair under consideration. Aichele and Felbermayr (forth-
coming) have shown that the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol has affected
CO2-emissions.8
I use standard errors proposed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998) to take serial
correlation within countries as well as cross-sectional correlation across coun-
tries into account (see Hoechle, 2007).9 Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are the
natural extension of the Newey-West standard errors (see Newey and West,
1987) to the case of cross-sectional dependence.10 The policy field of climate
change is a typical field in which one would predict cross-sectional correlation
to be very important because the behavior of all other countries is likely to
influence a single country’s behavior. Climate change mitigation is a global
public good. On the one hand, when everybody else abates emissions, there
might be a large incentive to free-ride. On the other hand, if no country re-
stricts its emissions, then there will be also no incentive to abate, because in
this case the worst-case scenario will not be avoidable. Moreover, there might
also be cross-sectional dependence through the existence of emission reduction
agreements. Accordingly, the Pesaran test (see Pesaran, 2004) rejects the null
hypothesis of cross-sectional independence at the 5%-level (p-value: 0.026).
Thus, taking into account cross-sectional dependence is important. The average
value of the off-diagonal elements in the cross-sectional correlation matrix is
0.242, which is a high value. Hoechle (2007) shows that Driscoll-Kraay standard
errors clearly outperform other types of commonly used standard errors in the
presence of cross-sectional dependence even if the time period of the panel is
relatively short.
7Note that my results are robust to the inclusion of the urban population percentage and
trade openness in level form as in Sharma (2011). Panel unit root tests give no definitive
indication of whether these variables are stationary or not.
8See also Sauquet (2014) who studies interdependence between countries in the Kyoto
ratification process.
9By contrast, Newey-West or clustered standard errors would only take serial correlation
within a country into account.
10The lag length of the MA-term in the calculation of the Discroll-Kraay standard errors is
set to 2 by means of a heuristic criterion as presented in Hoechle (2007). Hoechle (2007) notes
that this heuristic criterion often sets too short a lag length. I checked whether my results are
sensitive to choosing longer lag lengths but found that this is not the case.
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Besides the static fixed-effects model, I also estimate a dynamic panel data
model, motivated by the idea that the change in emissions might exhibit
some persistence over time, for example, because of the possibility of partial
adjustments in emission levels. The dynamic panel data model takes the
following form11:
∆Emissionsit =∑
j
αjPoliticalVariableijt +∑
k
βk∆ ln Xikt + γ∆Emissionsit−1 + ηi + λt + uit
The model contains the same political variables as well as the same control
variables as the static model specified in (1). It is well known that the common
fixed-effects estimator is biased in a dynamic panel data model with a relatively
short time dimension as in my case (T = 17). In those approaches that consider
the bias, one can distinguish between instrumental variables estimators and
estimators that directly correct for the bias. Estimators from the first group, for
example, the Arellano-Bond (1991) and the Blundell-Bond (1998) estimator, are
designed for small-T, large-N panels. Thus, these estimators are likely to be
biased in my panel with relatively small N = 19. Therefore, I use, from the
group of the estimators that directly correct for the bias, the estimator proposed
by Bruno (2005a, 2005b), which has been shown to have good properties for a
relatively small N.12
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Baseline results
Table 3.3 shows the baseline results. First, to evaluate whether my regressions
11I have checked the significance of a higher number of lags in the dependent variables using
the Arellano-Bond estimator, but the specification with only one lag proved to be optimal.
Higher lags were not significant.
12I choose the Blundell-Bond estimator as the initial estimator that has to be specified to
apply Bruno’s estimator. However, using the estimator proposed by Anderson and Hsiao
(1981) or the Arellano-Bond estimator gives the same results. Moreover, standard errors have
to be bootstrapped. I choose 1000 bootstrap repetitions. Note that the bootstrapped standard
errors are not able to account for cross-sectional dependence. However, as noted by Roodman
(2009), the problem of cross-sectional dependence in dynamic panel data models can at least be
reduced by including year-fixed effects. I am not aware of any estimator for the standard error
in dynamic panel data models that considers cross-sectional dependence.
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Table 3.3: Results from the baseline model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES FE DYN FE DYN
Government ideology -0.769∗∗∗ -0.884∗∗ -0.791∗∗∗ -0.905∗∗
(-3.325) (-2.204) (-3.148) (-2.178)
Number of parties 0.726∗ 0.667 0.527 0.469
(1.985) (1.548) (1.615) (1.039)
Minority government 0.858 0.860 0.401 0.414
(0.565) (0.632) (0.223) (0.280)
Election 0.228 0.123 0.151 0.061
(0.288) (0.192) (0.196) (0.093)
Population growth 0.024 -0.225
(0.011) (-0.074)
Urban population growth 0.509 0.751
(0.215) (0.317)
GDP growth -0.259 -0.298
(-1.577) (-1.492)
Change in share aged 0-14 -45.266 -41.001
(-1.193) (-0.669)
Change in share aged 15-64 167.405 198.379
(1.077) (0.796)
Electric power consumption 19.393 16.555growth
(1.604) (1.468)
Change in openness -0.584 -2.943
(-0.115) (-0.413)
Change in share employed -5.246 -0.201in secondary sector
(-0.498) (-0.016)
Change in share employed 16.606 15.714in tertiary sector
(1.166) (0.779)
KP ratification 1.246 1.281
(0.716) (0.740)
∆Emissionsit−1 -0.253∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗
(-4.479) (-4.237)
Observations 323 304 322 304
Number of countries 19 19 19 19
p-value F-test model 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.003
p-value F-test controls - - 0.000 0.489
Notes: Outcome variable is growth rates of emissions per unit GDP. Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors are used in columns (1) and (3). In columns (2) and (4),
bootstrapped standard errors are used. t-statistics in parentheses. ∗Significant
at the 10 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗∗∗Significant at the
1 percent level.
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can explain a part of the variation in the change of emission intensity, I have
performed F-tests for each regression testing for the joint significance of all
included variables. As can be seen, with the exception of the first model where
the p-value is 0.102, the F-tests always reject the null hypothesis that there is no
joint effect of the chosen explanatory variables. Thus, the chosen right-hand side
variables have some explanatory power for the change in emission intensity.
Column 1 presents the static fixed-effects model without control variables. Both
the index of government ideology and the number of parties in government are
significant at conventional levels. The coefficient of the government ideology
index implies that an increase of one unit in the index (i.e., going one step further
to the left of the political spectrum) yields a growth rate of emission intensity
that is 0.769% lower. By contrast, one additional party in government increases
the growth rate of emission intensity by approximately 0.726%. The election
year effect is small and insignificant. Minority governments increase growth
rates by 0.85%, but this effect is insignificant at conventional levels. Column
2 shows the results from the dynamic model without control variables. The
main conclusions from the static model carry over to the dynamic model. Most
coefficients have approximately the same size as in the static version. Again,
the results point to government ideology and fragmentation as important
political determinants of emissions, although the effect of fragmentation is
marginally insignificant. Moreover, column 2 shows that the dependent variable
indeed exhibits some persistence: the coefficient on the lagged value is highly
significant. This suggests that the emission intensity is only partially adjusted.
Column 3 shows the estimates from the static model with control variables.
Using an F-test, I first examined whether the included control variables are
jointly significant as a group. For each static model this is the case: The null
hypothesis can always be rejected at conventional significance levels. Thus, the
control variables add some explanatory power to the baseline models. For the
dynamic model, however, the control variables are not jointly significant. A
potential explanation could be that, if the control variables have a rather low
within-variation, much of their effects is captured by the lagged dependent
variable that is included.
Of the individual control variables, two seem to be the most important, though
marginally insignificant, in explaining the growth rates of emission intensity:
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First, the estimates suggest that a one-percent-higher growth rate of GDP de-
creases the growth rates of emission intensity by 0.26%. Second, emissions rise,
as expected, with the amount of electric power consumption. The insignifi-
cance of the control variables might be explained by the fact that because of
the inclusion of country-fixed effects, the coefficients of the control variables
measure the effects of changes in these variables rather than the level effects
and within-variation in some of the variables is rather low.
Importantly, the political variables in column 3 lead to the same conclusions
as in columns 1 and 2: a more left-leaning government yields significantly
lower growth rates of emission intensity while fragmentation represented by
the number of parties in government has a positive and marginally insignificant
effect. As a last baseline specification, I present the dynamic panel data model
with control variables in column 4. Again, the political variables are of a
similar magnitude as before. The control variables show that emission growth
rates significantly decline with an increase in the GDP growth rate. Taken
together, my analysis suggests that two political factors play an important role
in explaining the growth rates of emission intensity: Growth rates decrease
with a shift to the left of the political spectrum and (to a less significant extent)
increase with more parties in government.
3.4.2 Have political platforms converged? Different policy pe-
riods
Public attention given to environmental policy in general and the reduction
of CO2-emissions in particular has arguably not been constant over the years,
but has increased. The best examples for this are the Nobel Peace Prize in
2007 given to Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
as well as the massive attention that the Stern Review has gained from the
media as well as academia in 2006. Because of this increasing attention, it is
possible that the median voter in the average country in my sample has become
more informed and now gives the field of climate policy a larger weight in his
vote decision. More information about the potential consequences of climate
change might also reduce voter polarization regarding this topic. Moreover,
electoral competition might have increased over time. Green parties now play
an important role in several countries in my sample, and the threat that Green
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parties might “steal” potentially decisive votes from the traditional parties
might have forced the traditional parties to adopt some political positions of
the ecological parties. Moreover, in proportional election systems, Green parties
are sometimes important coalition partners, causing mainstream parties also
to adjust their political platforms. All of these developments might lead to
converging political platforms regarding climate policy over time. Political
platforms may have converged, as hypothesized by Laurency and Schindler
(2011), also because of international climate agreements that might limit the
maneuverability of political parties at the national level.
To test for the idea of convergence of political platforms over time, I split the
sample into the time periods 1992-1999 and 2000-2008, and investigate how
political factors have influenced the growth rates of CO2-emissions in both
sub-periods.13 If my hypothesis that climate policy has lost its polarization
across political parties is true, then I should observe that political factors have
more influence on emissions in the first time period. Table 3.4 shows the results
for the first and second time period, respectively. As can be seen, the influence
of government ideology in the first time period is approximately three times
as large as in the second time period. The influence of the number of parties
is even close to zero in the second time period. Thus, climate policy really
seems to have lost its polarization, and political platforms have converged in the
average country in my sample. However, it should be noted that there might
exist important outliers: In the United States, political platforms seem to have
diverged rather than converged over time, presumably because the US has not
reached a consensus on the reduction of CO2-emissions.
3.4.3 Robustness checks
In this section, I evaluate the robustness of the results. A first issue that needs
to be discussed is that up to now, I have assumed that climate policy can be
placed on a left-right scale of the political spectrum and that there exists a linear
relationship between reducing emissions and the index of government ideology.
The same linearity assumption has also been made for the relationship between
13I have checked whether my results are sensitive to the concrete choice of the cut-off point
between both time periods by extending and shortening the first time period by one year
(i.e., the second time period is then either shortened or lengthened by one year, respectively).
However, this does not affect my results.
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Table 3.4: Results for different time periods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES FE DYN FE DYN
(a) Time period 1992-1999
Government ideology -1.109*** -1.108 -0.870* -1.182
(-2.956) (-1.512) (-1.908) (-1.409)
Number of parties 1.324** 1.527* 1.557*** 1.572
(2.338) (1.856) (3.571) (1.631)
Minority government 1.634 1.557 2.497 2.807
(0.818) (0.581) (1.107) (0.939)
Election -0.148 -0.341 0.133 -0.149
(-0.189) (-0.353) (0.188) (-0.144)
∆Emissionsit−1 -0.335*** -0.336***
(-3.862) (-3.759)
Observations 152 133 151 133
Number of countries 19 19 19 19
Controls NO NO YES YES
(b) Time period 2000-2008
Government ideology -0.411* -0.432 -0.340 -0.268
(-1.826) (-0.681) (-1.271) (-0.402)
Number of parties -0.074 -0.390 0.137 -0.209
(-0.212) (-0.516) (0.327) (-0.267)
Minority government -6.140*** -6.313** -6.671*** -6.659**
(-4.157) (-2.228) (-4.705) (-2.230)
Election 0.867 0.885 0.744 0.656
(0.780) (1.068) (0.661) (0.763)
∆Emissionsit−1 -0.182** -0.220**
(-2.014) (-2.497)
Observations 171 152 171 152
Number of countries 19 19 19 19
Controls NO NO YES YES
Notes: Outcome variable is growth rates of emissions per unit GDP.
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are used in columns (1) and (3). In
columns (2) and (4), bootstrapped standard errors are used. t-statistics
in parentheses. Columns 3 and 4 contain the same control vari-
ables as columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 (coefficients are not shown here).
∗Significant at the 10 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level,
∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
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the number of parties and the change in emissions. To relax these assumptions,
I change the baseline specification by including dummy variables for whether
the government ideology index takes the value 3 or 4 (note again that the values
1 and 5 do not appear in my estimation period, while 2 serves as the reference
category). Analogously, I employ dummy variables to differentiate between the
categories “2 or 3 parties in government” and “4 or more parties in government”
(the case of only one party in government serves as the reference category).
As can be seen from table 3.5, center and left-wing governments are associated
with reduced emissions to a larger extent than right-wing governments, but,
surprisingly, center governments are associated with reduced emissions to a
larger extent than left-wing governments. Thus, climate policy can obviously
not be placed on the typical left-right scale of the political spectrum (as would,
for example, be the case for redistribution and tax rates). Moreover, table 3.5
shows that a government with 2 or 3 parties in a coalition has the same degree of
association with the growth rates of emissions as a government with 4 or more
parties. Both kinds of governments have higher growth rates than a single-party
government. Thus, the decisive factor when it comes to fragmentation does not
seem to be the quantitative aspect, i.e., the number of parties in government,
but rather the qualitative aspect, i.e., whether the country has a single-party
or coalition government. As this less restrictive specification seems to be more
appropriate than the baseline specification, the following robustness checks are
performed on the less restrictive specification.14
A second issue that needs to be discussed is the timing of the effects. It is natural
to believe that the emission reduction process is subject to several technological
constraints that might not be changeable in the short run. Thus, the climate
policy of the political sector might only pay off with some time lag. To consider
this possibility, I have estimated a distributed lag model. Specifically, I have
included, in addition to the year t effect, the year t− 1 and year t− 2 effects
of the political factors. However, only the year t− 1 effect of “2 or 3 parties
in government” has also been significant. Thus, there might be some small
evidence for lagged responses. However, taking the lagged responses into
account, the results show that including lags changes little the overall pattern
of the effects of the political variables. Surely, a problem is that due to the
rather small number of observations, a distributed lag model is estimated quite
14However, the results of robustness checks for the baseline models are similar.
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Table 3.5: Specification Check
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES FE DYN FE DYN
Center government -1.719∗∗∗ -1.976∗∗ -3.146∗∗∗ -3.588∗∗∗
(-3.472) (-1.982) (-3.089) (-3.046)
Left-wing government -1.197∗∗ -1.441∗ -1.476∗∗∗ -1.754∗∗
(-2.692) (-1.722) (-3.114) (-1.999)
2 or 3 parties 2.820 2.653 1.321 1.048
(1.624) (1.643) (0.590) (0.589)
4 or more parties 3.146* 2.994 2.630* 2.503
(2.097) (1.430) (1.875) (1.125)
Minority government 1.101 1.069 0.659 0.670
(0.641) (0.768) (0.348) (0.449)
Election 0.211 0.108 0.142 0.051
(0.277) (0.169) (0.185) (0.078)
Population growth 0.407 0.206
(0.184) (0.068)
Urban population growth 0.638 0.926
(0.275) (0.389)
GDP growth -0.287 -0.335∗
(-1.628) (-1.664)
Change in share aged 0-14 -6.959 1.574
(-0.166) (0.025)
Change in share aged 15-64 370.628∗ 428.708
(1.822) (1.635)
Electric power consumption 21.809∗ 19.284∗growth
(1.814) (1.706)
Change in openness -1.963 -4.483
(-0.466) (-0.623)
Change in share employed -3.946 1.310in secondary sector
(-0.395) (0.105)
Change in share employed 18.515 17.843in tertiary sector
(1.318) (0.879)
Kyoto 2.083 2.335
(0.953) (1.271)
∆Emissionsit−1 -0.252∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗
(-4.435) (-4.374)
Observations 323 304 322 304
Number of countries 19 19 19 19
p-value F test model 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value F test controls - - 0.000 0.220
Notes: Outcome variable is growth rates of emissions per unit GDP. Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors are used in columns (1) and (3). In columns (2) and (4),
bootstrapped standard errors are used. t-statistics in parentheses.∗Significant
at the 10 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗∗∗Significant at the
1 percent level.
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imprecisely. Therefore, future research on this issue might be important. To
summarize, political factors such as government ideology and fragmentation
seem to have a short-run association with the development of emissions.
A shortcoming of the proposed government ideology index could exist because
of the presence of minority governments in the sample. For example, assume
that a center-right government is in office. In the case of a minority government,
this governing coalition has no majority in parliament, and it could even be
the case that an opposing left-wing party has a larger seat share in parliament.
Nonetheless, because the center-right minority government is likely to fill
most of the cabinet seats, under the assumption that the governing right-wing
party has more than 1/3 of the seats in parliament and cabinet the government
ideology index would assume the value 2. However, the opposing left-wing
party might have more power in parliament than the governing coalition. It
is thus questionable whether political power is adequately captured in the
presence of minority governments. To rule out that my results are driven by
the presence of minority governments, I also have run all regressions excluding
all minority government observations. However, the results for government
ideology did not differ.
My results could be dependent on idiosyncratic circumstances in single coun-
tries. To rule this out, I test whether the point estimates are sensitive to
excluding single countries from the estimation sample. For government ide-
ology, the point estimates are slightly sensitive when I exclude Luxembourg
from the sample. However, the point estimates remain at a quantitatively large
magnitude: in the full specificaiton, center as well as left-wing governments are
associated with more emissions abatement than right-wing governments, to the
extent of approximately 1.6% and 1%, respectively, even when Luxembourg is
excluded. For the number of parties, the point estimates are slightly sensitive
when I exclude France or Iceland (for the effects of 2 or 3 parties) and Sweden
(for 4 and more parties in government). The effect of an exclusion of these
countries on the results concerning the number of parties is not surprising as
these countries have the largest within-variation in the number of parties in
my sample. However, even when one of these countries is excluded, the point
estimates are still of an economically relevant magnitude.
The change in emission intensity shows a considerable variation. For example,
the maximum growth rate of emissions is more than four standard deviations
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away from the mean of the growth rates. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate
how the results would change if these large fluctuations were removed. In non-
reported robustness checks, I have re-run the regressions in tables 3.3 and 3.5
using only those changes in emission intensity within two standard deviations
from the mean. The government ideology index stays significant and has the
same size as before. Thus, conclusions regarding government ideology do not
change. However, the effect of the number of parties is sensitive to excluding
outliers. For the specification used in table 3.3, the coefficient declines in size
and is insignificant. For the less restrictive specification of table 3.5, only the
effect of “4 or more parties in government” is significant. This suggests a need
for caution regarding the effects of the number of parties on emissions.
Reverse causality and omitted variable bias are natural concerns in any panel
data study such as this. However, while I have no valid instrumental variable for
the political variables under consideration to rule out such concerns completely,
I think that reverse causality is only of minor importance in my setting. Reverse
causality would be a problem if the amount of emissions influences which
parties are elected. Although the field of climate policy has undoubtedly gained
more attention in the last years, climate policy is not likely to have been a
significant issue in the electoral campaigns in most countries of my sample.
Thus, governments are also unlikely to have been turned out of office because
of the climate policy they pursue. For example, List and Sturm (2006) call
environmental policy a “secondary policy issue”. Surely, policy areas like
spending on social affairs or foreign policy still have greater importance in the
eyes of the voters. Additionally, as discussed above, ignorance of the voters
makes reverse causality unlikely because for reverse causality to be an issue it
would be necessary that a large part of the electorate is well informed about the
field of climate policy. Moreover, I am not aware of any anecdotal evidence (at
least in the time period under consideration) where climate policy has decided
the national election of a country in my sample.
Omitted variable bias could be a more relevant concern. Since I include country-
fixed effects, time-invariant factors cannot influence the results. However,
emissions could likely be influenced by a multitude of time-varying factors
that are not always measurable or for which data cannot always be obtained.
A good example is the sector composition of a country’s economy for which,
because of data limitations, I was only able to use rather crude proxies. It may
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be possible that a specific kind of government influences the speed of structural
adjustments in a country’s industry and that this in turn affects the amount of
emissions. For example, left-wing governments could be more willing to curb
down the influence of carbon-intensive industries in the economy, resulting
in lower emissions. To better proxy for the sectoral composition of a country,
in non-reported robustness checks, I have additionally included the share of
manufacturing in GDP as a control variable. However, the results were not
affected by this inclusion.
Moreover, the emission intensity depends on how electric power is generated,
and a specific government might be more inclined to promote the substitution
of natural gas for coal. In this case, lower emission intensity would in fact be
driven by substitution processes in the input factors for electric power. As a last
example, car ownership could be an important variable that might influence
the relationship between emissions and government ideology. Car owners
are more likely to be right-wing voters, whereas left-wing governments often
support alternative transport systems. As mentioned in the introduction, the
German Greens have promoted strong increases in taxes on fuels, presumably
because their own clientele tends to more strongly use public transport systems
like trains or busses. To summarize, it is not possible to establish causation
beyond doubt from the estimated regressions. Neither can causation be ruled
out entirely. The statistical influence of government ideology and fragmentation
is robust even when a number of important control variables and country-fixed
effects are included in the regressions. Since it is important to know which
political factors can influence climate policy, it should be evaluated in future
research whether the results in this study continue to hold such that there is
indeed a causal effect of political factors on the increase in CO2-emissions.
A possibility to overcome endogeneity issues in the investigation of the effects of
party differences would be to use a Regression Discontinuity analysis in which
close elections can be regarded as similar to random experiments and can thus
be used to generate exogenous variation in the party affiliations of governments
(see Lee et al., 2004; Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008; Folke, forthcoming). Regression
Discontinuity analyses have also been implemented in the environmental policy
literature (see Fredriksson et al., 2011; Folke, forthcoming). While desirable, the
usage of Regression Discontinuity methods is not possible in the present study
for at least two reasons: First, Regression Discontinuity methods require a large
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number of data points close to the thresholds that are typically not available
in cross-country studies. Second, comparable data on the margin of victory in
different electoral systems do not exist.
Nonetheless, it might be important to control for the extent of political competi-
tion in the regressions as has been done, for example, by List and Sturm (2006).
It seems plausible that a government under stiff political competition might be
more reluctant to implement potentially costly environmental policies, whereas
a government that can easily win the next election can afford to risk losing
some votes as a result of presumably unpopular policies. Because appropriate
data on the margin of victory across countries do not exist, I use the level of
electoral competitiveness measured as one minus a Herfindahl index calculated
as the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in parliament based on the
Database of Political Institutions (see Beck et al., 2001). However, the inclusion
of this variable did not change my results. Because of space considerations, I
omit the results of this robustness check here.
3.5 Conclusion
This study investigated how political factors like government ideology and
government fragmentation have influenced climate policy. Specifically, I in-
vestigated whether government ideology and government fragmentation have
contributed to the growth rates of CO2-emission intensity in OECD countries
in the time period 1992-2008. I found that both government ideology and
government fragmentation, the latter represented by the number of parties in
government, play an important role. Center governments are associated with
more emissions abatement than left-wing governments, while the latter are
associated with more emissions abatement than right-wing governments. Thus,
climate policy cannot be classified on a typical left-right scale of the political
spectrum. As for government fragmentation, I found that the qualitative aspect
(i.e., whether the government is formed by a single-party or a coalition) is
more important than the quantitative aspect (i.e., the number of parties in
government).
Moreover, the study found that political platforms have converged in recent
years. This might be due to better-informed voters or through increasing elec-
toral competition. Green parties have become more important, and mainstream
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parties might have adopted some of their positions. Furthermore, international
agreements might also have contributed to converging policy platforms over
time. As the period under consideration in this study is characterized by a
growing awareness of the importance of climate policy, a natural extension of
this study would be to investigate how political factors have contributed to the
increase in CO2-emissions in earlier time periods. It would be interesting to
know whether political factors play any role in an era with little or no awareness
about the potential consequences of rising emissions, especially with regard
to the rising emission levels in developing countries. It is also important to
study whether my results can be generalized to emerging economies such as
the BRICS countries, particularly because these countries account for a large
share of the global CO2-emissions. Additionally, an interesting extension of
this study would be to investigate to what extent political factors have influ-
enced multilateral environmental cooperation. At present, there exist more
than 1000 multilateral agreements dealing with not only climate change but
also other environmental problems. It would be interesting to observe whether
the willingness to sign these agreements depends on government ideology and
fragmentation.
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Chapter 4
Does globalization influence protectionism?
Empirical evidence from agricultural protec-
tion
4.1 Introduction
Globalization is supposed to heavily influence the parameters under which
policies are chosen. This is true in many economic sectors, and the food
sector is no exception. Already in 1997, Traill (1997) has written that the
food sector displays trends towards globalization and its consequences. For
example, he observes the tendency of agricultural production to involve more
stages, and that these stages increasingly take place in different countries. Food
manufacturers assemble ingredients which are now sourced supra-nationally.
Moreover, food trade is strongly growing and it is more often of an intra-
industry type. This also suggests that another effect of globalization on the
food sector could be a convergence in food consumption.
Globalization thus changes incentives for national policy-makers. In many
sectors, the resulting import competition might put domestic industries under
pressure, leading potentially to unemployment and income losses. In a recent
contribution, Autor et al. (2013) provide compelling evidence that increasing im-
port competition from China has indeed led to unemployment and lower wages
in the United States. According to Rodrik (2011), people will demand compen-
sation against risk that results from the exposure to international forces due to
globalization, and re-election concerned politicians might thus be incentivized
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to strengthen protectionist policies in those sectors that have a comparative dis-
advantage (see Hillman, 1982). It is a stylized fact in the food sector that there is
a negative relationship between support given to the agricultural sector and the
agricultural comparative advantage. Moreover, protection might be especially
strong in the food sector because interest groups are often well-organized. As
Anderson et al. (2013) note, import competition is thus the most articulated
argument for the restriction of food trade.
For the field of food policy, there are additional motivations for protectionist
policies than just to insulate domestic markets from import competition in the
course of globalization. An often articulated argument for agricultural support
given to domestic farmers is that it should ensure a high food quality. It is
interesting to observe that the average export ratios of developing countries
for milk and meat - two agricultural products that arguably are most subject
to quality concerns - have only minimally increased over the last 50 years and
are still on a relatively low level (see von Braun and Dı´az-Bonilla, 2008). Von
Braun and Dı´az-Bonilla (2008) note that this is due to trade protection as well
as sanitary measures which make these products behave like non-tradables. A
further good example is that the European restrictions on imports of beef from
the United States were justified by politicians on the ground of health risks
from hormones given to US cattle (see Hillman, 2003).
Moreover, a motivation for domestic food market support could be to avoid
importing of food price spikes and volatility from international markets (see
Gilbert and Morgan, 2010).1 Food price spikes and volatility could be seen
as especially problematic in developing countries in which food is a major
consumption item and thus expenditures on food often comprise a large amount
of the citizen’s budget. Tadesse et al. (2014) show that increased market
linkages can contribute to higher food price volatility. Market integration via
globalization could enforce the transmission of world prices to local markets.
In this case, politicians might want to insulate domestic markets to prevent this
transmission.2
As a last example for a potential motivation of increasing domestic food market
1On the other hand, if price volatility does not originate from the international, but from the
domestic market (for example because of region-specific weather shocks), international trade
could be a powerful engine to reduce price volatility (see FAO et al., 2011).
2It should be noted that if a sufficient number of countries act in this way, such a policy may
exacerbate volatility in the residual world market (see Gilbert and Morgan, 2010).
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support in the course of globalization, especially in developed countries it is
often argued that agricultural support should allow to sustain traditional rural
life and to avoid too extreme depopulation of the hinterland (see Bagwell and
Staiger, 2001). To the extent to which globalization reinforces urbanization
tendencies, policy-makers might also be motivated to support agriculture in
the course of globalization to counteract such developments.
However, there are also theoretical arguments for less protection of the domestic
food market in the course of globalization. The neo-classical literature shows
that free trade can be globally efficient (see, e.g., Krugman et al., 2012). Moreover,
agricultural support is often argued to be implemented because it secures a
country’s self-sufficiency and thus a stable national food supply. Globalization,
however, might lower the necessity of self-sufficiency. Self-sufficiency has been
mainly important in times in which countries were dependent on a few major
trading routes and/or trading partners. In times of globalization characterized
by improved transport possibilities, it seems hard to defend this argument.
Transportation that is now to a significant degree realized via air clearly reduces
the dependence on single trading routes or partners. Because there exist
both arguments for more and less agricultural protection in the course of
globalization, the effect of globalization on the protection of domestic food
markets is an open empirical question.
In this article, I examine the effect of globalization on agricultural protection
empirically. Although globalization is heavily studied (see, e.g., Nissanke and
Thorbecke, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008; Arribas et al., 2009; Bergh and Nilsson,
2010)3, this is the first paper that investigates whether globalization, which
is a process that has also been reinforced by less trade restrictions (but also
by technological improvements), does on the other hand again lead to more
protection.4
The focus on food policy can be motivated by several considerations. First, as
already mentioned above, the agricultural sector is influenced by the process
of globalization. Second, a new data set compiled by the World Bank (see
3See Potrafke (forthcoming) for a recent survey of the literature.
4Aidt and Gassebner (2010) investigate the effect of autocracy on trade flows. In some
specifications, they also include the KOF-index of globalization. However, in contrast to my
paper, they are interested in explaining realized trade flows rather than trade restrictions set up
by the government such as for example agricultural support. Moreover, also in contrast to my
paper, they do not deal with the potential endogeneity of globalization.
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Anderson and Valenzuela, 2008; Anderson and Nelgen, 2013) allows a very
accurate measurement of agricultural protection that moreover is available for a
wide range of countries and years. Third, agricultural policy is a very important
policy field. Approximately 75% of the world’s poorest people depend at least
indirectly on agriculture as their main source of income (World Bank, 2007).
The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union accounts for more
than 40% of its budget. The political importance of agricultural policy can
also be gauged by the fact that the Doha round could until now not come
to a definitive agreement because the participants resisted to liberalize the
agricultural market. Fourth, the agricultural sector is subject to heavy-handed
government interventions not only in single regions, but throughout the world.
Not only high-income, but also developing countries have an incentive to
insulate their domestic food markets in the course of globalization due to
agricultural overproduction and export dumping of the developed countries
(see Watkins, 2008).5 Despite significant market-opening reforms in several
sectors, strong anti-trade policies in the agricultural sector persist. Olper and
Raimondi (2013) thus call the agricultural sector “an ideal case for studying the
political economy of public policies”.
To study the effects of globalization on agricultural protection, I use a large cross-
country data set and the KOF-index as a proxy for globalization. The KOF-index
is widely employed in empirical studies because it has the advantage of taking
all possible dimensions of globalization into account. I will estimate a system
GMM model that does not only allow for persistence in agricultural support
over time, but also holds the promise that it is - if well specified - able to generate
internal instruments for globalization that can help to overcome identification
issues in the form of endogeneity and measurement error even when external
time-varying instruments are not available. As it is reasonable to believe that
not only globalization influences trade restrictions as for example domestic food
market protection, but that also trade restrictions can influence the globalization
process, endogeneity is an important issue that must be addressed.6 I find
that globalization significantly increases agricultural protection. Considering
5Historically, developing countries have taxed rather than subsidized agriculture. However,
since the beginning of the 1990s, many developing countries have begun to subsidize the
agricultural sector (see Anderson et al., 2013).
6As Potrafke (forthcoming) writes, the problem of endogeneity was so far not taken too
seriously in the existing globalization literature. This might explain why credible external
instrumental variables that vary in the time dimension do not exist so far.
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different aspects of globalization, my results show that not only economic
globalization, but that also political and social globalization increase agricultural
support.
My results are not only important for the specific area of domestic industry
protection, but might also shed light on the effects of globalization on other
institutions. For example, the theoretical literature has argued that due to grow-
ing international competition, globalization should lead to more deregulated
labor markets, causing deterioration in the working conditions of unskilled
workers (see, e.g., Wood, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002; Heine and Thakur, 2011). However,
the empirical evidence is far from supportive for this argument (see, e.g., Algan
and Cahuc, 2006; Fischer and Somogyi, 2009; Potrafke, 2013). An explanation
for this discrepancy would be that governments do not have to deregulate labor
markets in the course of globalization because they increasingly tend to insulate
their domestic markets.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In section 2, I discuss
the KOF-index of globalization and the data set on agricultural protection. In
section 3, I present my empirical strategy, while in section 4, the results are
presented. Finally, section 5 concludes the study.
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Agricultural protection
To measure agricultural protection, I use a new database that has recently been
developed by the World Bank (see Anderson and Valenzuela, 2008; Anderson
and Nelgen, 2013). It contains annual data on agricultural price distortions
for 82 countries over an average number of 45 years per country. This data
set thus provides information on agricultural support for a larger number
of countries and years than any other existing data set (see Anderson et al.,
2013). My main outcome variable is the Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA)
which is computed as the percentage by which government policies have
raised (or lowered) gross returns to farmers compared to the case in which
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governments have not intervened.7 If governments have raised gross returns,
i.e. if agricultural production was subsidized, then NRA > 0, while NRA < 0
if governments have effectively taxed agriculture. Compared to other possible
measures of agricultural protection, as for example score indices as used in
Giuliano et al. (2013), the outcome variables used in this article directly measure
the policy outcomes of interest, and are therefore less subject to measurement
errors and subjective judgments (see Olper and Raimondi, 2013).
In the robustness checks, I will also use the Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA)
in which the NRA for agricultural tradables is set in relation to the NRA for
non-agricultural tradables. The RRA thus takes into account that farmers are
not only affected by prices for their own products, but also compete with
non-agricultural producers over the same mobile resources (see Anderson et al.,
2013).
A shortcoming of the NRA as the outcome variable is that the NRA focuses
on price distortions and does not include decoupled support as for example
direct payments to farmers. However, this component of agricultural support is
important given that especially developed countries have shifted their policy
instruments from price support to decoupled payments in recent years (see
Swinnen et al., 2011; Anderson et al., 2013). To deal with this issue, in the
robustness checks I additionally have used a variant of the NRA (also available
in the dataset of Anderson and Valenzuela, 2008) that includes decoupled
support.
A further shortcoming of the employed outcome variables could be that these
aggregate indices might give no clear picture about the support of domestic
farmers if there is a large heterogeneity in the amount of support for different
types of agricultural goods (see Aksoy, 2005). Indeed, agricultural support
sometimes shows a large heterogeneity not only across countries, but also
across types of commodities within a country (see Anderson et al., 2013).
Furthermore, a problem with the aggregate indices could exist because the
weights used for aggregation could be measured with error, thus potentially
leading to an aggregation bias (see Olper and Raimondi, 2013). To attenuate
these issues, in the robustness checks I will also estimate the globalization effect
at the product type level.
7Note that I use the NRA for covered products. Results change neither quantitatively nor
qualitatively if I use the NRA that also contains noncovered products.
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4.2.2 KOF-index of globalization
Globalization is a complex process that could affect protectionism through vari-
ous channels. Globalization does not only influence the economic sphere, but
also political and social life. For example, political globalization could influence
protection through international trade agreements. Social globalization could
influence protection through an increasing concern for poverty in developing
countries, for example because of a more intense contact to foreign people
through tourism and improved communication possibilities.
While there are no studies that directly investigate the influence of globalization
on protectionism by using appropriate estimation methods and dealing with the
potential endogeneity of globalization, there are a few studies (see, e.g., Klomp
and de Haan, 2013; Olper and Raimondi, 2013) that include economic indicators
of globalization as control variables when investigating other determinants
of agricultural protection. However, given the above considerations, these
single economic indicators like trade openness are neither able to capture all
aspects of economic globalization (for example important factors such as foreign
direct investment or outsourcing are not captured) nor all possible dimensions
of overall globalization due to the multidimensional nature of globalization.
Empirical studies thus need a clear definition of what globalization is and how
different dimensions of globalization can be quantified.
The KOF-index of globalization (see Dreher, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008) is com-
monly accepted in the empirical literature to be such an attempt to capture
all relevant aspects of globalization. In its most recent version, it is annually
available for 207 countries. The KOF-index is based on 24 variables that relate to
different dimensions of globalization and are combined into three sub-indices
(social, political and economic globalization) and one overall index of global-
ization with an objective statistical method. It assigns a value from 0 to 100
indicating the level of globalization of a country. Higher values indicate more
globalization. In the year 2010, globalization has for example been high in
countries such as Ireland (91.79), the Netherlands (91.33) and Austria (89.48).
Globalization has for example been low in Sudan (36.19), Ethiopia (37.46) and
Tanzania (39.12).
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4.2.3 Estimation period and sample
I use data for all countries for which both the KOF-index of globalization and
data on agricultural protection provided by the World Bank are available. There
are 77 countries that fulfill this criterion. Table 4.1 lists the covered countries.
Table 4.1: Countries in the data set
Argentina Estonia Madagascar South Africa
Australia Ethiopia Malaysia Spain
Austria Finland Mali Sri Lanka
Bangladesh France Mexiko Sudan
Benin Germany Morocco Sweden
Brazil Ghana Mozambique Switzerland
Bulgaria Greece Netherlands Tanzania
Burkina Faso Hungary New Zealand Thailand
Cameroon Iceland Nicaragua Togo
Canada India Nigeria Turkey
Chad Indonesia Norway Uganda
Chile Ireland Pakistan Ukraine
China Israel Philippines United Kingdom
Colombia Italy Poland United States
Coˆte d’Ivoire Japan Portugal Vietnam
Czech Republic Kazakhstan Romania Zambia
Denmark Kenya Russia Zimbabwe
Dominican Republic Republic Korea Senegal
Ecuador Latvia Slovakia
Egypt Lithuania Slovenia
I use annual data for the time period 1991-2010. The start of the time period
is motivated by the fact that the fall of the Iron Curtain and the transition of
several countries from socialism to capitalism has likely led to a structural
break in agricultural support (see Rozelle and Swinnen, 2010) and trade policy
in general. It is well documented that these developments have led to more
trade liberalization (see Bru¨lhart et al., 2012). Moreover, some post-Soviet states
have become independent at the beginning of the 1990s such that the chosen
time period maximizes the potential balancedness of the panel data set. Note
that there are missing values both for the dependent variable as well as for
the explanatory variables. Thus, I will run my estimations on an unbalanced
panel data set. I will show in the robustness section, however, that my results
do not change when I focus on a balanced panel data set instead. Summary
statistics for the main variables used in this chapter can be found in table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Deviation Min Max Obs
NRA 0.193 0.495 -0.852 3.73 1482
RRA 0.153 0.505 -0.755 3.763 1317
Overall globalization 59.43 18.41 19.56 91.86 1514
Economic globalization 57.53 19.04 9.76 96.83 1514
Social globalization 49.91 24.35 7.59 91.25 1514
Political globalization 74.45 19.11 1.28 98.43 1514
GDP per capita 8416.2 10896.5 92.1 42450 1520
Population size 7.07e+07 1.89e+08 257000 1.37e+09 1506
GDP growth 3.39 4.57 -32.12 33.63 1506
Share employment in 17.63 17.86 0.3 89.3 1087agriculture
Prop. Rural population 0.435 0.217 0.066 0.887 1506
Polity2-index 5.43 5.62 -8 10 1500
Land area 1286506 2752899 20140 1.64e+07 1525
Prop. Agricultural land 43.89 19.36 2.66 85.64 1516
EU-membership 0.205 0.404 0 1 1525
Number natural disasters 6.03 9.99 0 101 1525
Conflict 0.187 0.39 0 1 1525
Notes: Land area is measured in square km.
Data sources can be found in the appendix.
4.3 Empirical strategy
Following the related literature on the determinants of agricultural support (see
Klomp and de Haan, 2013), I will estimate a dynamic panel data model. It has
the following form:
NRAit = γNRAit−1 + βGlobalizationist + αi + λt + uit (1)
where the dependent variable denotes the nominal rate of assistance to the agri-
cultural sector for country i in year t. Globalizationist denotes the s-th dimension
of globalization for country i in year t (s = {Overall, Economic, Social, Political}).
αi is a country-fixed effect that is able to take up general time-invariant country-
specific characteristics such as geography8, climate, or history, while λt is a
8For example, Bates and Block (2010) have shown that landlocked African countries have
a lower RRA and in some specifications also a lower NRA than countries with a coastborder.
These kinds of time-invariant geographic features of a country are captured by the country-
fixed effects.
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year-fixed effect that takes up global time trends in agricultural support. uit is
an error term with the usual properties.
A vector of time-varying control variables can be included into the model
in a straightforward way. In the specifications with control variables, I first
include GDP per capita to control for the level of development of a country.
Second, I include the growth rate of GDP to control for the effect of the business
cycle on agricultural support. Moreover, I include total population size, the
percentage of the rural population, membership in the EU, the number of
natural disasters in a country-year combination, the Polity2-index from the
Polity IV project to account for a country’s democratic capital (see Olper, 2001),
agricultural employment as a share of total employment (see Olper, 2007) as
well as agricultural land as a share of the total land area.9 Furthermore, I
control for the total land area and a dummy indicating whether a country was
involved in a conflict in the year under consideration.
It is well known that in a dynamic panel data model, the simple fixed-effects
estimator is biased unless the time dimension of the panel is large. This,
however, is not the case in my panel with T = 20. In a simulation study, Judson
and Owen (1999) show that the resulting bias is not negligible even if T = 30.
To account for the bias, I use the system GMM (see Arellano and Bover, 1995;
Blundell and Bond, 1998) estimator that combines moment conditions for the
model in first differences with moment conditions for the model in levels. The
system GMM estimator could be superior to the difference GMM estimator in
the present application because the dependent variable turns out to be highly
persistent. In this case, the difference GMM estimator might suffer from a weak
instruments problem, while the system GMM estimator does not (see Che et
al., 2013). However, I will show in the robustness checks that my results do not
differ when I use the difference GMM estimator instead.
9Klomp and de Haan (2013) also include a control variable indicating whether a country has
a proportional electoral system. Analogously, they include a control variable for parliamentary
systems (as compared to presidential systems). In my period of investigation, however, there
is a rather low within-variation in these variables: Only 8 countries have switched from a
parliamentary to a presidential system or vice versa. Moreover, only 9 countries have switched
from a majoritarian election system to a proportional electoral system or vice versa. In non-
reported robustness checks, I have included dummy variables for the electoral system and for
whether a country had a parliamentary or a presidential system. However, this did not affect
the results.
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I deal with potential reverse causality and omitted variable bias by treating
globalization as endogenous in my estimation approach. Thus, my estimation
approach exploits lagged values of globalization as instruments. If the system
GMM model is properly specified, it thereby holds the promise of overcom-
ing severe identification issues via the use of internal instrumental variables.
Reverse causality could be such an identification problem as it is likely that
not only does globalization influence agricultural support, but that also trade
restrictions as, for example, support given to specific sectors of an economy
influence the degree of a country’s globalization.
In my estimation approach, I employ the two-step estimator and use Wind-
meijer’s (2005) finite-sample correction of the standard errors. Windmeijer
(2005) has shown that the standard errors could else be subject to a downward
bias. Moreover, to avoid the problem of instrument proliferation, I collapse the
instruments as suggested by Roodman (2009).
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Baseline Results
Before turning to the GMM regressions, tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the results
from simple static fixed-effects specifications. In table 4.3, each dimension
of globalization has a significantly positive effect on agricultural support. In
table 4.4 in which I have included the control variables mentioned above,
the effects are smaller and insignificant. The effects of economic and political
globalization are close to being significant, while the effect of social globalization
on agricultural support is virtually zero. However, these simple fixed-effects
specifications are subject to two types of biases: First, given that agricultural
support is likely to be highly persistent as shown in many previous studies,
the omission of a lagged dependent variable leads to an omitted variable bias
because the lagged dependent variable is both correlated with agricultural
support as well as with the country-fixed effects. Second, globalization is
likely to be endogenous to agricultural support, thus motivating the use of an
instrumental variable for globalization. Both issues can be solved in a GMM
framework.
Table 4.5 presents the results from the system GMM estimator. Note first that
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Table 4.3: Static Panel Data Results without Control Variables, Fixed-
Effects Estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES NRA NRA NRA NRA
Overall globalization 0.018∗∗∗
(3.084)
Economic globalization 0.011∗∗∗
(2.670)
Social globalization 0.008∗
(1.789)
Political globalization 0.006∗∗
(2.610)
Observations 1473 1473 1473 1473
Number of clusters 77 77 77 77
Notes: All regressions include, but do not report, country- and
year-fixed effects. Robust t-statistics based on clustered stan-
dard errors in parentheses. ∗Significant at the 10 percent level,
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent
level.
the specification tests indicate that the models are well-specified: The null
hypothesis of the Hansen J test of the joint validity of the instruments cannot
be rejected. Moreover, the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation
cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels. Second-order autocor-
relation must be absent in order for the estimators to be consistent, while
first-order autocorrelation exists by design. Accordingly, the null hypothesis of
no first-order autocorrelation can be rejected. The lagged dependent variable
has a positive sign and is highly significant in every specification, indicating
that there is strong persistence in agricultural support. Thus, a dynamic panel
data model is justified, and not accounting for the lagged dependent variable
would lead to an omitted variable bias. Additionally, the number of instruments
is low and by far smaller than the number of cross-sections such that a bias due
to the problem of instrument proliferation is not likely.
As can be seen in column 1, the KOF-index of globalization is positive and
highly significant. Thus, this estimate suggests that globalization induces
policy-makers to increase agricultural protection. The numerical interpretation
of this estimate is that a one-unit increase in the KOF-index of globalization
leads to an increase in agricultural protection of 1.6%. In columns 2 to 4, I
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Table 4.4: Static Panel Data Results with Control Variables, Fixed-Effects
Estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES NRA NRA NRA NRA
Overall globalization 0.008
(1.129)
Economic globalization 0.007
(1.408)
Social globalization 0.000
(0.021)
Political globalization 0.003
(1.523)
GDP per capita -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(-4.534) (-4.805) (-5.420) (-5.068)
Population size 0.000∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗
(1.832) (1.781) (1.857) (1.885)
GDP growth 0.005∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(1.751) (2.048) (2.562) (2.221)
Share of employment in -0.004 -0.004 -0.005∗ -0.005∗agriculture
(-1.615) (-1.537) (-1.758) (-1.670)
Proportion of rural population 0.138 0.129 0.102 0.071
(0.538) (0.523) (0.401) (0.274)
Polity2-index 0.007∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(2.077) (1.764) (2.009) (2.071)
Land area -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-1.039) (-1.046) (-1.062) (-1.117)
Proportion of agricultural land -0.007∗ -0.006∗ -0.008∗∗ -0.008∗∗
(-1.778) (-1.978) (-2.103) (-2.204)
EU-membership -0.076 -0.104 -0.033 -0.044
(-1.004) (-1.248) (-0.451) (-0.567)
Number of natural disasters -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(-1.526) (-1.451) (-1.255) (-1.415)
Conflict 0.085∗ 0.076 0.092∗ 0.091∗
(1.691) (1.501) (1.915) (1.879)
Observations 1021 1021 1021 1021
Number of clusters 74 74 74 74
Notes: All regressions include, but do not report, country- and year-fixed effects.
Robust t-statistics based on clustered standard errors in parentheses. ∗Significant
at the 10 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗∗∗Significant at the 1
percent level.
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Table 4.5: Panel Data Results without Control Variables, System GMM
estimator, Globalization endogenous
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES NRA NRA NRA NRA
Overall globalization 0.016∗∗∗
(4.026)
Economic globalization 0.018∗∗∗
(3.635)
Social globalization 0.010∗∗∗
(4.025)
Political globalization 0.028∗∗∗
(4.235)
NRAit−1 0.752∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗
(12.679) (11.022) (16.793) (8.472)
Observations 1459 1459 1459 1459
Number of cross-sections 77 77 77 77
Number of instruments 41 41 41 41
AR(1) test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
AR(2) test p-value 0.252 0.303 0.241 0.139
Hansen J test p-value 0.162 0.152 0.212 0.316
Notes: All regressions include, but do not report, year-fixed effects.
Instruments are collapsed as suggested by Roodman (2009). Robust
two-step t-statistics based on Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correc-
tion in parentheses. ∗Significant at the 10 percent level, ∗∗Significant
at the 5 percent level, ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
investigate which dimension of globalization has the largest influence on agri-
cultural support. Each dimension has a highly significant effect on globalization.
Political globalization, however, has the largest effect, followed by economic
globalization.
In table 4.6, I include the control variables mentioned above. Of these, three
reach statistical significance at least at the 10%-level. First, agricultural support
increases in the share of the rural population. Second, agricultural support also
increases in the share of agricultural employment in total employment. Third,
agricultural support is lower for those countries that became member of the
EU. While the first finding is in line with existing studies, the second and third
finding stand in contrast to the recent literature. Olper (2007) finds that the
share of agricultural employment in total exployment significantly decreases
agricultural assistance. However, an explanation for the discrepancy between
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Table 4.6: Panel Data Results with Control Variables, System GMM estimator,
Globalization endogenous
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES NRA NRA NRA NRA
Overall globalization 0.049∗∗∗
(3.107)
Economic globalization 0.030∗∗
(2.556)
Social globalization 0.017∗
(1.717)
Political globalization 0.034∗∗∗
(3.227)
NRAit−1 0.642∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗ 0.771∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗
(6.086) (6.938) (13.32) (6.843)
GDP per capita -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗
(-1.336) -0.269 (-0.537) (-1.699)
Population size 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.246) (0.291) (0.234) (-1.375)
GDP growth 0.001 -0.003 0.005 0.009∗
(0.174) (-0.494) (1.462) (1.662)
Share of employment in agriculture 0.010∗ 0.004 0.006 0.001
(1.826) (1.137) (1.403) (0.233)
Proportion of rural population 0.711∗∗ 0.801∗ 0.258 0.909∗∗
(1.974) (1.918) (0.78) (1.972)
Polity2-index -0.018 -0.005 -0.006 -0-000
(-1.601) (-0.463) (-0.808) (-0.006)
Land area -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.634) (0.797) (-1.145) (-0.101)
Proportion of agricultural land -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000
(-1.157) (-0.364) (-1.478) (-0.076)
EU-Membership -0.542∗∗∗ -0.380∗∗∗ -0.201∗ 0.046
(-3.159) (-2.610) (-1.741) (0.253)
Number of natural disasters 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.004
(0.092) (0.317) (0.098) (-0.950)
Conflict 0.031 0.128 0.097 -0.077
(0.38) (1.599) (1.638) (-0.510)
Observations 1012 1012 1012 1012
Number of cross-sections 74 74 74 74
Number of instruments 52 52 52 52
AR(1) test p-value 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
AR(2) test p-value 0.404 0.211 0.224 0.217
Hansen J test p-value 0.602 0.588 0.173 0.522
Notes: All regressions include, but do not report, year-fixed effects. Instruments
are collapsed as suggested by Roodman (2009). Robust two-step t-statistics based on
Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction in parentheses. ∗Significant at the 10
percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
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the two studies might exist in the fact that Olper (2007) studies a time period in
which many developing countries (i.e. those with a high share of employment
in agriculture) have taxed rather than subsidized agriculture, while this has
changed in the more recent time period that I study (see also footnote 5).
Klomp and de Haan (2013) find that EU-membership significantly increases
support given to the agricultural sector. Note however that because of the use
of fixed-effects, the EU-membership variable is determined by those countries
in the sample that have switched from non-membership to membership in the
period of investigation. As Klomp and de Haan (2013) have used a different
time period than I do, the countries that have switched partly differ between
their paper and mine. In my period of investigation, many countries that have
switched to EU-membership clearly have lowered their agricultural support.
Prime examples for this are Austria, Finland and Romania.10 Note further that
as the coefficients of the control variables measure the effects of within-country
changes rather than level effects because of the use of a fixed-effects model, the
non-significance of some control variables might be explained by a rather low
within-variation.
The point estimates of the effect of globalization on agricultural support in the
regressions with control variables stay statistically significant and are even of
a larger magnitude than before. This might be explained through the effect
of the control variables or through the fact that the number of observations
is now smaller, since for the control variables, there are some missing values.
The bottom line from the dynamic panel data model is that globalization has
induced policy-makers to increase agricultural support, and that not only
economic globalization, but also other dimensions of globalization influence
agricultural support. Thus, only focusing on economic globalization would
have missed important insights. Importantly, the effects are obtained by treating
globalization as endogenous by means of the system GMM estimator which
generates internal instruments for globalization.
10The influence of the EU-enlargement on agricultural protection is also discussed by Ander-
son et al. (2013). They argue that the negative effect of EU-membership on agricultural protec-
tion is, beyond others, due to the facts that 1) the new EU-countries brought many poor farmers
into the EU which decreased the pressure for the EU to increase agricultural support and 2)
many of the poorer countries that became part of the EU were not part of the GATT which
caused GATT constraints for the whole EU. This, in turn, led to lower agricultural support.
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An interesting extension is to investigate to what extent these results are hetero-
geneous with regard to the income level of the included countries. To explore
whether this is case, I have built dummy variables for high, middle and low
income countries according to the classification of the World Bank, and have
run regressions in which I have included these dummies and interacted them
with the indices of globalization. The results can be found in table 4.7 (without
Table 4.7: Heterogeneity of the effects with regard to the income
level, System GMM estimator, Globalization endogenous, No control
variables included
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES NRA NRA NRA NRA
Overall global.∗High income 0.014∗∗∗
(2.595)
Overall global.∗Middle income 0.018∗∗∗
(3.17)
Overall global.∗Low income 0.022∗∗∗
(2.865)
Econ. global.∗High income 0.024∗∗∗
(3.166)
Econ. global.∗Middle income 0.024∗∗∗
(3.356)
Econ. global∗Low income 0.031∗∗
(2.536)
Social global.∗High income 0.022∗∗∗
(2.768)
Social global.∗Middle income 0.018∗∗∗
(3.069)
Social global.∗Low income 0.031∗∗∗
(3.119)
Polit. global.∗High income 0.011*
(1.695)
Polit. global.∗Middle income 0.013∗∗∗
(2.717)
Polit. global.∗Low income 0.011∗∗∗
(2.877)
NRAit−1 0.759∗∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗
(15.033) (11.937) (15.23) (13.829)
Observations 1459 1459 1459 1459
Number of cross-sections 77 77 77 77
Number of instruments 83 83 83 83
AR(1) test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test p-value 0.237 0.313 0.226 0.202
Hansen J test p-value 0.374 0.388 0.618 0.403
Notes: All regressions include, but do not report, year-fixed effects. In-
struments are collapsed as suggested by Roodman (2009). Robust two-step
t-statistics based on Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction in parenthe-
ses. ∗Significant at the 10 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level,
∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level
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control variables) and table 4.8 (control variables included). There is no clear
Table 4.8: Heterogeneity of the effects with regard to the income level,
System GMM estimator, Globalization endogenous, Control variables
included
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES NRA NRA NRA NRA
Overall global.∗High income 0.026
(0.242)
Overall global.∗Middle income 0.024
(0.208)
Overall global.∗Low income 0.027
(0.232)
Econ. global.∗High income 0.036∗∗
(2.214)
Econ. global.∗Middle income 0.026∗∗∗
(2.982)
Econ. global*Low income 0.018
(1.012)
Social global.∗High income 0.032
(1.306)
Social global.∗Middle income 0.017∗∗
(2.273)
Social global.∗Low income 0.054
(0.999)
Polit. global.∗High income 0.035∗∗
(2.019)
Polit. global.∗Middle income 0.013∗∗
(2.152)
Polit. global.∗Low income (0.002)
(-0.036)
NRAit−1 0.742 0.642∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗ 0.813∗∗∗
(0.985) (6.558) (11.359) (6.301)
Observations 1012 1012 1012 1012
Number of cross-sections 74 74 74 74
Number of instruments 77 77 77 77
AR(1) test p-value 0.328 0.001 0.001 0.003
AR(2) test p-value 0.284 0.196 0.191 0.235
Hansen J test p-value 0.141 0.239 0.216 0.39
Notes: All regressions include, but do not report, year-fixed effects. In-
struments are collapsed as suggested by Roodman (2009). Robust two-step
t-statistics based on Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction in paren-
theses. ∗Significant at the 10 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent
level, ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
pattern that the globalization effect is fundamentally different across income
groups. In most cases, the coefficients are similar for all three income groups.
If anything, there is a slight tendency that social globalization is more and
political globalization less important in low-income countries.
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4.4.2 Robustness checks
I have checked the robustness of my results in several ways. As a first robust-
ness check, I have estimated the difference GMM model (see Arellano and
Bond, 1991) instead of the system GMM model (Table 4.9).11 Compared to the
difference GMM model, the system GMM model uses an additional moment
condition that could be violated when the lagged first differenced dependent
variable is correlated with the country-fixed effects. Thus, both models have
different identification assumptions that have to be fulfilled for the coefficients
to be consistent. Moreover, the existing literature (see Che et al., 2013) has
provided evidence that results could be different depending on whether the
system or the difference GMM estimator is used. Therefore, it is important to
check the sensitivity of the results with respect to the estimation method that is
used. The difference GMM estimator confirms my results: With the difference
GMM model, the point estimates are even larger than in the case of the system
GMM model and, except for the effect of social globalization, always highly
significant. Interestingly, the effect of social globalization is now non-significant,
although the point estimate is much larger than with the system GMM estima-
tor. Thus, the standard errors have increased considerably. This indicates that
the instruments in the difference GMM model could indeed be weaker than in
the system GMM model in the present application, thus validating the choice
of the preferred estimation method.
My results could depend on the fact that my panel data set is not balanced.
To investigate whether this is the case, I have re-run my estimations without
control variables on a balanced panel data set. For this sake, I have restricted the
estimation sample to the time period 1996-2005 for which data on agricultural
support is available for all countries in the initial sample. Moreover, I have
excluded Sri Lanka from the sample because the KOF-index for Sri Lanka is
only available since 1998. However, my results do not change. If anything, the
coefficient of interest sometimes grows slightly in size (Table 4.10).
Surprisingly, GDP per capita has been insignificant in the GMM regressions
with control variables, whereas it has been found as a major determinant of
11For the difference GMM model, I only report the results for the specifications with control
variables. The specifications without control variables are in line with Table 5 which is why I
omit them here. Results are available upon request.
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Table 4.9: Panel Data Results with Control Variables, Difference GMM
estimator, Globalization endogenous
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES NRA NRA NRA NRA
Overall globalization 0.092∗∗∗
(2.900)
Economic globalization 0.061∗∗∗
(2.893)
Social globalization 0.057
(1.165)
Political globalization 0.046∗∗
(2.438)
NRAit−1 0.589∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗
(3.918) (4.136) (4.614) (6.400)
GDP per capita 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ 0.000
(0.487) (-0.280) (-1.956) (0.011)
Population size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.377) (0.459) (0.568) (1.498)
GDP growth 0.006 0.008∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(1.634) (1.895) (3.474) (2.381)
Share of employment in agriculture -0.001 -0.004 0.002 0.001
(-0.243) (-0.755) (0.421) (0.258)
Proportion of rural population 0.435 0.457 0.990 0.278
(0.773) (1.123) (1.376) (0.541)
Polity2-index 0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.009
(0.273) (-0.218) (0.362) (1.405)
Land area -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗
(-2.594) (-3.388) (-0.045) (-2.559)
Proportion of agricultural land -0.001 -0.001 -0.001∗ 0.000
(-0.386) (-0.438) (-1.827) (0.256)
EU-membership -0.192 -0.329∗ 0.062 0.058
(-1.365) (-1.751) (0.478) (0.629)
Number of natural disasters -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002
(-0.401) (-0.276) (0.481) (-0.928)
Conflict 0.077∗ -0.019 0.067∗ 0.100∗
(1.914) (-0.409) (1.815) (1.812)
Observations 904 904 904 904
Number of cross-sections 57 57 57 57
Number of instruments 49 49 49 49
AR(1) test p-value 0.007 0.001 0.016 0.007
AR(2) test p-value 0.34 0.193 0.229 0.197
Hansen J test p-value 0.313 0.418 0.204 0.331
Notes: All regressions include, but do not report, year-fixed effects. Instruments
are collapsed as suggested by Roodman (2009). Robust two-step t-statistics based on
Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction in parentheses. ∗Significant at the 10
percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
Does globalization influence protectionism? 143
Table 4.10: Panel Data Results without Control Variables, System GMM
estimator, Globalization endogenous, Balanced Panel Data Set 1996-2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES NRA NRA NRA NRA
NRAit−1 0.409∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗ 0.510∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗
(3.484) (3.889) (4.359) (3.885)
Overall globalization 0.018**
(2.227)
Economic globalization 0.020∗∗∗
(2.802)
Social globalization 0.014∗∗
(2.035)
Political globalization 0.018∗∗
(2.282)
Observations 760 760 760 760
Number of cross-sections 76 76 76 76
Number of instruments 31 31 31 31
AR(1) test p-value 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
AR(2) test p-value 0.11 0.116 0.114 0.134
Hansen J test p-value 0.076 0.042 0.136 0.166
Notes: All regressions include, but do not report, year-fixed effects.
Instruments are collapsed as suggested by Roodman (2009). Robust
two-step t-statistics based on Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correc-
tion in parentheses. ∗Significant at the 10 percent level, ∗∗Significant
at the 5 percent level, ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
agricultural support in other studies (see, e.g., Swinnen et al., 2012). I have
therefore also tried to include GDP per capita in logarithms. However, this
does neither affect the baseline results nor the fact that GDP per capita is
insignificant. Additionally, I have also included a squared term of GDP per
capita. In this case, the linear term is negatively significant, while the squared
term is positively significant, thus suggesting a U-shaped relationship between
economic development and agricultural protection. However, the globalization
effects are not affected. All dimensions of globalization still have a significant
effect on agricultural protection.
I have also employed the Relative Rate of Assistance as outcome variable. It may
well be the case that some governments do not change the NRA for agricultural
products, but might lower assistance for some non-agricultural sectors that are
less subject to import competition than agriculture. This would benefit the
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agricultural sector, but not be captured by the NRA. However, employing the
RRA as measure for agricultural protection does not change the results as can
be seen in table 4.11.12 In non-reported robustness checks, I also have used a
variant of the NRA that includes decoupled support to domestic farmers. It
might be the case that governments do not react to globalization with measures
that distort prices but instead for example increase direct payments to domestic
farmers. This would not be captured by the conventional NRA used in my
previous regressions. However, the results stay completely unchanged when
decoupled support is included in the outcome variable which is why I omit
them here.
My results could depend on idiosyncratic circumstances in single countries.
Therefore, I have checked whether my results are robust to excluding single
countries. However, no matter whether the control variables are included
or not, the coefficient of interest is always significant at conventional levels.
Thus, my results are not sensitive to excluding single countries. I have also
checked whether my results could be sensitive to outliers by excluding the most
globalized (KOF-index over 85) and the least globalized countries (KOF-index
below 40). However, the results do not change.
In non-reported specifications, I also have substituted the contemporaneous
KOF-index by lagged values of the KOF-index. Specifically, I have estimated
regressions in which I have either included the KOF-index lagged by one year
or lagged by two years. The idea is 1) that if the KOF-index is included in
lagged form the potential reverse causality problem can be further reduced and
2) that globalization could need time to manifest itself and to have an effect on
policies. However, my results stay the same when I employ lagged values of
the KOF-index.
I have also estimated more parsimonious specifications in which I have restricted
the set of control variables to those that have reached statistical significance at
least at the 10%-level in the baseline model in table 4.6. However, the results
were virtually the same which is why I omit them here.
As mentioned in the introduction, it is an established fact that there exists
a negative correlation between the agricultural comparative advantage and
12In table 4.11, I only provide the results for specifications with control variables. The results
are robust to excluding the control variables.
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Table 4.11: Panel Data Results with Control Variables, System GMM estimator,
Globalization endogenous, Relative Rate of Assistance as Outcome Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES RRA RRA RRA RRA
Overall globalization 0.051∗∗∗
(2.661)
Economic globalization 0.025∗∗∗
(3.587)
Social globalization 0.025∗∗
(2.124)
Political globalization 0.033∗
(1.798)
RRAit−1 0.553∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗
(4.034) (7.881) (9.474) (3.958)
GDP per capita -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.837) (1.551) (-0.837) (-0.730)
Population size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.064) (0.769) (0.847) (0.135)
GDP growth -0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.006
(-0.497) (-0.786) (0.722) (1.263)
Share of employment in agriculture 0.011 0.003 0.008 0.000
(1.430) (0.832) (1.322) (0.028)
Proportion of rural population 0.574 0.700∗∗ 0.307 0.578
(1.628) (2.028) (0.971) (1.212)
Polity2-index -0.017 -0.009 -0.012 0.014
(-1.448) (-1.202) (-1.178) (0.512)
Land area -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000
(-1.210) (-0.290) (-1.808) (-1.236)
Proportion of agricultural land -0.003 -0.000 -0.003 -0.000
(-0.903) (-0.081) (-1.461) (-0.055)
EU-membership -0.580∗∗∗ -0.369∗∗∗ -0.341∗∗∗ -0.249
(-3.592) (-3.491) (-2.741) (-1.524)
Number of natural disasters 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.004
(0.645) (0.522) (0.706) (-1.032)
Conflict 0.058 0.073 0.078 0.073
(0.637) (1.035) (1.186) (0.521)
Observations 942 942 942 942
Number of cross-sections 68 68 68 68
Number of instruments 52 52 52 52
AR(1) test p-value 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.012
AR(2) test p-value 0.506 0.219 0.31 0.265
Hansen J test p-value 0.747 0.603 0.18 0.645
Notes: All regressions include, but do not report, year-fixed effects. Instruments are
collapsed as suggested by Roodman (2009). Robust two-step t-statistics based on
Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction in parentheses. ∗Significant at the 10
percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
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agricultural support. So far, I have not controlled for the comparative advantage
of the agricultural sector. In non-reported robustness checks, I have proxied
for the comparative advantage first by including the net export share in total
agricultural production based on FAO data into the regression (see Swinnen
et al., 2012).13 However, the globalization effects were unchanged. Second,
I use agricultural land per capita (instead of agricultural land as a share of
the total land area) as a proxy for the comparative advantage of agriculture.
However, conclusions did not change. Only social globalization was marginally
insignificant. Results are available upon request.
An additional specification test is to compare the results for the simple fixed-
effects estimator in a dynamic panel data model (Table 4.12) and for the pooled
Table 4.12: Dynamic Panel Data Results without Control Variables, Fixed-
Effects Estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES NRA NRA NRA NRA
Overall globalization 0.003
(1.464)
Economic globalization 0.002
(1.163)
Social globalization 0.000
(0.394)
Political globalization 0.001∗
(1.828)
NRAit−1 0.701∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗
(30.258) (28.849) (31.188) (30.118)
Observations 1459 1459 1459 1459
Number of clusters 77 77 77 77
Notes: All regressions include, but do not report, country- and year-
fixed effects. Robust t-statistics based on clustered standard errors
in parentheses. ∗Significant at the 10 percent level, ∗∗Significant at
the 5 percent level, ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
OLS model (Table 4.13) with the results of the system GMM model. Unbiased
estimates for the lagged dependent variable in the system GMM model should
lie between the estimates of the lagged dependent variable in the fixed-effects
13The net export share in total agricultural production is calculated as (export value − import
value)/production value.
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Table 4.13: Pooled OLS Results without Control Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES NRA NRA NRA NRA
Overall globalization 0.000∗
(1.754)
Economic globalization 0.000
(1.181)
Social globalization 0.000∗∗
(2.034)
Political globalization 0.000
(1.251)
0.893∗∗∗ 0.895∗∗∗ 0.891∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗
NRAit−1 (60.258) (61.370) (57.722) (82.584)
Observations 1459 1459 1459 1459
Number of clusters 77 77 77 77
Notes: All regressions include, but do not report, year-fixed effects.
Robust t-statistics based on clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent
level, ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
and the pooled OLS specification. This bracketing range therefore provides a
natural specification check of the system GMM model: If the coefficients do
not lie in this range, then there would be reason to worry about the model
specification (see Bond, 2002). According to column 1 of tables 4.12 and 4.13, for
overall globalization the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable must lie
between 0.701 and 0.893. As can be seen from table 4.5, these criteria are fulfilled
such that the model seems to be well-specified. Moreover, from table 4.12 it
becomes evident that the bias of the simple fixed-effects specification compared
to the system GMM model that takes the bias into account is enormous. This
once more illustrates the importance of estimating a system GMM model.
It can also be easily seen that the coefficients of the lagged dependent vari-
able also lie in this bracketing range when the three different dimensions of
globalization are used as explanatory variables instead. The coefficients of the
lagged dependent variable also lie in this bracketing range for the specifications
with control variables. To economize on space, I have omitted the fixed-effects
and pooled OLS specification for the case when control variables are included
because the results are not different. Results are available upon request.
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As mentioned above, estimates with the aggregate indices as the outcome
variable could give an unclear picture about agricultural protection if there
were a large heterogeneity of protection across different types of agricultural
goods within a country. To investigate whether this could affect my conclusions,
I have also run some regressions on the commodity group level. Following
Olper and Raimondi (2013), I consider the following four commodity sectors:
1) Grains and Tubers, 2) Oilseeds, 3) Livestock and 4) Tropical crops.14 In the
sector-level regressions, in addition to the controls used in the baseline analysis,
I control for each product value share on total agricultural production as well
as for product fixed effects (see Olper and Raimondi, 2011).
Table 4.14 shows the results. In principle, the globalization effects are quite
Table 4.14: The globalization effect across different types of commodities
Grains and Oilseeds Livestock TropicalTubers crops
Overall globalization 0.044 0.015 0.005 0.008
(3.075)∗∗∗ (0.644) (0.381) (0.347)
Economic globalization 0.021 -0.018 0.012 0.012
(1.22) (2.175)∗∗ (1.516) (0.832)
Social globalization 0.007 -0.009 0.002 -0.012
(1.272) (1.233) (0.267) (1.219)
Political globalization 0.034 0.032 0.016 0.042
(1.899)∗ (1.300) (0.736) (1.743)∗
Observations 2894 1097 3968 1219
Controls YES YES YES YES
Method System System System SystemGMM GMM GMM GMM
Notes: All regressions include, but do not report, year-fixed effects and
control variables. Instruments are collapsed as suggested by Roodman
(2009). Robust two-step t-statistics based on Windmeijer’s (2005) finite
sample correction in parentheses. ∗Significant at the 10 percent level,
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
similar across commodity types. However, there are some exceptions. For
oilseeds, economic globalization can even have a significantly negative effect on
protection. For overall globalization, protection of grains and tubers seems to be
14For these regressions I have additionally included a third lag of the dependent variable be-
cause the specification test otherwise showed that autocorrelation was not sufficiently removed.
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most affected. As in the aggregate regressions, the effect of social globalization
is the smallest. In the disaggregated data, the coefficient is always close to zero
and can even be slightly negative. In sum, the positive effect of globalization on
protection can also be found in most regressions with commodity level data.
However, the coefficients are often very imprecisely measured as indicated by a
high standard error. Thus, aggregated data seem to be more efficient. Finally, a
note of caution is in order for the results of “Livestock” and “Tropical crops”.
While for “Grains and Tubers” and “Oilseeds” the models were always very well
specified, this was not the case for both other categories. The autocorrelation
tests performed well, but the Hansen J test rejected the null hypothesis of
instrument exogeneity suggesting a need for caution regarding the effects for
these commodity types.
A specific identification problem that should have been solved with the GMM
model is reverse causality. To assess the extent to which reverse causality is
indeed a problem in my regressions, I use a reverse regression to investigate
whether feedback effects from agricultural support to globalization exist (see
Olper et al., 2014). I estimate the following reverse regression:
Globalizationist = γGlobalizationist−1 + βNRAit−1 + αi + λt + uit (2)
If agricultural support had a significant effect on globalization, this would point
to some reverse causality problems. Table 4.15 shows the results.15 Agricultural
support is never significant no matter which dimension of globalization is used.
This indicates that reverse causality does not seem to be a major limitation of
my analysis.
Nevertheless, an important concern that remains is omitted variable bias al-
though I include country-fixed effects that are able to take up many important
time-invariant variables and a lagged dependent variable that can capture
time-varying, but slow moving explanatory variables. It is still possible that
an omitted shock affects both globalization and agricultural support, and can
thus drive the relationship between both variables. Thus, I have found a robust
association between globalization and agricultural support. While it appears
that an omitted variable must have a large effect on the estimates to explain
away the effect of globalization on agricultural support, it can, however, not
15Table 4.15 shows the results when control variables are included. Results without control
variables are similar and therefore omitted to save space.
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Table 4.15: Reverse Regressions with Control Variables, System GMM estimator,
Agricultural Support Endogenous
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Overall glob. Economic glob. Social glob. Political glob.
NRAit−1 0.070 0.771 -0.508 0.682
(0.175) (1.090) (-1.537) (0.669)
Overall globalizationit−1 0.892∗∗∗
(10.799)
Economic globalizationit−1 0.810∗∗∗
(7.858)
Social globalizationit−1 0.941∗∗∗
(13.612)
Political globalizationit−1 0.820∗∗∗
(4.880)
Observations 1012 1012 1012 1012
Number of cross-sections 74 74 74 74
Number of instruments 51 51 51 51
AR(1) test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010
AR(2) test p-value 0.787 0.236 0.358 0.973
Hansen J test p-value 0.582 0.358 0.643 0.721
Controls YES YES YES YES
Notes: All regressions include, but do not report, year-fixed effects and control variables.
Instruments are collapsed as suggested by Roodman (2009). Robust two-step t-statistics based
on Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction in parentheses. ∗Significant at the 10 percent
level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
be definitively concluded that the estimated relationship is causal. Thus, it is
clearly desirable in future research to check whether my results also hold for
alternative, external instruments.
4.5 Conclusion
This is the first paper that has empirically investigated whether globalization
affects public support given to the agricultural sector. For this sake, I have
employed the KOF-index as a proxy for globalization and data on agricultural
support recently developed by the World Bank. By contrast to most of the
existing literature on the effects of globalization, I take the potential endogeneity
of globalization into account via internal instruments generated by the system
GMM estimator.
Theoretically, the link between agricultural support and globalization is am-
biguous. There exist both arguments for an increase as well as for a decrease of
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agricultural support in the course of globalization. For example, agricultural
support could increase because of concerns for domestic import competition or
food quality. On the other hand, agricultural support could decrease because of
the efficiency of free trade as derived in the neo-classical literature.
I find that globalization significantly increases agricultural support. Not only
economic globalization, but also social and political globalization have sig-
nificant effects on agricultural support. Thus, only focusing on economic
globalization or single indicators of globalization such as trade openness would
have missed important insights. My results are robust to a battery of robustness
checks.
Nonetheless, future research should develop external instruments for globaliza-
tion and evaluate whether my results continue to hold. It is also important in
future research to discriminate between the different channels through which
globalization might affect agricultural support. Is the concern of national policy-
makers, for example, related to import competition, urbanization or potentially
decreasing food quality in the course of globalization? Besides being interesting
in its own right, knowing which specific channel is responsible for the results
presented in this chapter is also important to evaluate the welfare consequences
of my findings.
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Appendix: Data sources
Variable Source
NRA Anderson and Valenzuela (2008);Anderson and Nelgen (2013)
RRA Anderson and Valenzuela (2008);Anderson and Nelgen (2013)
Overall globalization Dreher (2006); Dreher et al. (2008)
Economic globalization Dreher (2006); Dreher et al. (2008)
Social globalization Dreher (2006); Dreher et al. (2008)
Political globalization Dreher (2006); Dreher et al. (2008)
GDP per capita Anderson and Valenzuela (2008);Anderson and Nelgen (2013)
Population size Anderson and Valenzuela (2008);Anderson and Nelgen (2013)
GDP growth
Own calculations based on
Anderson and Valenzuela (2008);
Anderson and Nelgen (2013)
Share employment in agriculture World Development Indicators
Proportion rural population
Own calculation based on
Anderson and Valenzuela (2008);
Anderson and Nelgen (2013)
Polity2-index Polity IV Project
Land area World Development Indicators
Proportion agricultural land World Development Indicators
EU-membership Own calculation
Number of natural disasters Own calculation based on EM-DAT
Conflict Own calculation based on theUCDP Conflict Encyclopedia
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Concluding Remarks
This thesis has presented four self-contained essays on the influence of institu-
tions and representation on policy. Chapter 1 and chapter 3 investigate how
representation, represented by the form of government and political ideology,
affects policies. Chapters 2 and 4 are concerned with the effects of different
institutions on policies.
Because all chapters make self-contained contributions to the literature, there
are important differences between them. For example, the chapters differ in the
kind of data they employ (national-level- versus local level-data), in the specific
kind of empirical method they use (macro-versus microeconometric approaches)
and in the policies they focus on (fiscal policies, emissions or special-interest
policies).
However, while all chapters make independent contributions, there are some
common denominators underlying the chapters of this thesis. First, they all
have an empirical focus, and use state-of-the-art empirical methods. This is
reasonable as for all chapters, theoretical predictions are ambiguous. Second, all
estimation approaches must - to a more or lesser extent - deal with a potential
endogeneity problem in the estimation approach. Third, all chapters can be
categorized into the “New Political Economy” - literature. But most importantly,
all chapters have the clear result that institutions and representation matter for
(economic) policy, thus motivating further research in this important field.
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